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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates debates and tensions in Second Wave 
Anglo-American Feminisms since the sixties. It interrogates 
claims that feminism is in crisis, and that the term 'feminism' 
itself is now semantically overburdened. Its chief purpose is to 
show that despite feminism's heterogeneity, there are central 
features of feminist politics which offer an oppositional 
identity to theorists concerned with exposing the way meanings of 
gender still shape society and academic discourse. The scope of 
this work extends from early Second Wave writings to current 
scholarly reflections on the interface between feminist and other 
critical theories. This study emphasizes that even the apparent 
'anti-theory' thrust of early writers stand testimony to an 
abiding concern with theories of knowledge, power and 
representation. Even feminism's early antagonism to 'high 
theory' could be interpreted as a challenge to the means by which 
'theory' is constructed. 
The first three chapters examine the emergence of a 'Second 
Wave' in feminist thought, and the various investments of its 
differing 'strands' in existing political and theoretical 
positions. Chapters Four and Five scrutinize what are deemed 
gaps or sites of conflict in Second Wave theory: theories of 
ideology, culture, sexuality and subjectivity. Feminism is 
arguably at its most radical and contentious where its 
methodology drifts furthest from the epistemological 
'mainstream'. Chapter Six considers recent developments in 
feminist thought 
- 
many of which emerged during the writing of 
this work 
- 
illustrating a growing chasm between academic 
feminism and political feminism. 
The conclusion engages with critical discussions of feminism's 
alleged 'identity crisis', and the means by which feminist 
agendas are put to anti-feminist uses in face of a political 
swing to the Right in Britain and the USA. It suggests that the 
worst effects of a 'backlash' might be countered by greater 
attention to feminism's recent past. This is not to advocate 
nostalgia, but to indicate that feminism can learn from its past 
and present 'mistakes'. Recent questions are not new, but ones 
which merit ever more complex solutions, for the sake of 
feminism's survival as an autonomous and challenging philosophy. 
-1- 
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INTRODUCTION 
Feminism embodies many theories rather than being a 
single discrete theory, and rather than being a 
politically coherent approach to the subordination of 
women, is a political commitment 
- 
or in some of its 
forms more an ethical commitment 
- 
to giving women their 
true value. it is not even possible to say that it is a 
commitment to equality, since some feminists have argued, 
both in the past and today, for separate spheres of 
influence, emphasizing difference and complementarity 
rather than equality. ' 
PSEAMBLE: THE PROBLEM 
The research undertaken for this thesis began in October 1985. 
At this time I had little background knowledge of feminism; my 
experiences as a student of English Literature, and later 
Critical Theory, gave the lie to the notion that feminism as a 
political stance might be acceptable, but that it lacked the 
'rigour' to qualify as scholarly work. Halfway through my 
studies for a Masters Degree, awash with theories of the Subject, 
and Michel Foucault's contention that 'Man is only a recent 
invention', 2 it occurred to me that 'woman' had yet to find her 
place in critical theory. I was interested in utopian theories, 
and determined to write an essay on feminism and utopian writing, 
with particular reference to Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Herland 
(1916); it was perhaps the worst essay I ever wrote. I lacked a 
language of feminism, or any means to express how the projection 
of alternative worlds for women, and the corresponding critique 
of current social realities was both politically engaging, and 
theoretically challenging. 
For me, it was as if feminism had lain dormant since the 
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1970s: I was sympathetic to feminist political activities, but 
the theoretical parameters within which I worked appeared to deny 
feminism any critical currency. I had read texts such as 
Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch (1971), and found ways to 
articulate the specificity of female experience of everyday life, 
as well as to contest dominant representations of femininity; but 
I could not write them into my academic work. It was a long 
ponderous process for me to realize that modern theoretical 
critiques of objectivity still did not call into question the 
grounds for male exclusivity, and that to facilitate feminism's 
admittance as theory, one had to semantically extend its 
boundaries. This being the case, all feminist writing, in its 
challenge to meaning and representation, had theoretical 
potential. 
I was initially daunted to discover the sheer volume of 
substantial academic texts which fitted loosely into my category 
of 'feminist theory', and which were multiplying by the year. 
Later I was simply astounded that such an innovative and exciting 
body of thought could have been ignored almost completely in an 
academic environment which had readily got to grips with the more 
esoteric theories of structuralism, post-structuralism and 
psychoanalytic theory. My feeling that feminism needed to be 
theoretically foregrounded, was therefore coupled with an 
awareness that feminism as discourse had proliferated; perhaps, 
after all, there could be nothing more to say about feminism. 
All research students have, at some time, to face up to the 
problem of how to narrow down their field: my problem was to 
decide on what exactly my 'field' was. Feminist literary theory 
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led me to critical/creative writings and political theory, which 
in turn drew me to psychoanalytic and social theory. Not to 
retain at least a flavour of all these approaches in my own work 
seemed impossible, since all these 'feminisms' had in part a 
symbiotic relationship. I concluded that the main strength of 
modern feminist thought was its interdisciplinarity, its 
resistance to easy categorization, and that to seriously attempt 
to re-partition fragments of feminism into subject-oriented 
pigeon-holes would be to perform an act of phallocentric 
vandalism. This, it turned out, was the least of my worries. 
All research students probably experience the sensation of 
'living' their work; as a feminist and a theorist I find myself 
doing this repeatedly 
- 
not least because interested (and 
antagonistic) people constantly demand explanations of what 
feminism is, and what actions it requires. 
What I found particularly unnerving during my initial period 
of research, was the tenor of important feminist works published 
during the mid-eighties (especially during the years 1985-87). 
The market seemed to be flooded with summaries, retrospectives 
and anthologies of pathfinding feminist essays 
- 
readers to 
enable people to 'get by' in feminism. On the face of it this 
was a gratifying discovery because it seemed to reflect a period 
of renewed interest in feminist thought by a new generation of 
readers too young, like myself, to experience the birth of 
feminism's Second Wave in the late 1960s. Yet at the same time I 
detected among these writings a note of anxiety, a sense of 
impending crisis, best illustrated by the publication of Juliet 
Mitchell's and Ann Oakley's selection of essays entitled What is 
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Feminism? (1986). The use of the present tense in the title 
could not conceal the fact that many of the contributors slipped 
uneasily into the past tense, and seemed to be implicitly asking, 
'What was Feminism? '. 
This trend for nostalgia is as common in contemporary feminist 
thought as is the trend for amnesia about the achievements of 
feminist politics in the seventies. In either case, what current 
feminists increasingly recognized was the existence of inner 
tensions that threatened to tear the Women's Movement apart. It 
became redundant or simply misguided to talk about female 
experience 
- 
or feminism 
- 
in the singular. A more positive 
breakthrough of the eighties was the realization that feminism 
had come of age; it was beginning to articulate its own position 
in relation to other academic discourse and in relation to 
mainstream political thought, in spite of the academic 
mainstream's rejection of feminism. One problem with feminism's 
new theoretical awareness has been an increasing disjunction 
between feminist theory (as an academic growth industry) and 
feminist politics 
- 
any actual development of the social 
ramifications of feminism as a body of thought (or 'bodies of 
thoughts', more properly) which is actively engaged in affirming 
the need for social change. 
Perhaps it is in the nature of academic pursuits to suffer to 
some degree from a theory/practice dichotomy. In the area of 
feminist theory attempts have been made to heal this rift by 
arguing that feminist interventions in the academic sphere are 
themselves political acts 
- 
since they expose other inequities 
within academe, such as the sparsity of female academics in 
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positions of power, and the failure to address the specific needs 
of women students. Nevertheless this form of praxis safely 
occurs within the confines of the classroom: a more pressing 
concern in face of such a marked cleavage is how to forge a more 
convincing link between academic and political feminism. To some 
extent academic forms of discourse are partially recuperated as 
'political' in the light of feminist extensions of the term. For 
critics like Toril Moi the act of producing a feminist reading of 
a text is a political act in itself: 
The radically new impact of feminist criticism is to be 
found not at the level of theory or methodology, but at 
the level of politics. Feminists have politicized 
existing critical methods and approaches. If feminist 
criticism has subverted established critical judgements 
it is because of its radically new emphasis on sexual 
politiCS. 3 
Now, at the beginning of the nineties, one needs to realize that 
Second Wave feminism has undergone a massive epistemological 
transformation. I shall later argue that feminism was never a 
site of consensus; but a symptom of latter-day feminist theory 
has been to interrogate and foreground these divisions as a 
feature of its critique, particularly in a recognition of the 
importance of theorizing about/reflecting upon the significance 
of conflicting subject-positions within feminism. 
I came to an early decision to focus upon what has been termed 
'Anglo-American' feminism, and in retrospect I think that this 
decision was both a perverse and fortunate one. Perverse, in 
that my male colleagues seemed to readily address so-called 
'French feminism', and award it at least a notional place within 
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theory, and I was more interested in theorizing about aspects of 
feminism which were regarded as stubbornly 'non-theoretical'. 
Fortunate, in the sense that my attention to Anglo-American 
theory led me to investigate much of the feminist work that is 
now casually ignored on the grounds that its work had been 
superceded, and that its lessons had been learned. My forays 
into 'confessional' feminism, led me to make critical comparisons 
which would never have occurred to me had I contented myself with 
comparing French and Anglo-American feminisms. 
English feminist politics has always shown a tendency to 
operate at one remove from mainstream parliamentary politics 
- 
perhaps rightly feminists have regarded the prospect of fully 
integrating into such a phallocentric stronghold with profound 
suspicion. American liberal feminists have more successfully 
entered mainstream politics with reformist zeal, supported by 
networks such as the National Organization for Women (N. O. W. ), 
founded in 1966. British and American feminisms share many of 
the same trends and influences, except perhaps that English 
feminism has traditionally favoured a loosely 'socialist' rather 
than liberal political position. What is exciting about 
Anglo-American feminism is the fact of its heterogeneity, because 
of the many and diverse origins from which it has drawn strength. 
The aim of this preamble has been to situate some of the 
problems I have encountered when endeavouring to gather together 
extremely diverse and contradictory material into the body of 
this thesis. It also constitutes an effort on my part to give 
what follows a clearly definable speaking voice, which required a 
brief evaluation of the way this work evolved, and indeed why it 
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evolved at all. My wish to intrude upon my work in this way is 
firstly a gesture 
-a tribute to the legacy of radical feminism 
which has championed the unorthodox and experimental in women's 
writing since the late sixties, especially encouraging a creative 
and personal approach to critical writing. The second reason is 
closely linked to the first: to deal with my subject neutrally 
and 'authoritatively' would, in one sense, seem to be a betrayal 
of my commitment to the development of feminism in academic 
institutions, in social formations, and to the radicalism of 
critical theory in general. It is also accepted practice for 
feminists to explicitly declare their particular brand of 
feminism, although this is something I find increasingly 
difficult to do. When I embarked upon this research, I was 
primarily attracted to a socialist feminist position, but have 
gradually found that some of the boundaries between feminism's 
'57 varieties' have blurred before my eyes. I have explicitly 
blurred such boundaries in the latter chapters of this thesis, in 
my attempt to seek an 'ethics' of heterogeneity, and to argue 
that even when feminism is considered to be a veritable 
battleground, its common ground is far more extensive and far 
more enriching than particular feminist links with other 
theoretical positions. Because this thesis often explores the 
common trends and gaps within modern feminist discourses, it is 
in fact essential to transgress such boundaries. Although it 
might be true to say that some of the differences in feminist 
theory and practice are irreconcilable at the present time, on 
closer inspection it is clear that the common features of the 
many strands which comprise feminism might be usefully 
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re-examined in order to seek a way out of the critical impasse 
that best characterizes feminist writings and feminist politics 
today. 4 
In order to restrict the scope of this work to some degree, I 
have found it essential to deal primarily with feminist writings 
since the late sixties. This has to some extent created an 
artificial and even debatable hiatus in feminist history, when 
some critics believe feminism did not die or wane after its 
so-called First Wave ended in the 1920s. 5 Nonetheless this 
particular landmark is widely accepted as a time of new dynamism 
in feminism (a Second Wave), and as it is also a time remembered 
as being one of academic and political crisis it serves as an 
important point of departure. The following sections of this 
introductory chapter are intended to provide a rationale for the 
developing argument within the thesis as a whole, as well as 
gesturing towards its conclusion. 
NEGOTIATING FEMINISM'S 'STRANDS' 
The first three chapters function, in part, as an extended 
critical introduction to successive chapters, and evaluate some 
of the common tendencies and distinguishing features of 
Anglo-American feminisms. The opening chapter assesses the 
impact of emergent Second Wave politics, as well as briefly 
indicating its origins, and the reasons why feminism emerged as a 
stance autonomous from other radical political positions. It 
seems to me that there have been three broad stages in the growth 
of feminist thought from the sixties to the nineties which might 
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be articulated as a movement from creativity to sophistication to 
relative stasis. 6 These 'stages' are however purely artificial 
- 
intended as a useful means of critical shorthand for the reader. 
The first chapter elucidates some of the issues that seem 
central to feminism of whatever hue 
- 
such as the critical 
appropriations of the terms 'gender' and 'patriarchy', and 
critiques of ideology and the familial institution. It will 
become clear that although feminists in general agree some basic 
principles about the factors contributing to women's oppression 
in society and culture, they have very different ideas about how 
to resolve these problems. These inner tensions in the Women's 
Movement have lately been characterized as a symptom of the 
eighties, correlative with the growth of feminism and women's 
studies into academic disciplines. Juliet Mitchell, for one, 
harks back with nostalgia to the 'heady days' of sixties protest 
when sisterhood seemed powerful.? 
Chapters Two and Three suggest that tensions were always 
simmering under the surface of feminist politics, and such 
conflicts came to a head when women of colour, lesbians and 
working-class women used feminist discourse to articulate their 
sense of exclusion from its 'mainstream'. Perhaps, therefore, an 
illusion of solidarity had been briefly created because during 
the seventies feminism remained, primarily, the province of 
highly educated, white middle-class heterosexual women. What 
seems to create the main antagonisms within feminism is the fear 
that feminism, in common with other radical societal 
perspectives, will inevitably replicate social hierarchies, 
thinly veiled by the rhetoric of universal sisterhood. The 
.1 
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increasing presence of black, lesbian and working-class women 
necessarily shifted the terms for debate 
- 
women could no longer 
be certain that they meant the same thing when discussing 
oppression in relation to their own experiences. To some extent 
the glorious slogan of radical feminism, 'the personal is 
political', had backfired. The development of an increasingly 
complex 'politics of identity' meant women found they had less 
not more in common 
-a bitterness grew which developed an odd 
hierarchy among the oppressed to discover who had the most 
'authentic' voice for the Women's Movement 
- 
in other words, who 
had also been oppressed in terms of her race, class, disability 
or sexual orientation, by her feminist sisters. Kathryn Harriss 
observes that by 1983: 
An obsession seized the movement for self-labelling and 
labelling others, not to elucidate debate but to fix a 
woman somewhere along a predetermined hierarchy of 
oppressions in order to justify or contest a political 
opinion by reference to the speaker's identity. 8 
Historically, black women had long been torn between civil 
rights and women's rights, suffering injustice and prejudice at 
the hands of both groups, just as lesbians were torn between gay 
politics and feminist sexual politics. For feminism to 
reconsolidate and survive these rifts it needs at least to adopt 
a four-pronged approach to oppression, and to again exploit all 
that was innovative and refreshing about radical feminist 
politics of the seventies - its denial of hierarchy of authority 
within its ranks, its policy of total support via a concept of a 
fundamental (if not universal) shared oppression. In face of the 
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legacy of the dominant New Right politics of the eighties (and 
its emerging pro-female front in the nineties), it is essential 
for feminists to constantly re-evaluate their critical positions 
for flaws and contradictions, to accommodate marked ideological 
and social shifts. 
At first sight these first three chapters might be construed 
as an attempt at a survey of significant positions in feminist 
thought. Several such commentaries exist, the most popular being 
Alison Jaggar's Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) and 
Rosemarie Tong's Feminist Thought (1989). I hope it will become 
apparent that these chapters are much more than summaries 
intended to provide the reader with a working knowledge of each 
strand of feminism. As I have stated earlier, my decision to 
critically evaluate Anglo-American feminism led me to reappraise 
the writings of Second Wave pioneers; and while such a 
re-evaluation led me to identify inconsistencies, it also 
convinced me of the importance of such work as a revolution in 
theoretical forms of expression. There has been a tendency among 
contemporary commentators to over-simplify the scope of early 
Second Wave work; part of my endeavour in these chapters has been 
to identify the most challenging and complex aspects of these 
texts, in order to show how they might be utilized today. 
IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, SUBJECTIVITY AND SEXUALITY 
Chapters Four and Five comprise a closer focus on theoretical 
concepts which have either previously been elided by many 
feminist critics, or have proved to be a massive stumbling block 
- 
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for them. Firstly, I shall consider the problem of ideology for 
feminism, using a post-Althusserian model which facilitates a 
concentration on the processes of State Repressive Apparatuses 
(for example, education, the law and the welfare state). Such 
apparatuses raise complex issues for feminist theory because of 
the ways in which they simultaneously protect and subordinate 
women. Women's relation to the state has always been a problem 
for feminists: liberal feminists, who have embraced the 
traditional individualist elements of liberal doctrine, have 
always striven to lessen the power of the state, whereas for 
socialist feminists the state is viewed as both ally and 
adversary, and its purview extends far beyond education and 
social services: 
Although the state is formally only interested in such 
'private' matters as sexuality only in so far as they 
affect the 'public' good, it is clear that the degree of 
state involvement in sexuality and procreation renders 
the public/private distinction untenable. 9 
In its role as supporter of the family-household system (and 
hence of heterosexuality as the desired social norm), the state 
effectively institutionalizes the subordination of women. In 
terms of healthcare and social services women may find the state 
vital for their welfare and financial support. Any cutback in 
financial and social support (as witnessed in recent years) 
drives women back into the home as chief carers in the family 
relationship. While both liberal and socialist feminists have 
taken action to review certain laws to afford women more autonomy 
through equal pay legislation, etc., as long as the state 
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represents the interests of the family, women will suffer and 
yet, in times of hardship, be sustained in its 'care'. 
Socialist feminists, for their part are only too aware that 
support of the 'family' in essence guarantees support to the male 
'breadwinner', at the expense of continued pay inequalities for 
women. Feminism as oppositional ideology(ies) has to come to 
terms with the fact that phallocentric ideologies pervade all 
parliamentary politics and Left-wing groups, and in order to 
counter the tendency for feminism to be absorbed by or become an 
adjunct to any of these, feminism needs to maintain an effective 
and autonomous theoretical framework. 
Ideology is also reinforced and perpetuated via cultural 
productions. Some of the most important early feminist texts 
(for example Mary Ellmann's Thinking About Women (1969) and Kate 
Millett's Sexual Politics (1971)) deal with the images of women 
presented in male-authored texts and demonstrate how these 
representations contribute to the stereotyping of the female sex, 
ascribing immutable qualities of femininity and reinscribing 
gender difference in a quasi-essentialist fashion. However, 
seeking out such stereotypes risks becoming a circular process. 
If we accept Ellmann's point that these stereotypes are 
fundamentally iterative and self-contradictory, what more can we 
do about them once we have pinpointed their existence? In fact 
the 'images of women' school of feminist literary criticism has 
in later years been successfully developed and expanded in 
conjunction with psychoanalytic theory by feminists working in 
the area of film/media studies, and has latterly proved 
attractive to postmodernist theorists. 
- 
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If women have been pervasively characterized as lacking or 
inferior in art and the media, they have also historically had 
their greatest success in influencing cultural history by their 
specific engagement in literary production. '° Unsurprisingly, 
feminist criticism has developed rapidly in the realms of 
literary theory/cultural studies. With greater access to a wider 
variety of cultural productions, and armed with increasingly 
sophisticated feminist tools for analysis, it would appear that 
women have an ideal opportunity to perpetuate a feminist 
ideology. Unfortunately this is only the case in a limited 
context. The dominant phallocratic ideology has proved deft at 
absorbing contradictions: feminist criticism too often becomes a 
discrete area of study, and by being accorded a marginal 'special 
interest' status, its potential ideological impact is effectively 
defused. 
Chapter Five focuses on the problem of constructing an 
effective theory of female sexuality which is able to broach the 
already sexualized image of women that has been perpetuated 
during the post-industrial capitalist era. Psychoanalysis has 
been appropriated by feminists to account for the differing 
experiences of subjectivity encountered by men and women from 
childhood to adulthood. Freud, variously interpreted by 
feminists as a founding father or the enemy incarnate, is an 
important landmark in the analysis of the sexual identity of the 
individual and the power of the unconscious. As Michel Foucault 
points out in his first volume of The History of Sexuality 
(1976), the analysis of sexuality as being somehow the core of 
the individual's being led to the hystericization and 
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medicalization of the female body. Women's sexuality has long 
been viewed in Western society as a dangerous phenomenon in need 
of strict control 
- 
as has the sexuality of children. Female 
sexuality is of social and political consequence in a capitalist 
social organization which feeds off the family structure it 
zealously protects. In such a social organization it is 
therefore vital to control women's fertility, as well as to 
maintain the discrete moral power of the nuclear family system, 
to ensure legitimacy of future heirs to capital. 
Correlative with the birth of the Second Wave in Western 
Culture was the emergence of the so-called 'permissive society' 
of the sixties; and the radical left espoused a new era of sexual 
freedom for women (heterosexual men have always been 'free' in 
practice if not in theory). In order to live the utopia of 
choice and freedom in sexual matters, feminists had to canvas the 
state for free contraception and abortion on demand: in effect 
nothing ever came 'free' to women. In any case, in the sphere of 
heterosexual relationships this liberation was prematurely 
truncated, since within (hetero)sexual politics, gender roles had 
not undergone any significant transformation - women were still 
objects of desire for the male gaze - and as objects there were 
certain 'feminine' standards of sexuality to live up to. The 
early eighties heralded a period of sexual trauma, with the 
growing threat posed by AIDS 
- 
and men and women on the periphery 
of acceptable sexual behaviour (for example gay men and 
prostitutes) 
- 
became the first target of public censure. In 
periods of moral terror in any culture it seems that women and 
sexual and racial minorities will bear the brunt of social 
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castigation. 
In order to comprehensively address the problems of ideology 
and sexuality it is necessary to approach the subject via a 
consideration of the wider mechanisms of power and domination. 
Although conducted to a large extent in a gender-blind context, 
Foucault's methodological framework usefully provides a point of 
departure through which to negotiate an exit from the cul-de-sac 
of oppositional discourse which Foucault, at times, rather 
pessimistically elucidates. Foucault separates the two elements 
of power (as an abstract fluid force) and domination (as the 
concrete privilege of those in power) to construct a model of the 
process of power that resembles a pyramidal formation. He argues 
that the state, through ideology and the acquisition of knowledge 
(about sexuality, criminality, insanity, etc. ), is better 
equipped to police its members, as well as enrolling some at 
every level of the social hierarchy to act as ideological/moral 
'police' (psychoanalysts, gaolers, parents, teachers) at both a 
'national' and localized level. 
If we hold with Foucault that an epistemic discursive 
formation dictates the conditions of existence of any utterance 
at any given time and that therefore feminism (like Marxism) is a 
'fish in water', 11 the possibility of effective oppositional 
discourse seems remote, in that power is viewed as functioning 
semi-autonomously from those in the dominant position in a social 
formation. However, Foucault's analysis of oppositional 
discourse in Power/Knowledge (1980), inconclusive as it is, can 
be evaluated in relation to radical and later New Right politics 
in order to attempt to construct an oppositional discourse which 
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refuses to replicate existing power models. Feminism, in its 
refusal to engage in hierarchical power roles, or to put forward 
particular spokespeople, seems to be heading in the right 
direction 
- 
though it is doubtful that a 'revolution in 
consciousness' will ever be realized without limited intervention 
in either party politics or the mass media. 
RETHINKING FEMINISM 
The sixth chapter appraises the future of oppositional discourse 
as a projected feminist utopia, which has to always bear in mind 
its origin in politics. Since this chapter delves deeper into 
theoretical speculation it effectively comprises the 
'superstructure' of the thesis; but it also attempts to pull 
together the issues raised by the foregoing chapters. In this 
chapter I primarily evaluate theoretical developments which have 
emerged in tandem with this thesis. It is a perennial problem 
that any long-term piece of research risks being superceded 
before it is fully realized, and it is quite possible that had I 
begun my explorations some years later, my own work would have 
acquired a quite different shape. However, as my own 
investigations continued it seemed more appropriate to stand by 
my original intentions and to use feminism's recent past to 
reflect upon its present rather than the reverse. 
In recent years many feminists have detected what might be 
regarded as a crisis in feminism 
- 
while theory goes on in leaps 
and bounds, praxis becomes a greater problem. In common with 
parliamentary opposition parties, the Women's Movement has as yet 
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been unequal to tackling the subtleties of New Right policies and 
ideology, which pose a significant threat to the left-wing and 
arguably an even stronger one to women's rights. It is not 
altogether surprising that feminists are beginning to more 
frequently reflect on their past rather than their future, in the 
wake of a sinister 'new sexism' and 'new racism' which thrive 
under the rhetoric of cultural and sexual equality. Women and 
ethnic groups are again encouraged to celebrate their differences 
and remain a manageable marginalized faction. 
Perhaps feminism as it appears today holds the most ironic and 
dualistic of positions. In theory (literally) feminism is 
becoming a widespread and respectable academic process 
(especially in the fields of English and Cultural Studies). I 
shall select the publication of Men in Feminism (1987)12 as one 
recent landmark which concretizes some of the rumblings in the 
Establishment that had been rising to a head, at least since the 
publication of Elaine Showalter's article 'Critical 
Cross-Dressing; Male Feminists and the Woman of the Year'13 in 
1983. This article summarizes some of the doubts many feminists 
express in Men in Feminism about the critical intervention of 
'male feminists' on the scene, sensing perhaps that women, during 
this period of crisis, need to resolve a few more of their own 
critical differences before calling in male reinforcements. I 
share this unease; that despite the well-intentioned, 
ideologically sound offerings from Paul Smith, Stephen Heath and 
others in this publication, direct involvement by men in feminist 
theory can be politically and academically dangerous. As Elaine 
Showalter observes: 
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Feminist criticism has worried too much already, in my 
opinion, about communicating with the white fathers, even 
at the price of translating its findings into the warp of 
their obscure critical languages. If some of them are 
now learning gur language, all the better; but there is 
more than a hint in some recent critical writing that 
it's time for men to step in and show the girls how to do 
it. 14 
In common with Showalter, I remain disturbed by the prospect of a 
substantial intervention in feminism by men, and shall further 
elucidate my reasons in Chapter Six. 
Suffice to say for the present that several years after the 
publication of Feminist Literary Studies (1984), 1 am still 
reeling from some of the assertions made by its author, K. K. 
Ruthven. Firstly, he rapidly dispenses with all questions of the 
political impact of feminist criticism by describing it as 'just 
one more way of talking about books'; 15 and then sporadically 
throughout the book he vents his spleen on feminist 'terrorists' 
who would perhaps receive his work with trepidation, by a series 
of cheap shots that seem designed to reinforce current 
stereotypes of feminism: 
Even in its milder forms, feminist discourse strikes men 
as being accusatory, as it is meant to do; and in its 
most uncompromising manifestations it is unrelentingly 
intimidatory. 
Feminist terrorism is the mirror image of machismo. 
Unregenerately separatist 
- 
men are the problem, so how 
could they possibly be part of the solution? - it offers 
the vicarious satisfactions of retaliation and reprisal 
in a war of the sexes for which the only acceptable end 
is unconditional surrender of all power to women. 
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Terrorism polarises the sexes in such a way that men must 
either ignore feminism or attack it... 16 
Ruthven continually undercuts his professed reasonable and 
moderate aims in engaging in feminist debate and indulges in the 
verbal aggression of a veritable storm-trooper. While I do not 
wish to tar Heath, Smith, et al. with the same brush, Ruthven's 
brand of male-oriented discourse thinly disguised as 
'pro-feminist' is capable of doing more damage than it is of 
procuring support for the Women's Movement. The authority that a 
male voice immediately acquires over the female in academic 
discourse is a related problem that is perhaps too huge and 
pervasive for even the most gender-conscious of males. 
Politically and in the wider public sphere, feminism seems to 
have died an untimely death 
- 
if media pronouncements of the 
'post-feminist' age are to be believed. The Old Guard of 
feminist pioneers are exhumed to support this view 
- 
such as 
Germaine Greer, latter-day doyenne of the chat shows 
- 
who 
gracefully do their bit to kill the cause they once championed. 
These speakers for womankind are a striking reminder of the New 
Right transition of 1980s Europe and the USA. Feminists in 
academia need to turn to this confusing and contradictory blaze 
of signifiers which pepper the media and constantly remind us 
that we still have our work cut out if a feminist revolution in 
consciousness is not to be diverted into a series of pyrrhic 
victories 
- 
such as getting women's studies courses on the 
critical agenda 
- 
no matter how important these individual gains 
are. 
We are seduced by images of career women enjoying their 
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new-found prosperity; sanitary products may now be advertised on 
television, showing women wearing tight fitting clothes with the 
promise that it is their 'secret': both these images of women, 
however, remain seamlessly 'feminine' 
- 
the 'new woman' is almost 
identical to the old. What is clearly apparent is that women are 
constantly being reassured that neither 'success' nor biological 
femaleness need compromise their quintessential femininity 
- 
and 
it is this ever-shifting ideological construct 'the feminine' 
that has to be critically re-evaluated by feminists. 
Returning to the academic institutions themselves we find an 
attempt at practice 
- 
the women's studies courses or options 
offered on degrees in English, History, etc. Here women of the 
Second Wave generation attempt to raise the consciousness of 
younger women who tend to think that to proclaim oneself a 
'feminist' is a dirty word 
- 
given the current clash of 
conflicting feminisms there may unfortunately be a grain of truth 
in their judgement. It is becoming increasingly common for 
women's studies to be regarded as separate from feminist 'high' 
theory 
-a process which seems to be aligning the well-known 
feminist theorists with male counterparts in the sphere of 
critical theory. 
This is especially true of discourses on postmodernism, 
couched as they are in the language of resistance and 
transgression, in a celebration of postmodern aesthetics as an 
effacement of the boundaries between high and popular culture. 
The discourses of postmodernism seem to lend themselves to 
feminism, since in the past cultural productions by women have 
proliferated or have at times been relegated to the realms of 
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popular culture; and accordingly a serious approach to forms of 
popular culture can only (on the face of it) raise the profile of 
feminist research. Having said this, the forms of analysis and 
definitions of what constitutes the postmodern moment are as 
heterogeneous as the variety of feminist positions we witness 
today. 
In the 'feminist' forms of postmodern approaches, 
postmodernism is defined as the epistemological meeting place of 
feminism, deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis. E. Ann 
Kaplan, for one, sees this merger as the point of formation of a 
'utopian' manifestation of postmodernism which she describes as 
involving 'a movement of culture and texts beyond oppressive 
binary categories and could not be imagined without the work of, 
among others, Bakhtin, Derrida, Lacan, Cixous, Kristeva and 
Roland Barthes'. 17 The radical decentring of the subject which a 
deconstructive reading of a text entails, and the gesture towards 
an end to the binary oppositions masculinity/femininity is at one 
level very attractive to modern feminists, just as it seemed to 
Virginia Woolf in A Room of One's Own (1929). But sixty years 
on, the moment of that dissolution in opposition seems to me 
still a utopian moment, and though utopian writing is a useful 
and undervalued aspect of feminist politics, it must be 
emphasized that this erosion of the dread binary has yet to be 
witnessed by current feminists in their personal (political) 
lives. 
Many feminists might wonder whether feminism is to be subsumed 
in this particular brand of 'utopian' postmodernism, or if 
feminism is in fact the organizing principle. I suspect the 
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former trend more likely, given the fate of feminism to date as a 
marginalized discourse in academic thought 
- 
something to be 
summoned as an interesting and diverting 'perspective', rather 
than an impressive mode of autonomous discourse. Interestingly 
(but not surprisingly), the emergence of postmodern culture has 
been situated as parallel to the rise of the Second Wave of 
feminism (1968 approximately). Within these theoretical debates 
of 'men in feminism' and postmodernism, feminism again appears to 
be conceived as a largely homogeneous evolutionary process which 
has at its heart a series of well-directed goals. In reality, 
the minority of published feminists are totally committed to the 
form of feminism which takes as its condition of existence 
post-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory or post-structuralism. 
Perhaps in these years of relative stasis, feminists are more 
likely to be engaged in an ongoing debate between conflicting 
feminist approaches 
- 
debates which seem to thrive in an 
atmosphere of measured detente. 
If I seem to be negative about the contributions acknowledged 
by feminism to other radical theories of subjectivity, it is 
because I remain wary about the potential appropriation of 
feminist achievement within a wider intellectual tradition of 
radicalism, into which feminism might be neatly slotted and 
gradually swamped. Feminist theoryl" has drawn strength from its 
marginal position in academia and politics although conversely, 
it suffers from this ghettoization. Here I locate one of the 
most infuriating and exciting of contradictions inherent in 
feminist discourse: on the one hand it needs to emphasize its 
separateness from the disciplines, as they are traditionally 
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defined, because of its nascent interdisciplinarity; and yet on 
the other hand there exists a profound desire to be credited for 
attempts to transform and expand those disciplines from within by 
highlighting the gaps and silences on the subject of women (as 
subject) in relation to Western social and political thought. 
Now that I find myself a part of academia as a teacher, I seem 
to relive that contradiction daily. I am an English lecturer 
appointed for my specialism in modern feminist theory and 
criticism; I teach the traditional canon plus women's writing and 
feminist perspectives on male authored texts. More recently I 
have establised a course on Western Feminisms which I teach to 
politics students within a modular degree scheme. Despite the 
rewards of teaching such a course, it does not appear to me to 
signify an acceptance of' feminism's interventionary impact at an 
interdisciplinary level. Rather my feminist work is commonly 
regarded by teachers and students alike as an extra subject, 
which would be reminiscent of 'women's studies' if such a subject 
area were identified in my institution. This suggests that even 
the victory of establishing women's studies as a discipline has 
its cost and its paradox, that of enabling the academic 
mainstream to conveniently 'forget' feminism's political function 
within the academic institution. Nonetheless, feminist academics 
who share my good fortune to teach their own subject are probably 
the envy of an older generation of feminists who to some extent 
fought the most difficult of battles - to achieve recognition at 
all 
- 
for us. 
Perhaps the most negative aspect of teaching feminism is the 
initial and virtually wholesale acceptance by students of the 
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notion that we have indeed entered a post-feminist age, which has 
incorporated and refined the basic tenets of feminist thought. 
(On the positive side, it is rewarding to observe just how many 
students find feminist criticism exciting and challenging once 
they have discarded their original preconceptions about it. ) New 
Right politics, it seems, has effected an ideological shift that 
is an awesome business to attack. Sexism 
- 
one of the 'feminist' 
words incorporated into idiomatic speech today 
- 
has gone 
underground. To doggedly maintain one's feminist politics today 
is a wearying exercise and in direct conflict with the media 
images of the successful career women with the world at her feet 
and her femininity at her fingertips and who, incidentally, does 
not remind me of me. 
ENVOI 
In addition to attempting an extension of the parameters of 
feminist theory by the appropriation and modification of some 
pre-existing theoretical models, such as Foucault's, and those of 
socialist and radical feminism, it seemed necessary to review the 
present tensions operating within feminist theoretical discourse 
itself. In the wake of such heterogeneity a fundamental question 
which necessarily arises is whether feminisms can remain 
'feminist' 
- 
so that the term retains some of its original 
political resonance. 
I argue throughout this thesis that although feminism as an 
object of study is going forward, feminism as a political 
methodology engaged in the material and social problems of 
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women's oppression, has remained depressingly static. Feminism 
needs to re-emerge from the mire of 'identity politics' in order 
to fully engage with and interrogate the nature of subtle 
ideological and material shifts which have occurred since the 
beginnings of its Second Wave. I would not wish to suggest that 
a single unifying feminist discourse is either possible or 
desirable, but rather that feminisms can thrive upon such a 
diversity of approaches, moving towards a celebration of 
heterogeneity, and away from the more negative influences of the 
'founding fathers' of academic discourse. For this reason, I 
have made it a policy to limit, as far as is possible, direct 
references to male-oriented theories and criticisms, when a 
woman-centred one can serve my purposes equally well. I 
recognize that in this decision, certain bodies of thought, such 
as (male) Marxism, only receive scant attention. This is merely 
to allow more space for what turned out to be a huge enterprise: 
in an academic environment where feminists often have to retreat 
two paces in order to move forward, I hope a little theoretical 
'skipping' will be accepted. 
- 
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CHAPTER ONE 
_'5C_ WAVE' : PURGING FEMINISMS IN THE 1970s 
The new women's movement that arose in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s in most Western countries was not the first 
feminist movement in history. The term 'second wave 
feminism' has been attached to the new movement to 
indicate that we are witnessing the second peak of a 
feminist movement that has existed for more than 100 
years, ever since the second half of the nineteenth 
century. ' 
REFORM TO REVOLiTT I ON 
It is impossible and therefore probably inadvisable to pinpoint 
one year to mark the beginning of feminism's so-called 'Second 
Wave'; however, 1968 has a certain symbolic resonance, not least 
as the year of public manifestations of New Left radicalism in 
Europe and the USA. In the United States, many women, 
disenchanted by their involvement in male-dominated left-wing 
politics, were defecting to localized, non-hierarchical women's 
liberation groups. Such groups were established in order to 
interrogate the social and material conditions of individual 
women's existence, often with the longer term aim of creating an 
agenda for political transformation of the social status of 
women. Women's participation in left-wing politics, which often 
involved performing largely menial 'feminine' tasks - such as 
typing and clerical/domestic support work - alerted them to the 
stark fact that existing political positions did not take the 
issue of women's subordination seriously. Furthermore, radical 
men appeared to be quite happy to exploit a 'natural' sexual 
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division of labour in order to service their own cause, unaware 
or unconcerned that they might be themselves perpetuating 
oppressive power relations. Because mainstream political and 
social theories focused on 'male' experience in the public sphere 
of work, women found themselves, paradoxically, 'outside' 
analyses of class and relations of production, while being 
nominally contained within such a perspective 
- 
as far as male 
comrades were concerned. Left-wing analyses of social injustice 
focused on class as the central determinant of power relations, 
assuming that male and female experiences were identical; and if 
women's oppression was considered at all it was regarded as an 
effect of capitalism. 
In a speech given at the Free University in New York City on 
17 February 1968, Anne Koedt articulated a sense of collective 
female disillusionment: 
Within the last year many radical women's groups have 
sprung up throughout the country. This was caused by the 
fact that movement women found themselves playing 
secondary roles on every level 
- 
be it in terms of 
leadership, or simply in terms of' being listened to. 
They found themselves (and others) afraid to speak up 
because of self-doubts when in the presence of men. They 
ended up concentrating on food-making, typing, 
mimeographing, general assistance work, and serving as a 
sexual supply for their male comrades after hours. 2 
Women began to reflect upon feminism's past, and to reconceive 
the potential for women's liberation outside the parameters of a 
political discourse which afforded no space for women as a 
distinct, though unwieldy, category. Their disenchantment with 
the radical political movements of the sixties led them to 
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believe that female subordination was more than just an effect of 
dominant political forces; it was endemic in all social relations 
with men. Once women began to scrutinize such effects 
collectively 
- 
in the form of consciousness raising groups in 
particular 
- 
they found their suspicions that a Socialist 
revolution would rapidly metamorphose into a white bourgeois male 
revolution well-founded. As a consequence revolutionary 
strategies themselves had to be reviewed: women were not simply 
militating for material changes, but recognized the need for a 
profound shift in the dominant ideological representation of 
femininity: 
In 1968 the Women's Liberation Movement announced itself 
to a startled public by staging a demonstration at the 
Miss America contest in Atlantic City, protesting, among 
other points, 'Women in our society are forced daily to 
compete for male approval, enslaved by ludicrous beauty 
standards that we ourselves are conditioned to take 
seriously and to accept. '3 
This event signalled a new phase of feminist activism, and 
initiated other protests in both America and Britain. It also 
became an object lesson to its organizers about how such 
demonstrations of sisterly solidarity could be construed as 
vicious attacks on other women (the contestants in the Beauty 
pageant in this case), and later protests were more unambiguously 
directed at the men responsible for producing women as sex 
objects. More significantly, perhaps, this event framed all 
future media interpretations of feminists as rabid 'bra burners': 
They decided to stage a protest 
- 
and to illustrate 
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their point they dumped bras and girdles into a 'freedom 
trash bucket'. Imaginary flames were added later by a 
news agency reporter, and the idea caught on in a big 
way. The media loved it. Sexy and absurd, it neatly 
disposed of a phenomenon which would otherwise have 
proved rather awkward to explain. 4 
Thus the first recorded emergence of Second Wave radicalism on 
to the public consciousness was successfully defused by the 
media; such protests could be dismissed as attacks from bitter 
unattractive females who could never become Miss America 
themselves. In retrospect, such events signalled a marked 
tactical shift from the reformist roots of feminism's 'First 
Wave': radical feminists inaugurated a departure from the 
mainstream political arena altogether. The primary site of 
struggle, as characterized by these early demonstrations, was to 
be the female body itself, and the restraints imposed upon it by 
contemporary Western notions of femininity. 
In Britain 1968 marked fifty years of women's suffrage; a 
landmark viewed increasingly as at best a Pyrrhic victory. After 
the First World War the First Wave of feminism had achieved its 
stated major aim, and the two world wars required a commitment by 
women to work for the war effort. The side effect of this was, 
of course, a degree of liberation for women from the constriction 
of their domestic roles 
- 
in times of desperate need it seemed 
that childcare and catering provisions materialized as an aspect 
of the state's role in maintaining and streamlining a wartime 
economy. Elizabeth Wilson describes the British wartime 
housewife as positively seduced into performing the dual role of 
carer and worker 
- 
roles which had previously been ideologically 
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cast as mutually in conflict and tension: 
The housewife was the heroic figure of the Second World 
War, and additionally so because she was often a worker 
as well. The 'glamour band' twisted round her hair 
served both to protect it as she bent over an industrial 
war machine, and, as its name suggested, glamorized the 
utilitarian... This wartime housewife was lapped round 
with state solicitude and with honeyed praise from the 
press; a striking contrast with her neglect in prewar 
years. $ 
The interwar years and the decade after the Second World War 
are commonly viewed as a period of relative inactivity for 
feminist politics 
- 
hence the distinction made between 'First' 
and 'Second Wave' movements, which also signified a major 
transition from the rhetoric of 'rights' to the radicalism of 
'liberation'. World events had transformed the lives of 
working-class and bourgeois women alike, and it seemed possible 
that this transformation might be permanent. Women 
- 
that 
'reserve army' of cheap labour 
- 
entered the labour market en 
masse and as a result women's traditional roles as mother and 
carer had to be redefined, or at least extended to accommodate 
their new dual identity within/without the home. 
However, the years after the Second World War produced a 
retroactive ideological shift: a revivified 'cult of the 
housewife' was effectively a consolidated attack on women's 
new-found freedom 
- 
devoted to recreating and redefining the 
domestic space as women's space. Domestic labour was now fully 
construed within capitalist terms; the housewife of the 1950s and 
1960s was constructed and mythologized as a competent 
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businesswoman surrounded by a wealth of labour-saving devices in 
the home, so that housewifery could be ideologically packaged as 
a skilled, highly technologized industry all of its own. The 
housewife's role was one of autonomy and responsibility; as the 
major purchaser of commodities in the family household, she was 
intensively targeted through commercial advertising. The image 
of the housewife as the purveyor of high standards of domestic 
organization was fed back to individual women through the media 
- 
where it had become increasingly glamorized and correspondingly 
difficult to live up to, unless this role was adopted as a 
full-time occupation. 
Undoubtedly the twentieth century saw substantial improvements 
in the quality of women's lives. The wife and mother of the 
1950s and 60s no longer closely resembled the 'Angel in the 
House' of Victorian popular mythology, but the home was again 
regarded as the proper haven for the 'whole' woman. For 'normal' 
women 
- 
women who married and had children 
- 
maintaining the 
household was to be be their proper destiny; indeed it became an 
identity in itself, to the exclusion of all others. Careers were 
supposed to be temporary launch pads, abandoned when the 'career' 
of motherhood was embarked upon. Women who wanted both a family 
and career had a difficult time juggling work with their domestic 
and 'true' identity. Career women who eschewed the path of 
maternity and matrimony confronted the inequities of a labour 
market where they were neither paid for doing the same work as 
men nor rewarded with promotion to senior positions for showing 
equal competence. As Betty Friedan observed, 'It is more than a 
strange paradox that as all professions are finally open to women 
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in America, "career woman" has become a dirty word'. 6 In fact, 
there remain clear ideological links between the literary image 
of the 'Angel in the House' and the 1950s magazine projection of 
the 'modern housewife'. Both images represent a disjunction 
between the glamorized ideal of the passive, pure and contented 
homemaker, and the material realities of the role which afforded 
little glamour and less intellectual and social stimulation. 
is well-documented, for instance, that many women in both the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries found feminine domesticity 
dull, monotonous and ultimately clinically depressing.? 
What had happened to the women who spoke out against their 
secondary status in the early 1900s? Had suffrage really 
It 
satisfied their demands, or was it more a case of there being no 
words to express female oppression that didn't conjure up 
treacherous images of unnaturalness and perversity? Elizabeth 
Wilson implies that the war years fractured the potential for 
female collectivization but did not kill feminist fervour 
altogether: 
So feminism did not die in the years after the war. 
There continued to be women's organizations that made 
feminist demands, even if there was no movement to combat 
the general oppression of women, and there were certainly 
many women who struggled as feminists, although they 
often felt isolated. What made their struggles difficult 
and lonely was that this oppression was invisible and was 
silenced. Feminism led an underground or sleeping beauty 
existence in a society which claimed to have wiped out 
that oppression. 8 
It appears that after feminism's First Wave of visible and very 
public collective action, feminism was sustained primarily as an 
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intellectual tendency, without a movement to galvanize it into 
action. So it seems that an etiolated form of feminism survived 
the war years, but not as a collective movement able to combat a 
renewed negative ideological onslaught from the establishment. 
By the time the Second Wave emerged, feminist manifestos 
demonstrated that the parameters of feminist discourse had been 
extended beyond recognition. It is almost certain that this 
transformation in feminist politics was achieved by women 
departing from the mainstream political arena altogether, and 
communicating through a network constructed by themselves. While 
the media attempted to portray such women as petty latter-day 
hyenas in petticoats, they betrayed a fear that feminists who did 
not lobby or present petitions through figure-heads offered a 
more sinister threat to the status quo. How could one really 
identify those numerous but invisible militants who, for example, 
festooned advertising posters with stickers in the London 
Underground, declaring them offensive to women? In their early 
public appearances, feminists declared their solidarity as women 
rather than as adherents to a particular political philosophy. 
Emergent feminists of the late sixties and early seventies 
were inclined to be more reflective in their extensive analyses 
of 'what it meant to be a woman', and less reluctant to rupture 
existing social/familial relations than their First Wave 
forebears. one major reason for this new, more radical face of 
Second Wave feminism was that the women who now joined the 
broad-based 'movement' came from more diverse backgrounds than 
the solidly upper middle-class Suffragists. Certain avenues had 
opened up for women in the public sphere: more women were 
- 
36 
- 
gaining access to higher education and consequently finding it 
less easy to settle into domestic quietude. Many movement women 
had been involved in radical Left-wing politics; and though they 
might have become disaffected with the rigidly hierarchical, 
phallocentric nature of such organizations, they had learnt 
important political lessons. The radical movements of the late 
sixties inspired the hope that direct action and attacks on the 
all-pervasive Establishment might eventually cause substantial 
material and ideological shifts in the social formation. The 
most thorny problem for modern feminists remained, however, the 
unassailable fact that while women could now to some extent 
redefine their social identity by pursuing a career, they could 
not shake off the timeless and naturalized association of women 
with the home. 
CONSTRUCTING THEORIES/FINDING AN ORIGIN 
In 1963 the publication of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique 
appeared to herald a new dynamism for feminist thought, as it 
tackled many of the issues that were to characterize Second Wave 
politics in the latter part of the sixties. The scope of her 
analysis of 'the problem that has no name' 
- 
the alienation felt 
among American housewives dehumanized by the drudgery of domestic 
labour 
- 
confirmed Friedan as one of the pioneers of modern 
feminism. one reason for the book's resounding success lay in 
its focus on the experiences of white middle-class women 
- 
the 
same group that were to form the majority in the new women's 
movement. Nearly thirty years later, that problem still has no 
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name; or rather, the problem itself has diversified into numerous 
equally intractable problems. For contemporary feminist 
theorists the act of naming is almost as difficult as the 
problems themselves: Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf and 
Simone de Beauvoir all observed that 'woman' in Western culture 
is defined in only negative terms ('man' being the universal or 
'norm') 
- 
by what they lack: status, independent income, 
education, history and most of all, the discrete qualities 
associated with 'masculinity'. 
In the eighteenth century, Mary Wollstonecraft championed the 
as yet unborn 'rights of woman', by challenging the veracity of 
the characteristics traditionally ascribed as 'feminine'. She 
argued instead that culture and not nature or biological essence 
had constructed the image of the trifling, over-emotional, 
irrational and fragile female: 
Men complain, and with reason, of the follies and 
caprices of our sex, when they do not keenly satirize our 
headstrong passions and grovelling vices. Behold, I 
should answer, the natural effect of ignorance! The mind 
will ever be unstable that has only prejudices to rest 
on, and the current will run with destructive fury when 
there are no barriers to break its force. 9 
Virginia Woolf, in A Room of One's Own (1929) examines the 
literal and ideological exclusion of women from all that 
comprises Western culture, using as analogy the plight of the 
woman writer. She seems to anticipate Simone de Beauvoir's 
ground-breaking concept of woman as other, in her description of 
women's experience of cultural alienation: 
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... 
if one is a woman one is often surprised by a sudden 
splitting off of consciousness, say in walking down 
Whitehall, when from being the natural inheritor of that 
civilization, she becomes, on the contrary, outside of 
it, alien and critical. 10 
In contrast to Wollstonecraft's liberal aims, Woolf's solution is 
a utopian one, where sexual equality might be attained by a 
fusion of the two sexes 
- 
mind and body 
- 
in a state of 
androgyny. However, a closer reading suggests that her vision of 
androgyny is a future where cultural definitions of what it is to 
be 'masculine' or 'feminine' could be broached and ascribed as 
free-floating human qualities: 'If one is a man, still the woman 
part of his brain must have effect; and woman also must have 
intercourse with the man in her. '1' Simone de Beauvoir, writing 
twenty years after Woolf, takes this embryonic notion of woman as 
Other further in her refutation of biologistic arguments in 
relation to sexual difference. She categorically asserts that 
the power to describe/define essential characteristics peculiar 
to the female of the species has always been the male preserve: 
Men have always held the lot of woman in their hands; 
and they have determined what it should be, not according 
to her interest, but rather with regard to their own 
projects, their fears and their needs. 12 
The implication, therefore, is that pleas for reform within the 
existing social order are futile, if such an order is constructed 
and determined by male interests. 
Both Woolf and Wollstonecraft seem to share a conviction that 
woman as equal could be integrated into civilization as it is now 
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ordered, whereas de Beauvoir implies that civilization has been 
constructed and perpetuated on principles which do not allow for 
the emergence of woman in fully 'human' terms, who is defined by 
virtue of her not being man: 
One is not born, but rather becomes a woman. No 
biological, psychological, or economic fate determines 
the figure that the human female presents in society; it 
is civilization as a whole that produces this creature, 
intermediate between male and eunuch, which is described 
as feminine. 13 
In this famous statement which locates the category woman as 
lying uneasily between the concepts of male (phallic) and 
'not-male' (castrated), de Beauvoir offers a critique of 
male-oriented discourses 
- 
such as Freud's 
- 
which typify women 
as essentially the representation of lack. In an earlier chapter 
she attacks the foundations of Freud's theory of the castration 
complex within the oedipal framework of desire with an 
iconoclastic verve reminiscent of latter-day radical feminist 
critiques offered by Germaine Greer and Kate Millett. 14 In other 
ways The Second Sex lays theoretical ground which Second Wave 
radicals were to profit and learn from. Significantly, de 
Beauvoir clearly associates the identity of woman as other with 
the means by which biology has been summoned to concretize female 
subordination as a social necessity. Woman's 'lack', in de 
Beauvoir's view, is not anatomical, but cultural and ideological 
- 
gaining credence from the fact of woman's unique role as 
reproducer of the species. 15 This heralds the radical feminist 
exhortation to women to re-examine their own relationship to 
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their bodies, not least to counter the mythification of the 
female form which male-oriented knowledge has propagated. For de 
Beauvoir, a correlative problem is the means by which women 
themselves act in 'bad faith', internalizing ideas of their own 
cultural inferiority 
- 
'It must be admitted that the males find 
in woman more complicity than the oppressor usually finds in the 
oppressed'. 16 This foreshadows the radical feminist project of 
consciousness raising which in part serves the purpose of 
alerting women to the means by which they contribute to their own 
subordination. 
Perhaps de Beauvoir's notion of woman as eunuch inspired the 
title of Greer's The Female Eunuch (1970) 
- 
although it remains 
an unacknowledged legacy. Greer locates the cultural status of 
woman as in fact equivalent to the eunuch, interrogating Freud's 
representation of the child's perception of herself as castrated: 
In traditional psychological theory, which is after all 
only another way of describing and rationalizing the 
status quo, the desexualization of women is illustrated 
in the Freudian theory of the female sex as lacking a 
sexual organ. 17 
As is implied above, Greer characterizes Freudian theory as 
affirming women's inferiority by defining them by what they lack 
-a penis - and as a consequence lacking a sexual organ/sexual 
feelings altogether. For radical feminists generally, Freud not 
only endorses patriarchal power by foregrounding the phallus as 
the symbol of culture and civilization; he also affirms the view 
that 'normal' women have no demonstrable sexuality at all. Her 
brief critique of Freud is one which Juliet Mitchell, in 
- 
41 
- 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), takes much further in an 
attempt to salvage psychoanalytic theory for feminist purposes. 
She argues that Freudian theory can be used to aid understanding 
of patriarchal processes, in that Freud's work might be 
interpreted as symptomatic of the existing social organization, 
describing the effects of culturally oriented gender difference 
rather than prescribing them as absolute. 18 
From the comparatively simple analysis of women's oppression 
offered by Wollstonecraft, grounded in a High Liberal faith in 
the power of reason and the justice of civilization, through to 
the reformist zeal of Suffragettes and Abolitionists in the UK 
and USA, to Woolf and de Beauvoir, we can observe that the focus 
for analysis of women's oppression was constantly shifting and 
finding new roots. Since feminists had discovered that woman 
could only be defined as 'not-man' 
- 
outside or invisible in 
mainstream forms of knowledge 
-a central problematic lay in 
finding a language which could articulate the specificity of 
female experience of civilization as both critique and manifesto 
for change. Modern feminists were more likely to have access to 
higher education, which made available privileged discursive 
networks, but which nonetheless continued to marginalize them as 
women. 
At times, early theoretical explorations of the subject seem 
nebulous and diffuse, especially as modern feminists lacked 
Wollstonecraft's confidence that female subordination lay at the 
heart of specific social institutions that might be modified. De 
Beauvoir's suspicion that 'civilization as a whole' is at fault, 
constructed as it is along masculine principles, required more 
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detailed research. Feminists certainly concurred with de 
Beauvoir's assertion that male discourse is essentially resistant 
to pleas that women be incorporated into 'humanity' on the 
grounds of rational argument. The fact of female marginalization 
was a priori sedimented in an epistemological framework which 
nonetheless could on occasion summon the nominally inclusive 
rhetoric of generic 'man'. Confronted by the absence of an 
available academic/political space for a 'discourse of feminism', 
it is perhaps not at all surprising that Second Wave feminists 
expended much of their energy challenging the veracity of each 
other's assertions, rather than structuring debates around shared 
and well-defined agendas. 
As a result of sometimes conflicting feminist analyses 
appearing to spring up independent of each other's theoretical 
contributions, it has become a commonplace to characterize modern 
feminism by its different and heterogeneous 'strands', rather 
than its common aims. Later feminist commentators no longer work 
on the assumption that the Second Wave emerged from a position of 
unity and consensus; since modern feminists draw strength and 
inspiration from a multiplicity of sources from the eighteenth 
century onwards, it is idealistic and simplistic to talk about 
feminism as if it was a singular oppositional strategy: 
Indeed, the history of the women's movement in the 
1970s, a time of apparent unity, was marked by bitter, at 
times virulent, internal disputes over what it was 
possible or permissable for a feminist to do, say, think 
or feel. 19 
Certainly, a cursory glance at the various manifestos reprinted 
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in Radical Feminism20 illustrates this point vividly. 
From the mid-eighties onwards, to utilize a feminist position 
without locating it within a particular strand is to invite 
criticism of inaccuracy or oversimplification. But despite 
evidence that the Second Wave was founded upon active tensions, 
feminists of the early seventies did construct networks of 
communication via collectives, conferences, demonstrations and 
newsletters, which crossed such boundaries and emphasized 
feminism's commonality. There may not have been one 
interpretation of feminism, but all strands were rooted in the 
belief that women suffer social injustice because of their sex; 
and the emergence of Women's Liberation as both a movement and an 
intellectual tendency proved attractive to many women. Emphasis 
on consciousness raising and direct action meant that feminist 
politics emanated from the individual and the private sphere of 
experiential and emotional responses to oppression. This 
dictated the shape of early feminist agendas 
- 
concentrating on 
issues such as paid housework, abortion, contraception, the 
family, and the sexual division of labour. There appeared to be 
no clear-cut divide between theory and practice within the 
nascent movement which 
- 
by virtue of its broad-based structure - 
implicitly conceived of itself as a theory in perpetual process, 
rather than a doctrine to be disseminated to willing converts. 
Writings from this period devote most of their energy to 
pinpointing gaps in contemporary knowledge, rather than offering 
authoritative solutions or dogma. In this sense all strands were 
constantly in a state of transformation and modification - to 
identify oneself as a radical, for example, would not guarantee a 
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consensus among radicals as a whole as to how radical feminism 
could be defined. 
The Women's Liberation Movement remained loosely structured 
and decentralized in its determination not to produce 'stars' or 
leaders to speak for its 'members'. This was one of the most 
striking and positive features of sexual politics, as well as 
being, arguably, the cause of its later decline. The feminist 
'cells' which sprung up independently throughout the US and later 
in Britain, produced tentative manifestos focusing on issues of 
particular concern to women, but tended on the whole to shy away 
from anything that can be described as pure 'theory'. It was 
only later that the urgent need for a theoretical framework from 
which to review such issues was acknowledged, not least because 
the popular consciousness was of feminists as terrorists, which 
alienated women who might otherwise have profited by identifying 
themselves with the Women's Movement. Personal memoirs confirm 
that feminism changed the lives of individual women, 21 but had 
still not succeeded in breaching the gaps in mainstream knowledge 
that Woolf and de Beauvoir highlighted. Western epistemology is 
indeed centred upon 'public man' and his reasoned quest for a 
theory of identity, meaning and truth, 22 and in the public sphere 
female experience was apt to become buried under the weight of 
more 'important' considerations. 
In short, when women collected to talk about problems 
affecting women they found themselves curiously and ambiguously 
outside language: a melange of personal experiences collated and 
shared did not qualify as fully-rounded political or theoretical 
discourse. It was relatively easy for (male) commentators to 
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suppress some of the most cogent feminist arguments by virtue of 
them lacking the 'correct' discursive apparatus; they bore no 
relation to 'public man' debates and therefore lacked theoretical 
and political credibility. From its birth feminist discourse was 
outlawed from pre-established intellectual theories because 
Western thought could not conceptualize a discourse whose 
difference hinged primarily on its gender specificity, but whose 
effects questioned and conflated existing academic disciplinary 
frameworks. At the same time it was already contained within 
such criteria - there being no 'outside', no neutral women's 
space 
- 
just as the term 'woman' was contained and compressed 
legally and philosophically within generic 'man'. 
Of course the women who collected together to fight for 
gendered issues were mainly white and middle-class, and this 
necessarily affected the way they compiled agendas for change. 
It seems, in retrospect, that feminism constructed itself around 
a core of 'issues' which were assumed to represent the worse 
effects of sexual subordination. Despite disagreements about the 
shape of feminist thought and the nature of the utopia it 
projected, there appeared to be tacit agreement about what these 
issues were, and most of them centred around the direct social 
effects of women being defined as biologically weaker, and 
naturally destined for quite different roles than men. Such a 
focus demanded a closer scrutiny and a concerted attack on images 
of femininity which distorted or glamorized women's real 
experiences and homogenized their multifarious identities. 
What made the Women's Movement distinct from other radical 
movements of the late sixties can be summed up by one of its most 
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famous slogans, 'the personal is political'. The more this 
simple statement has been reiterated, the more power it seems to 
yield. It indicated the concentration of feminism upon women's 
personal experiences of femaleness, and the developing of the 
notion that the private was of very public concern. 
Consciousness raising groups sought not only to awaken women to 
the injustices of their secondary social position. They 
encouraged them to reassess their personal and emotional lives in 
terms of subordination and coercion; and in highlighting their 
own position in relation to their families, their lovers and 
their work, allowed them to negotiate an autonomous identity 
beyond the normalizing categories of carer and nurturer. 
Although its initial processes focused upon the personal and 
individual, the ultimate aim of consciousness raising is an 
analytical one, enabling the members of a group to view women's 
oppression in more abstract, even theoretical terms. There were 
of course dangers that such sexual politics becomes personal 
therapy; 23 but the value of viewing personal problems from a 
collective standpoint should not be underestimated, and was one 
of the particular strengths of radical feminism. 
This emphasis upon experience in order to expose the misery 
that many women felt within their private lives created a very 
different form of politics, and yet made perfect sense since the 
evasion of 'domestic' issues in politics had excluded women for 
centuries. Nonetheless it meant that the actual status of 
feminism as perceived by other political groups was problematic. 
Left-wingers felt that a concentration on gender-specific issues 
acted as a diversion from the main business of a consolidated 
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attack against the ruling classes. At the US National Conference 
for a New Politics in 1967 New Left men denied women's issues any 
political currency: 24 it remained a commonplace thereafter to 
argue that a revolution in class consciousness would liberate 
both women and men from the oppressive effects of a capitalist 
social organization. To liberal and conservative eyes the views 
of feminists represented the views of the unrepresentative few; 
and it is true that feminists alienated many potentially 
sympathetic women by what was viewed as their extremism 
- 
especially by their questioning of one of the most central 
institutions of society, the family. 
There was substantial agreement between both radical and 
socialist feminists about what the main issues for feminism were. 
However, clear splits are evident in their analyses of the roots 
of female oppression: while they were quite certain of the 
effects of female subordination, there tended to be sharp 
disagreements about where the origins of male power were located. 
Before going on to examine the heterogeneous nature of Second 
Wave feminism, I shall briefly survey some of the features 
central to all feminist attacks upon the status quo. 
POLITICAL AGENDAS OF THE SECOND WAVE 
Emergent Second Wave feminist thought tended to distance itself 
from the academic mainstream, concentrating instead upon the 
development of political activity and expression. This provoked 
internal debate about identifying and describing major oppressive 
mechanisms in society which shaped women's lives, but did not 
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correlate with radical male-oriented political analyses of social 
divisions. Certain terms became common feminist parlance in 
radical, liberal and socialist contexts, and the issues focused 
upon can be deemed, to some extent, to reflect shared concerns. 
The activities of feminism as a movement brought together 
differing strands in the establishment of centres and 
communication networks, which represented Women's Liberation at 
its broadest base. 
If the 1968 Miss America protest in Atlantic City brought 
feminism out into the public gaze, the British awakening to 
Second Wave feminism was far more sedate. In February 1970 
Ruskin College, oxford saw the first Women's Liberation 
conference in Britain, attended by at least six hundred people. 
It is viewed by many as a moment of political awakening; 25 yet 
regrettably, just as the Miss America Protest is most memorable 
for initiating the myth of feminists as bra burners, the Ruskin 
conference is remembered for the graffiti daubed all over the 
college walls. 26 This conference was followed by a protest in 
November 1970 at the Miss World Competition at the Albert Hall, 
as a means to communicate to other women directly 
- 
beyond the 
distorting effects of the mass media. Unfortunately, in common 
with the Miss America protest, the reasons behind the disruption 
were hostilely misrepresented by the press as a destructive act 
by the disaffected few. 
The major success of the Ruskin Conference was to establish a 
National Women's Coordinating Committee which encompassed the 
variety of feminisms rather than appearing to stand for one party 
line; and a structure of small autonomous groups was adopted: 
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Our first priority isn't to get over information, but to 
know what everyone in the room thinks. We believe in 
getting people to interact, not to listen to experts. We 
want them to themselves make an analysis of their 
situation, which will lead them to action... 27 
Feminists expended much of* their energy creating centres which 
would help women, as well as forge a consciousness that such 
support networks were essential and were precisely what was 
unavailable in state provision of female welfare. Women's 
centres with various facilities were set up in many cities in 
both Britain and the states. In Britain Erin Pizzey set up the 
the first Refuge for battered women in Chiswick which spawned 
many others nationwide, establishing a Women's Aid Federation. 28 
Women's health centres promoted self-awareness about the female 
body and female sexuality, and Rape Crisis Centres began to 
emerge in Britain from 1976. From the late 1960s in America 
Women's Studies courses or options became available within higher 
education institutions. Such centres and areas of study focused 
feminist concerns upon male violence and the family, female 
sexuality, and the need to establish a women's 'sub-culture' of 
mutual support. All these aims were underpinned by the shared 
assumption that society was constructed and perpetuated along 
patriarchal lines, peculiarly resistant to the needs of half the 
population. 
The Women's National Coordinating Committee in Britain tabled 
four basic demands: equal pay, equal education and job 
opportunities, free contraception and abortion on demand and free 
twenty-four hour nurseries. 29 These demands themselves prompted 
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a reinterpretation of the reasons for women's special or unequal 
treatment in such areas 
- 
not least a re-evaluation of what 
'patriarchy' could mean. The term patriarchy often rather 
loosely connoted the universal and timeless oppression of women 
by men 
- 
and is currently so semantically overburdened as to be 
virtually meaningless as a tool of feminist debate, unless it is 
afforded a degree of specificity 
- 
not least to indicate 
awareness that certain groups of men have unequal access to 
dominant power networks. In Patriarchal Precedents (1983), 
Rosalind Coward demonstrates that debates around the issue of 
patriarchy and its historical emergence have been in existence 
since at least the nineteenth century. Such debates comprised a 
search for proof that the relations between the sexes had changed 
drastically from the 'natural' and primitive family organization 
of matriarchy to the highly complex and 'artificial' structure of 
the patriarchal nuclear family. However the notion of the 
existence of a prehistoric system of 'mother-right' suggested a 
system of female domination of which intellectuals deemed the 
'weaker sex' to be scarcely capable. Instead matriarchy was 
deemed to be based on kinship organization rather than power 
relations. The central concern of these debates was in 
considering the origins of the modern family form and seeking 
justification for the validity of 'father-right' 
- 
not least to 
determine the question of whether there were innate definable 
qualities discrete to either sex. As a consequence, Coward 
asserts, 'this period saw the construction of very definite 
categories of masculinity and femininity'. 30 Matriarchal 
hypotheses became associated with primitivism; whereas 
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patriarchal dominance is seen as analogous to the formation of 
civilization itself. Patriarchy, for commentators such as 
Engels, was inextricably linked to the family form as the 
'natural' basic unit in a civilized social formation 
- 
it takes 
on a highly culturally specific form where qualities of 
masculinity and femininity are deemed to have precise separate 
social functions (women as 'carers', men as breadwinners/ 
protectors of family property). Indeed Engels argues that there 
existed a sexual division of labour even within 'primitive' 
family forms, and that women's crucial role as reproducers and 
carers versus men's as hunter/gatherers (guardians of the most 
basic forms of economic exchange) contributed to the 'world 
historical defeat of the female sex'. 31 Thus gendered roles of 
labour and reproduction are consolidated as 'natural' 
- 
in the 
sense that they are perceived to be intrinsic to civilization 
itself. 
Max Weber's sociological definition of the term patriarchy is 
of a household organization where the father dominates members of 
an extended kinship network, and thereby controls the economic 
production of the household. While this particular family form 
is not representative of contemporary Western culture, which is 
associated with nuclear families of closer kinship ties, 
feminists have argued, however, that our society still bears the 
vestiges of patriarchal organization. Kate Millett in Sexual 
Politics (1971) did much to popularize the usage of the term 
patriarchy for feminists. For her patriarchy was the dominant 
oppressive force, despite differing class and ethnic origins 
embedding individuals in various relations of power, and causing 
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local distinctions between forms of patriarchy. She argues that 
it is a system of power which encompasses all these distinctions. 
If one takes patriarchal government to be the 
institution whereby that half of the populace which is 
female is controlled by that half which is male, the 
principles of patriarchy appear to be two fold: male 
shall dominate female, elder male shall dominate younger. 
However, just as with any human institution, there is 
frequently a distance between the real and the ideal; 
contradictions and exceptions do exist within the system. 
While patriarchy as an institution is a social constant 
so deeply entrenched as to run through all other 
political, social, or economic forms, whether of caste or 
class, feudality or bureaucracy, just as it pervades all 
major religions, it also exhibits great variety in 
history and locale. 32 
Millett has been frequently criticized by latter-day feminists 
for her ahistorical position on women's oppression. I think that 
this passage demonstrates that she does on one level take such 
factors into account; in addition she attempts to analyse 
mechanisms of patriarchy as acting primarily at the level of 
ideology. Juliet Mitchell described patriarchy in psychoanalytic 
terms as the Law of the Father (following Lacan) - meaning that 
entry into civilization (via language or the Symbolic order) 
necessitates entry into a pre-defined patriarchal system; and in 
common with Millett suggests that patriarchy informs our 
perception of social reality by being entrenched in knowledge 
itself. It is easy to understand the attraction of the notion of 
patriarchy for feminists, but patriarchy simply defined as the 
rule of all men over all women often assumes a transhistorical 
character which obstructs historically specific and materialist 
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analyses of oppression. The liberal usage of the term as an 
'explanation' for male domination sometimes obscures the 
possibility of a more detailed examination of the ubiquitous 
nature of female subordination in contemporary Western societies. 
Roisin McDonough and Rachel Harrison assert that 'capitalism 
has made patriarchal law redundant. That is the basic 
contradiction. '33 In common with many socialist feminists, they 
imply that the structure of the nuclear family and the 
organization of relations of production are set in opposition: 
while men enter directly into class-oriented, historically 
determined forms of wage labour, women remain identified through 
the 'timeless' patterns of kinship. 34 Nevertheless the family 
fulfils an economic role within capitalism in the relations of 
commodity production and human reproduction. Patriarchy in its 
traditional meaning of (elder) father right may have waned as a 
significant social force, but feminists crucially recognized a 
reduced form of patriarchal relations at work within the family - 
a form which utilizes women's procreative functions and similarly 
provides justification for sexual division of labour in the 
workplace. Patriarchy is undoubtedly a confused and confusing 
concept. Clearly one is able to identify vestiges of patriarchal 
rule in familial structures, similar to those which predate 
capitalism; but capitalism has ideologically exaggerated the 
observable differences of biological sex in order to maintain its 
own conditions of possibility. Even if patriarchal rule does not 
operate as a perceived material reality, there is a need to 
invoke the concept at the level of representation, as Michele 
Barrett does, by allowing that a 'patriarchal ideology' is still 
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For feminists the effects of a patriarchal ideology are most 
keenly felt within the family environment 
- 
which is precisely 
the sphere that has been largely ignored by Marxist theorists. 
The family has been simply seen as instrumental in the 
perpetuation of capitalism, or women's roles within this domain 
are naturalized as functional by many sociologists. Talcott 
Parsons's classic functionalist sociological argument was that 
contemporary families have two major roles to perform: a) to 
socialize children into societal norms and correct status 
expectations; b) to provide a stable emotional environment to 
cushion the (male) worker from the psychological damage caused by 
the alienation of work. It is clear that the wife, not the 
family as an entity, perform both these functions, while the 
husband/father's position in the public sphere determines the 
family's class status. It is immediately apparent that it is 
women's role that is theoretically elided, although in many ways 
she guarantees the existence of the familial form 
- 
hence the 
work done by modern feminists to construct a broader theoretical 
perspective better able to question the traditional demarcation 
between the public and private spheres. Analyses of the family 
as an economic/sociological unit tend to result in the 'woman 
question' disappearing behind the facade of The Family. 36 
Therefore feminists have emphasized the impact of a particular 
familial ideology upon women's domestic role and the sexual 
division of waged labour, which naturalizes women's place in the 
home, and ignores her social contributions in public spheres of 
economics. 
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The family, although in definition fluid and changeable to 
suit the ideological demands of differing epochs and cultures, is 
reified as an institution, indestructible despite the 
vicissitudes of time; more than that, it is accepted as part of 
the natural order of things, strengthened by ideologies of 
religion, the law and popular morality. If patriarchy is 
conceived as synonymous with civilization then the family is 
viewed as civilization's cornerstone. This naturalization of the 
family has prompted many feminists t 
site of women's oppression. However 
the family as a repository of social 
operations, nonetheless, lie outside 
enlighten us about the nature of its 
of power. 
o pinpoint it as the crucial 
sociological perspectives on 
forces (whose 'real' 
its confines) do little to 
complex relation to networks 
In common with patriarchy, it appears that the most vital role 
of the family in contemporary Western society is as an 
ideological construct, which structures the forces of 
socialization. It has been argued, for example, that the 
bourgeois ideology of the family (the husband the only financial 
support, with the 'housewife' confined to the home) has become 
dominant, and internalized by the working class 
- 
although it 
bears little resemblance to their observable conditions of 
existence. It i 
this disjunction 
and its familial 
ambiguity at the 
pressure exerted 
behaviour relate 
s important, therefore, to examine the effects of 
between the economic organization of a household 
ideology upon the lives of women. This 
heart of 'the family' means that 'much of the 
on individuals to conform to various indices of 
more to fear of social disapproval of "the 
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family" than to strictly internal family demands'. 37 Adherence 
to gender identity, for instance, is something endorsed and 
reinforced by schools, media, peers and other ideological 
agencies outside the household domain. 
Patriarchy and the family are therefore chief concepts under 
interrogation by feminists since the late sixties, in face of 
gender blind analysis offered by male critics. The feminist 
appropriation of the term gender underpins all such analysis, and 
one of feminism's major theoretical contributions is to review 
the meanings connoted by the term gender, primarily by divorcing 
biological determinants from cultural representations of gender 
difference and arguing that the social construction of gender 
bears a tenuous relation to biological sex differences. This in 
itself is not a position peculiar to Second Wave thinkers: since 
Mary Wollstonecraft it has been observed that the social 
construction of gender difference substantially limits female 
potential in social and public life. Liberal feminists such as 
Wollstonecraft would, however, retain an investment in the 
supposedly common-sense knowledge that some aspects of gender 
difference are nascent to men and women. It is only relatively 
recently that feminists have posed the artificiality of gender 
dichotomies to examine all elements of social life presumed to be 
informed by the natural instincts of men and women. Therefore 
existing forms of order, if' predicated upon the assumptions that 
women and men's roles were necessarily polarized, could be 
completely renegotiated - and needed to be - to ensure a future 
of human equality. Radical feminists observed that in their 
everyday life women seem trapped within a vicious circle of 
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biologism which operates most effectively at an ideological level 
(in terms of acceptable images of women), but also affects their 
material position in society (in terms of their perceptions of 
their potential, career choices, the sexual division of labour 
within/without the home, etc. ). 
It seems that the operation of sexual difference which 
ideologically borrows and exaggerates the bare facts of 
biological difference is initiated virtually from birth and 
reinforced at every level of social organization from the 
smallest (the family) to a meta-level (the state). Michel 
Foucault's analysis of the way structures of' power operate and 
filter down to permeate the entire social hierarchy offers us a 
useful analogy to establish the way ideology reinforces our 
perceptions of our material lived experiences, where an abstract 
notion of normality guides our concept of the limits of social 
behaviour, which can be enforced by coercion to varying degrees 
if necessary. I quote as an example from Discipline and Punish 
(1979): 
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are 
in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, 
the educator-judge, the 'social-worker'-judge; it is on 
them that the universal reign of the normative is based; 
and each individual, wherever he may find himself, 
subjects it to his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his 
aptitudes, his achievements. 38 
This, if one substituted the 'generic' he for 'she', is a useful 
summary of the effects of gender socialization and the means by 
which women unconsciously internalize notions of normative 
feminine behaviour. According to Foucault's analysis, the 
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workings of power over individual behaviour remain chimerical: it 
is not a 'thing', yet it operates: it is not identical to 
domination (a dominant class/faction can be overthrown in favour 
of an opposing class/faction, but abstract power structures 
remain the same), since it exerts its force on the dominated and 
dominant alike 
- 
and recently there has been a proliferation of 
writings on the oppressiveness of masculinity, for example. 
Normative structures ironically situate the 'individual' at the 
centre of their concern while at the same time indirectly 
restricting real individual potential. 
When examining the relations between the ideological and 
economic bases, the means by which gender is constructed and 
reproduced is a central issue for feminists. The assertion that 
it is gender and not biological sex difference which informs 
oppressive mechanisms has been an important step forward for 
Second Wave feminism. Although of course writers such as Simone 
De Beauvoir in The Second Sex and Virginia Woolf in A Room of 
One's own made similar claims, it was not until the late sixties 
that feminists launched a concerted attack on the fusion of 
nature and nurture. Although there is an internal tension in 
radical feminist writings between a critique of the social 
construction of femininity in Western culture and a celebration 
of the 'feminine' as a political stance, most feminists greet 
essentialistic anti-feminist arguments with the contempt they 
deserve. 'Scientific' research on biological difference largely 
concentrates on the facts of the female life cycle as a series of 
handicaps that beset women throughout their adult lives - for 
example, childbirth, lactation, menstruation, menopause and 
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associated clinical disorders arising from hormonal changes 
- 
although the 'inconvenience' of' such functions can be either 
physical or social and can vary enormously in different cultures. 
A technological age has rendered the graver risks of, for 
example, childbirth, minimal. It seems that men have no 
analogous biological obstacle course to overcome, but it might be 
argued that this in part is due to the fact that it is only 
women's bodies that have been medicalized to such an extent, and 
that this medicalization accomplishes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The rational man of liberal humanist ideology can transcend 'his' 
animal physicality to attain spiritual heights; women's minds are 
documented as ruled by their bodily functions. As Michele 
Barrett observes: 
The pattern of gender relations in our society is 
overwhelmingly a social rather than a natural one, but it 
is a social construction that caricatures biological 
difference in the most grotesque way and then appeals to 
this misrepresented natural world for its own 
justification. 39 
Gender construction undoubtedly influences perceptions of male 
and female sexuality - another vital area of feminist discussion. 
The familial ideology not only effectively sorts the boys from 
the girls, it also encourages in each a disposition towards 
'appropriate' forms of eroticism. In the past there have been 
severe sanctions on 'non-productive' forms of sexual behaviour, 
such as homosexuality, and legal restrictions which denied women 
the right to control their reproductive capacity. Such normative 
procedures arguably deeply affect our choices within our personal 
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relationships 
- 
towards, for example, marriage and life-long 
monogamy. The biology of human reproduction becomes a political 
issue for feminists because of the means by which it has been 
inserted into social relations. While questioning 'scientific' 
explanations for socially constructed forms of sexual difference, 
feminists still need to challenge the meanings that are conferred 
upon biological difference, and the way biological 'fact' is 
'quoted' in cultural productions. 
Grassroots feminist work, including direct action and public 
protests, urges women to reconceive their social realities and to 
think in terms of future utopian possibilities. Although it does 
not constitute a doctrine to which we can ascribe key figures as 
mouthpieces for the movement, feminism needs to recognize its 
role as an educative process. Changing the consciousness of 
adult women is an important immediate aim, but the power of 
gender-divided society works primarily at the level of ideology 
- 
and if gender socialization begins from early childhood, a long 
term feminist agenda must be to scrutinize the state education 
system as a tool of gendered patriarchal ideology. Schooling is 
one of the most effective state institutions through which gender 
socialization is reproduced: even the implementation of 
widespread co-educational schooling, and the practice of 
introducing non-discriminatory curricula have done little to 
remedy the inequality of gendered expectations of academic 
success: 
The way in which the subjects are presented and their 
actual content frequently make them gender specific. For 
example the raison d'etre for boys to do home economics 
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is seen, by staff and pupils alike, in terms of boys 
'helping out' at some future date when their wives are 
incapacitated, or prior to marriage during their bachelor 
days; or for boys, home economics is sometimes linked to 
cookery which may be seen in terms of future employment 
in the catering industry. On the other hand, for girls 
home economics is justified in terms of their future 
roles as wives and mothers... Where girls are allowed, or 
even encouraged, to do woodwork or metalwork, this is 
justified again in terms of domestic duties 
- 
mending a 
broken toy or putting up shelves. 40 
Although girls are now unlikely to be forced to take 'feminine' 
subjects or be denied the opportunity to take as many subjects at 
GCSE or 'A' level as their male peers, the tradition that girls 
should take subjects related to their assumed future domestic 
role still affects their eventual subject choices in many cases. 
It is indeed likely that young girls' restrictive subject and 
therefore future career choices reflects their realistic 
awareness that the labour market itself operates upon gender 
lines. Furthermore 'peer group pressure' is probably likely to 
cause girls to be self-deprecating about their academic prowess 
since aggressiveness and competitiveness are deemed to be 
masculine traits, and therefore 'unhealthy' when observed in 
women. In addition girls may respond to pressures from parents 
and families who have internalized social sexual divisions as the 
norm, and not pursue their education - or congregate in the areas 
of the arts and social sciences, rather than the natural and 
physical sciences. 
Arthur Brittan and Mary Maynard argue in Sexism, Racism, and 
Oppression (1984) that coercion is mediated through gender, 
rather than gender itself being the instrument of force: 
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To socialize a girl into gender... entails more than her 
internalizing role scripts and expectations 
- 
it entails 
taking into account the power situation of the 
socializers and the socialized. And in our society, 
power and control are not usually in the hands of 
women. a1 
In other words gender socialization is partial rather than total, 
and is not simply a prison for the subject. one can conceivably 
adopt the oppositional strategy of gender reinterpretation, but 
usually this option of resistance is only available to the 
privileged. White, middle-class educated women (or men) are 
better able to distance themselves from the operations of gender 
since the limits of 'individuality' themselves seem to be largely 
class-determined: identity crisis is in some sense itself a 
privilege. Even if a woman recognizes the nature of her 
oppression through gender mechanisms, she cannot simply overcome 
it as an individual 
- 
she will still be judged and made 
accountable through gender/class expectations in social 
relations. Questions of gender are further confused through the 
fact that gender does not constitute rigid universal categories, 
and is often context-specific: people act out different roles in 
different situations. All gender constructions are derived from 
an unquestioned belief in the superiority of the male sex, but 
they are by no means inflexible or non-contradictory. The 
ability of gender ideology (all ideology) to incorporate 
'deviance' 
- 
such as the 'career woman' - is the most sinister 
and pervasive aspect of its strength. 
Thus gender and patriarchy - unwieldy terms though they are - 
- 
63 
- 
are fundamental points of departure for feminists in constructing 
an oppositional strategy, whether reformist or revolutionary. 
All Second Wave 'strands' consider these aspects to be central to 
their critical agenda; even Marxist feminists, emerging from a 
tradition which perceives power relations in terms of an ongoing 
class struggle, recognize the need to shift the main focus into 
the 'private' sphere of social/sexual relations. Their critical 
conclusions and the utopias that they formulate may conflict; but 
such tensions and contradictions seem to echo above all the 
contradictions' and tensions lying at the heart of an ideology of 
gender or patriarchy. As a movement, however, there is a sphere 
of activity in grassroots struggle which we can identify as 
'feminist' in the singular 
-a commitment to changing gendered 
inequality by attempting to unearth its roots. Feminist politics 
is in this respect unusual and possibly unique in its refusal to 
lay down doctrinal givens 
- 
all feminist research is offered as 
work in progress, a small contribution to a huge and growing 
epistemological concern which has yet to determine itself. 
THE ETHICS OF HETEROGENEITY 
Any political movement will face internal power struggles which 
threaten to destabilize and undercut its vitality. Moreover, 
Second Wave feminism did not emerge from a common political base 
- 
its philosophical roots lie in diverse schools of thought, and 
there has been substantial disagreement over the extent to which 
such 'patriarchal' roots should, or could, be shed. One of the 
earliest and most significant debates for Women's Liberation was 
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whether men should feature in its ranks. At early conferences 
and protests in both the USA and Britain men attended and were 
allowed a voice, but many women felt that the presence of men 
altered the nature and quality of debates, and that they often 
dominated discussion. Debates centred upon the question of 
whether men could be ousted if one accepted that 'the creation of 
a new woman of necessity demands the creation of a new man'. 42 
Although perhaps the majority of feminists did not foresee total 
separatism as a workable long-term solution, they craved the 
autonomy to construct a movement for women 
- 
'They wanted their 
movement not to reject men so much as to be independent from 
them. '43 
Radical feminists had characterized patriarchy rather loosely 
as an expression of male power over all women, and socialist and 
liberals alike turned their gaze to women's private lives and 
personal experiences, which seemed to affirm that women's problem 
was, generally speaking, men - not just those who held the reins 
of power in government, but also fathers, partners and 
contemporaries. The idea that the 'personal is political' gained 
impetus among feminists, and the scrutiny of their own life 
histories was seen as enabling and potentially liberating. 
'Sexual politics' must at one level relate to sex and an 
awareness that power relationships exist and are perpetuated in 
the most private domains of a woman's life: 
'Sexual politics' held together the idea of women as a 
social group dominated by men as a social group (male 
domination/female oppression), at the same time as 
turning back to the issue of women as sex outside of the 
bounds of reproduction. It threw political focus onto 
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the most intimate transactions of the bedroom: this 
became one of the meanings of 'the personal is 
Political'. 44 
Although heterosexual women could not conceive of total 
separatism as a viable feminist alternative, feminist critiques 
of the means by which prevailing norms within heterosexual 
practices reaffirm female subordination demanded that 
heterosexual relations be scrutinized and revised. No matter how 
well-meaning pro-feminist men appeared to be, at the level of 
sexuality and relationships they were all implicated as having a 
vested interest in the status quo. One of the single most 
important pamphlets in circulation during the late sixties was 
Anne Koedt's 'The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm' (1968), which cited 
the findings of Kinsey and Masters and Johnson that the clitoris 
and not the vagina was the site of orgasmic pleasure in women. 
If penetrative intercourse was viewed as the central determining 
feature of heterosexual union, it could now be conceived as a 
sexual practice defined only in terms of male desire -a focus 
which had not appeared to shift during the 'permissive' era. The 
logical conclusion of the observation that penetration was of 
secondary importance to women was that men were, theoretically at 
least, sexually expendable; more than this, that definitions of 
heterosexuality were open to renegotiation: 
Many have described the impact of Koedt's paper as 
'revolutionary'. It didn't tally with every woman's 
experience, nor did it lead to wholesale abandonment of 
heterosexuality. But it did enable women to talk about 
their sexuality in their own terms, to escape from male 
definitions of 'normality' and 'frigidity', to feel they 
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had a right to make demands, and to perceive what had 
previously seemed to be their own individual 'problems' 
as part of a pattern which was essentially political. '5 
Radical feminists emphasized the repercussions of sexism in 
women's domestic and sexual lives. If family life most 
effectively perpetuated male domination 
- 
in that it empowered 
individual men to recognize social/sexual hegemony over women 
- 
degrees of separatism merited serious attention. Radicals 
unquestionably perceived the work of redefining the limits of 
biologist defences of male power, and mapping out the effects of' 
culture and ideology upon the individual woman, as women's work. 
Separatism in the sphere of political debate was, then, a 
fundamental requirement. 
For socialist (or materialist) feminists there were clear 
political alliances and aims which automatically linked them with 
the (patriarchal) political establishment. Even accepting that 
the inception of socialist feminist discourse marks a point of 
disjunction with mainstream Marxist analysis, there are 
nonetheless clear shared links with Marxism and its prioritizing 
of class factors in any social analysis of power and inequality. 
As the years have passed, socialist feminists have created an 
analytical structure quite distinct in several ways from more 
traditional Marxist perspectives and often antagonistic to the 
gender-blindness of Marxist writings, but their strategic 
priorities remain quite distinct from those of radical feminists. 
While different cells of radicals expended energy creating 
manifestos, socialist feminists endeavoured to expand the Marxist 
one, focusing upon the arena of ideological struggle, which of 
-67- 
necessity would perceive radicals' 'lightning strike' protests 
and raids as ultimately counterproductive. Nonetheless the 
attention of radical feminists to consciousness raising draws an 
implicit parallel with socialist feminist theorizing, since the 
purpose of both activities is to challenge and transform women's 
perceptions of their social status. Liberal feminists were in 
the most paradoxical position of' defending the value of 
institutional political processes as a viable site for change, 
while their campaigns over such issues as wages for housework 
effectively demanded a very radical transformation of the social 
status quo. 
These divergent 'schools' of thought became synonymous with 
the two main features of women's liberation: radical feminism was 
a major force as the vanguard of the movement, whereas socialist 
feminism developed a sophisticated theoretical response to the 
problem of male domination. 46 A closer scrutiny of radical and 
socialist writings actually demonstrates that the two tendencies 
were fuelled by each other, and that many major feminist writers 
of the time tapped into both positions. 47 These superficial 
oppositions, coupled with the diverse contributions of lesbian, 
black and liberal feminists make for a politics which is 
multifarious in its manifestations. One clear reason why 
heterogeneity fuels the dynamics of Women's Liberation is that 
'Women, in a sense, are feminism's greatest problem. The 
assumption of a potential identity between women, rather than 
solving the problem, became a condition of increasing 
tensions'. 48 Part of feminism's success has been to establish 
woman as an object of study, by freeing her from the distortions 
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of male-oriented knowledge. But since the chief proponents of 
early Second Wave politics were white, middle-class, educated 
women, there was always a grave risk that female identity would 
become as homogenized as it is in male discourse, and that 
countless women would be marginalized by a movement which claimed 
to champion their rights. 
Bell Hooks argues that the majority of white feminists have 
done little but pay lip service to the idea of the diversity of 
women's lived experience, even though she agrees that the 
political interrogation of the personal is enabling for all 
women, 'because it challenges each of us to alter our person, our 
personal engagement (either as victims or perpetrators or both) 
in a system of domination. 549 Latterly many feminists have taken 
up black women's critical challenge, and have investigated how 
sex, race and class function as factors which together structure 
the social meanings of femininity, and in which women themselves 
constitute hierarchies of power and privilege. Hooks argues that 
it is necessary to forge a theory which can account for the 
shared experiences of all women, as well as acknowledging their 
differences. She cautions that white feminists' well-meaning 
refusal to 'speak for' black women serves to reinforce the 
polarity between black and white female experience, and could 
itself result in a perpetuation of racism, in that 'It 
helps... take the burden of accountability away from white women 
and places it solely onto women of colour'. 50 
At first sight lesbians in the Women's Movement have fared 
better than black women; since the late sixties they have been 
visibly present as activists and contributors to Second Wave 
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writings. Indeed depending upon what account of the early years 
one reads, lesbian feminists are sometimes characterized as about 
to wrest feminism from its heterosexual guardians. It is still a 
commonplace to associate radical politics with lesbianism, even 
though this scarcely appears to be the case. 51 one method by 
which the mass media has consistently attempted to undermine the 
power of feminist discourse and alienate potential recruits is to 
characterize all feminists as lesbians. It is disturbing, 
therefore, that many early feminists propagated homophobic 
sentiments and', moreover, perceived a lesbian presence in 
feminism as necessarily negative. Ginette Castro's account of 
these formative years of Second Wave militancy suggest that 
lesbians were commonly seen as a disruptive force within the 
movement, using it as a vehicle for proselytization. She further 
recounts rumours that lesbians were used by the FBI to discredit 
feminism; and that an anonymous force within the ranks 
successfully 'outed' Kate Millett as a bisexual. 52 Castro's 
description of Second Wave American feminism emphasizes 
discontinuities rather than consensus. and characterizes the 
movement as in the throes of a struggle for power between warring 
strands, but more particularly between feminist 'stars'. 
Although Castro's survey seems at times to delight in charting 
the acrimony within the movement, she appears to regard such 
power struggles as inevitable: 'born out of powerlessness and 
lack of experience in holding power, internal dissensions thus 
are part of the pathology of oppression. '53 
The strengths of feminism were its commitment to alternative 
forms of political organization, summarized in the following 
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statement from the Women's Liberation Workshop: 
We reject a structure based on the concept of leaders 
and led. For this reason, groups small enough for all to 
take part in discussion are basic units of our movement. 
We feel that the small group makes personal commitment a 
possibility and a necessity and that it provides 
understanding and solidarity... As a federation of a 
number of different groups, Women's Liberation Workshop 
is essentially heterogeneous, incorporating within it a 
wide range of opinions and plans for action. 54 
Feminism studiously avoided the pitfalls of leadership by making 
it an explicit policy to allow every women who joined to have a 
voice at a local level. The more negative side-effect of this, 
however, was that no one could veto the views of women who were 
foregrounded by the media as spokespeople, thus allowing the 
creation of an unofficial star system, including such figures as 
Betty Friedan and Germaine Greer 
- 
who have since recanted their 
earlier views. 'Joreen', writing in 1972, conceives feminism's 
'structurelessness' as itself tyrannical, in that after the 
exhilaration felt by individual women in small 'rap groups' there 
is a sense of aimlessness and anticlimax. She also claims that a 
denial of organizational structure enables elite groups of women 
to gain power by subterfuge - 'The more Unstructured a group is, 
the more lacking it is in informal structures, and the more it 
adheres to an ideology of "structurelessness", the more 
vulnerable it is to be taken over by a group of political 
comrades. '55 Her solution to this problem is to institutionalize 
modified democratic procedures, on the assumption that 
'structures' are instituted unofficially in any case. 
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In this chapter I have attempted to show that the Second Wave 
was founded upon heterogeneity, and current claims that the 
movement has since become riven by irreconcilable tensions might 
therefore be considered inaccurate, and certainly debatable. 
Heterogeneity could conversely be considered a strength, if we 
accept that feminist theory conceives of itself as largely a work 
in progress which challenges existing social visions, rather than 
chiefly trying to impose a new singular 'correct' viewpoint. 
Interventions by black and lesbian feminists, for example, have 
been instrumental in extending the scope of the feminist purview, 
contributing in an ideological war waged against the homogenized 
representation of woman offered in mainstream society. It would 
be misleading, not to say offensive to suggest that such debates 
have disrupted feminism's unity 
- 
which implies a defection from 
a concretized dogma. Feminism today may allow privileged space 
to the privileged; but its strength essentially lies in its 
commitment to creating a politics which offers a form of 
knowledge where 'women are its subjects, its enunciators, the 
creators of its theory, of its practice and of its language-956 
CONCLUS I ON 
This thesis is founded upon the conviction that feminism's 
heterogeneity and elusivity is its strength. Dissension need not 
amount to a disavowal of its central principles, but could rather 
be interpreted as maintaining its dynamism. Neither does the 
acceptance of heterogeneity preclude a consideration of the 
shared features of such strands, and more importantly an 
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examination of common epistemological gaps. The existence of 
such heated debates (which now tend to take place within the 
confines of the academic institution) confirms the richness of 
feminist discourse which is constantly diversifying, shifting 
ground in an effort to undercut the hegemony of male discourse. 
For the purposes of opening up the complexities of this 
discussion I shall spend the following two chapters offering a 
critical survey of dominant feminist 'strands'. One must 
acknowledge that Second Wave feminism has lost the impetus of 
grassroots activity: but as an intellectual tendency it has 
shored up the vestiges of this radicalism 
- 
even if it is now 
more often put to cerebral uses. As a theory it has lost its 
commitment to heterogeneity as a positive foil against 
patriarchal homogenizing influences. More than that, feminism of 
the present day occasionally appears to suffer from amnesia about 
its own past, where pioneer Second Wavers acted as veritable 
bricoleurs, making use of the analytical means to hand, in the 
absence of a pre-existing feminist orthodoxy. Annette Kolodny, 
in 'Some notes on Defining a "Feminist Literary Criticism"' 
(1975) suggests that in the sphere of literary studies, a 
feminist perspective can only be developed by such a process of 
bricolage: 
Let us, rather, use what we can from the past, embracing 
that which is, in fact illuminating and persuasive; let 
us refine or add to, in order to perfect those tools: and 
were the previous critical methods are found wanting, let 
us there expend our energies in inventing new questions 
and new methods of analysis. 57 
- 
73 
- 
Feminists of the nineties are in a position to draw upon a 
tradition of thought which has transgressed the boundaries of 
phallocentric discourse. To perceive heterogeneity as a 
necessary evil is to accept the contemporary popular wisdom that 
feminism lost its direction, or has gone as far as it could. The 
gaps in Second Wave discourse are sustained if strands are seen 
as autonomous; once we reassess their shared history, we can 
begin to further supplement feminist epistemology. 
As I hinted early on, in one sense such a separation 
(artificial as it may seem) is necessary and inevitable to 
counter accusations of homogenizing the Women's Movement, giving 
the lie that it is, or ever was a coherent set of doctrines. 
Much of its generative thrust is due, arguably, to the high 
degree of dissent which continues to prompt fierce debate within 
the movement, even though, ironically, such debates imply that 
women remain feminism's greatest problem. 'Woman' as political 
category is itself a site of contestation, once we consider 
questions of differences among women forged by other social 
divisions such as class, ethnicity or sexual orientation. There 
is a much more pragmatic reason, however, for considering the 
main strands of feminist thought in isolation. However 
misleading such generalizations may be in the case of theorists 
who seem to straddle such boundaries, or form sub-groups within a 
particular major strand, it is essential to have in mind a 
provisional 'map' of developments and distinctions in feminist 
thought so that gaps, links, common tendencies and the 
possibility of reconcilable differences can be comprehensively 
examined. As with all theoretical approaches with common aims. 
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to imply that feminism falls into several rigid categories is to 
produce a partial analysis of the power of feminist politics over 
the last two decades 
- 
this forced separation is only undertaken 
to forge more critical links between these tendencies. It also 
allows my work to conform to the approaches of the majority of 
contemporary feminist commentators who have understandably found 
that referring to 'strands' has given scope for developments in 
feminist scholarly practices that would otherwise risk remaining 
static as if immutable, if one were to ignore the intense debates 
within the ranks and attempt to discuss feminist discourse as if 
it were a unified dogma. 
I have accordingly chosen to split five main tendencies within 
feminism's Second Wave into two chapters; discussing liberal and 
socialist feminism and then radical, black and lesbian feminism. 
This split has few hidden critical agendas, except that it allows 
me to discuss the two feminist approaches which retained quite 
solid links with the mainstream political arena, versus the three 
tendencies which found a pressing need to remain outside the 
traditional realm of politics in order to redefine politics and 
extend social analysis by breaking all the 'rules' of political 
and academic analysis. It is self-evident that black and lesbian 
feminists can be socialists or liberals; but they also had to 
confront the fact that if mainstream politics had been 
gender-blind, middle-class feminism of whatever hue had been 
correspondingly race-blind and heterosexist in its bias. Even 
when feminist pioneers from the Enlightenment to the 1970s had 
inserted questions of gender into social analysis, it was largely 
left up to black, lesbian and working-class feminists to consider 
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the many levels and guises that gendered oppression could take, 
and link these to racism and homophobia which are just as endemic 
to Western thought. 
Juliet Mitchell is one of many current theorists who questions 
whether a development in feminist politics has effected any real 
social change; 58 and this question is especially pertinent when 
we note the increased fragmentation of the movement in the last 
decade and its transition from 'action' to relative inactivity as 
it filtered into the rarefied atmosphere of academe. Despite 
legal reforms on matters such as abortion, sex discrimination and 
equal pay, the real position of women has changed very little. 
It is vital that feminists investigate why these reforms have had 
such a negligible effect upon the material status of the majority 
of women (whether at work or in the home), and devote more 
attention to the problems of ideology and gender socialization 
- 
changing the law is relatively easy when compared to transforming 
a nation's social consciousness. 
The political atmosphere of the eighties and nineties can be 
characterized by its concentration on protecting the family 
structure. Both major political parties in Britain profess to be 
'family' parties, which necessarily involves supporting and 
defending the right of the (male) breadwinner to earn a 'family 
wage': where women might fit into this equation is a challenge to 
which mainstream politics has proved itself unequal. The 
phenomenon of a 'New Right' swing in both British and American 
political structures has signified a gradual erosion of state 
support, and increasing ideological pressure upon women to resume 
their position in the home as carers for children and the 
- 
76 
- 
elderly. As the eighties drew to a close there was a great deal 
of rhetoric about attracting women back into full-time work in 
face of a falling number of school leavers. Nonetheless women 
wanting a career still face almost inexorable problems if they 
have children or dependants, since childcare provisions are still 
relatively scarce and expensive, and healthcare cutbacks mean 
that more women have total responsibility for caring for the sick 
and elderly. 
It still seems that women are being pulled in two opposing 
directions: the attractions of a profession and a degree of 
financial autonomy have to be weighed against domestic 
responsibilities, which still tend to rest with the woman. 
Materially the government had to respond to a shrinking young 
workforce and call on the 'reserve army' of female labour - 
until, of course, the effects of the recession were keenly felt. 
Ideologically 'family politics' constantly reinforce the image of 
the wife/mother as the figure which binds the family together, as 
the stabilizing and most fundamental institution of civilized 
society. Over the years the media has produced a plethora of' 
stories dealing with juvenile delinquency, drug and solvent 
abuse, and child molestation: women, traditionally viewed as the 
guardians of a nation's morality, are often more than indirectly 
held accountable for the sins of an advanced capitalist society. 
With the AIDS epidemic, the end of the 'permissive society' has 
long been proclaimed. The resulting moral backlash endangers the 
hard-won sexual liberty of women, who are encouraged to return to 
lifelong monogamous relationships, despite the fact that the 
terms upon which they are constructed have not changed 
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Significantly. 
The unease felt among contemporary feminists that feminist 
politics proved unable to unseat mainstream political agendas, or 
that 'post-feminist' women (often pro-family proponents) have 
colonized the public media space of' 'women's issues', are to some 
extent well-founded. Both parliamentary politics and 
'post-feminism' have hijacked feminist issues and perverted their 
meanings to serve the interests of a patriarchal status quo. 
Feminism's heterogeneity signals its potential for transgressive 
and unpredictable action, despite the unfortunate truth that 
'even the term that signifies its rejection 
- 
"post-feminism" 
incorporates it. 'Sy Feminism's retreat 'off the streets' into 
academic/political quasi-respectability has rendered it partially 
innured to the effects of a New Right swing in Western countries. 
Now the theoretical sophistication of modern feminist discourse 
needs to be fed back into popular women's consciousness. Women's 
issues are common media currency these days, and it is essential 
that feminists challenge the extent to which these issues are 
being resolved in women's favour. Arguably there is less, not 
more room, for pessimism about the future of a chameleon-like 
organization which, in Dahlerup's words, 'has been declared dead 
many times. '60 
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CIIfAPTER TWO 
LIBERAL AND MARXIST FEMINISMS 
As feminists we need to reclaim our history and 
understand the complex construction of what we now know 
as feminism. It is also necessary to analyse those 
ideologies which have shaped our thinking and structured 
our experience of gender and our explanation of women's 
oppression. It seems to me that all of this is part of 
the project of building a feminist political theory. ' 
Having accepted that the term feminism is itself problematic 
because the theories that inform it are heterogeneous, it is 
perhaps useful to posit a very basic description of the feminist 
endeavour which embraces the most influential strands to be 
elucidated in this and the following chapter. All feminist 
positions are founded upon the belief that women suffer from 
systematic social injustices because of their sex and therefore, 
'any feminist is, at the very minimum, committed to some form of 
reappraisal of the position of women in society'. 2 one of the 
major sites of difference is in defining the 'oppressor' and 
locating the source of oppression - and indeed the term 
'oppression' might be exchanged for something less emotive, 
conjuring up, as it does, images of tyranny unpalatable to some 
moderates. The sometimes conflicting positions within feminism 
tend nonetheless to foreground the same substantive issues: it is 
when it comes to isolating 'causes' that there seems to be little 
or no agreement. 
An initial problem lies in the definition of 'politics' itself 
-a term most memorably appropriated and extended 
by radical 
feminists. Since politics and political theory are usually 
defined as the science of government and civic order, there can 
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clearly be no obvious critical space for feminist commentators, 
if we accept that this is a public sphere still largely closed to 
women. As many feminists have insisted upon grounding feminist 
analysis in female experience and therefore contesting male 
meanings, it seems reasonable to view all feminist positions 
- 
even the most entrenched in liberal orthodoxy 
- 
as transgressing 
such a definition. Despite the fact that since the seventies 
most feminists have determined their stance to be political, they 
have been regularly excluded from the corpus of political theory. 
The fear is, presumably, that politics as an academic discipline 
will lose some of its 'rigour', and that the broader sphere of 
institutional politics will be confronted by new agendas which 
further stretch the boundaries of democracy. 
I include liberal and Marxist feminism together in this 
chapter because, by virtue of their alliances with pre-existing 
political orthodoxies, we might tentatively regard them as having 
a degree of analytical investment within male-oriented meanings 
of politics and social transformation. As will be seen, however, 
the insertion of gender-based issues into such well-established 
bodies of knowledge of necessity extends the limits of such 
knowledge, and places both liberal and Marxist feminists in a 
degree of conflict with the original analytical framework of both 
political positions. It could be argued that Marxism yields 
greater possibilities as a model which potentially exposes the 
dependency of Western civilization upon perpetuating class 
distinctions, and therefore might be 'stretched', following 
Engels, to expose the utility of gender difference to capitalist 
social relations. However, the hegemony of liberal3 
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philosophical positions in Western society, which stretch back to 
at least the seventeenth century, and looks to its origins in 
'natural laws' (such is Thomas Hobbes's position4), makes it an 
even more diffuse and unwieldy socio-political stance than 
Marxism. Both liberal and Marxist feminists, therefore, occupy 
positions simultaneously within/without the patriarchal 
mainstream 
-a mainstream that has itself defined and redefined 
the notion of politics. Both strands are sites of internal 
tension and debate; but within the limits of this thesis, I can 
only gesture towards the most important of these divisions. I am 
more directly concerned with the effects upon these stances of 
inheriting 'orthodoxies' (by feminist standards), and in 
questioning to what extent these uneasy alliances have enriched 
feminist thought, despite evidence that hegemonic political 
influences often prove stultifying and contradictory for female 
dissenters. 
THE LIBERAL FEMINIST TRADITION 
It is often argued that the origins of liberal philosophy are 
co-existent with the rise of capitalism, so that the language of 
autonomy and self-improvement becomes inextricably linked to the 
property interests of the middle classes. 5 Liberal investment in 
a concept of metaphysical dualism separated 'man' from other 
animals as distinct because of the ability to reason: thus 
conceptually resulting in a mind/body split - the mind associated 
with rationality, and the body with all things base and physical 
shared with other living creatures. The ability to reason and 
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the consequent capacity for humans to conceive of themselves as 
unique individuals, and therefore the basic constituents of all 
social groups, is foregrounded by classic liberals. This guiding 
notion of abstract individualism immediately creates fissures in 
the liberal political position, since: 
logically, if not empirically, human individuals could 
exist outside a social context; their essential 
characteristics, their needs and interests, their 
capacities and desires, are given independently of their 
social- context and are not created or even fundamentally 
altered by that context. b 
Nonetheless liberal philosophy is concerned with providing 
political justification for the existence of a hierarchical 
civilization, in which many members must accept their lack of 
privilege as natural and immutable. Liberal political philosophy 
regards such a model of civilization as natural; and in doing so 
writers such as Thomas Hobbes in The Citizen (1651) project a 
view of Man in the bare state of nature as constantly in a state 
of conflict with all other men, who require contracts of 
citizenship and rules of morality and government which will 
satisfy the citizen's nascent self-interest. Society therefore 
facilitates institutionalization of rules for free competition 
within the state, by reasoning that the unbridled pursuit of 
self-interest at the expense of all others logically results in 
self-destruction. Hobbes thus asserts that though 'nature hath 
given to every one a right to all', ' for the sake of the 
protection offered by civic rule, 'the right of all men to all 
things ought not to be retained'. 8 Although Hobbes maintains 
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that in their natural (uncivilized) state all men would be equal, 
in terms of their right to pursue their own self-interest, this 
right is relinquished under civil laws in the name of higher 
reason: 
I know that Aristotle, in his first book of Politics, 
affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, 
that some men by nature are made worthy to command, 
others only to serve; as if lord and servant were 
distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, 
that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge or 
ignorance. 9 
Hobbes, in common with other liberal philosophers, seems to 
utilize two conflicting views of nature: one which avers that 
man, abstracted from society and forced to thrive upon his 
instinct for self-preservation, would need to be esteemed equal; 
one which espouses rationality as itself a natural human quality 
engendering a recognition within all humans of the need for 
social groupings governed by rules and contracts, which some 
enforce and some have enforced upon them. Although later writers 
conceive of individuals acting upon principles of moral 
impartiality as opposed to naked self-interest, liberal thinkers 
tend to picture social cohesion as based upon individual 
competitiveness. They assert, therefore, that civilization 
demands limited powers of the state to introduce a shared 
agreement of mutual respect and civic rights, and to counter the 
likelihood of conflict. 
This rhetoric of nature conjures up images of biological and 
social determinism simultaneously, especially in the liberal 
belief that there are timeless and universal principles which 
- 
83 
- 
inform the regulation of harmonious society. But in the above 
summary of the classic liberal position I have been using the 
term 'man' advisedly. Liberalism tends to cast female nature as 
separate, an adjunct to the male principle, which derives its 
meaning only as different from masculinity, yet contained within 
such a category. The concepts of the public and private sphere 
are used to identify the limits of state intervention in 
individual existence. The 'public' comes to mean aspects of 
social life where state intervention is legitimate; whereas the 
'private sphere' is the realm of abstract individualism 
- 
where 
'man' maintains his own dominion free from the fetters of civic 
intervention. Male nature 
- 
the idealized public face of 
masculinity 
- 
becomes the paradigm of social interaction by 
default; female nature belongs to the home and to the irrational 
side of human nature, associated with qualities such as 
nurturance and emotion. 
Accordingly the chief aim of liberal feminism -a tendency 
whose history is almost as long and as chequered as the history 
of liberal thought 
- 
has been to accord to women the rights that 
men hold 'naturally'. Liberal feminism has a long tradition of 
gender-based interventions in Western thought, and we have the 
legacy of such writers as Mary Wollstonecraft, and later John 
Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, who set out to show that all 
social categories are structured by the fact of gender; and that 
'femininity' is a prison rather than a quality of healthy 
femaleness. The language of liberty, rights and legal equality 
is the currency of liberal feminism, witnessed clearly in the 
works of the Suffragists; but few, perhaps, have argued more 
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passionately than Wollstonecraft that femininity is a condition 
akin to slavery. The seemingly neutral and inclusive term 'human 
nature' needed to be re-examined to demonstrate that while 'human 
nature' obliterates social/biological difference by conjuring up 
an impression of collectivity, it in fact marginalizes female 
experience by characterizing men and women as quite different and 
of conflicting 'natures'. This essential contradiction between 
an overarching but simultaneously bifurcated concept of human 
nature which is summoned by early liberal feminists, reflects 
wider tensions within the liberal notion of human nature 
altogether. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that 'human' powers 
of reason did not unequivocally extend to women; rather, the 
liberal concept of female nature assumed women's innate 
irrationality. 
Enlightenment feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft asserted 
that women too possessed the innate capacity for reason, but that 
this capability had been quelled by their lack of education: 
Women are everywhere in this deplorable state; for, in 
order to preserve their innocence, as ignorance is 
courteously termed, truth is hidden from them, and they 
are made to assume an artificial character before their 
faculties have acquired any strength. Taught from their 
infancy that beauty is woman's sceptre, the mind shapes 
itself to the body, and roaming round its gilt cage, only 
seeks to adore its prison. Men have various employments 
and pursuits which engage their attention, and give a 
character to the opening mind; but women, confined to 
one, and having their thoughts constantly directed to the 
most insignificant part of themselves, seldom extend 
their views beyond the triumph of the hour. But were 
their understanding once emancipated from the slavery to 
which the pride and sensuality of man and their 
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short-sighted desire, like that of dominion in tyrants, 
of present sway, has subjected them, we should probably 
read of their weaknesses with surprise. 10 
In Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Wollstonecraft is 
perhaps the earliest feminist thinker to challenge essentialist 
notions of femininity 
- 
qualities which seemed to neatly oppose 
those rational virtues of human (or male) nature. Wollstonecraft 
demonstrated that women were commonly viewed as ruled by the pull 
of their bodily functions (notably reproduction) and physical 
attributes, and therefore mentally incapacitated. Though wary of 
asserting that, given the opportunity to realize their full 
potential through the discipline of education, women could 
achieve full equality with men, Wollstonecraft firmly posits what 
will become a vital distinction for latter-day feminists; that 
the bare physical facts of biological difference should not be 
unquestionably extended to create distinctions between the mental 
or rational capability of men and women. 
on one level, Wollstonecraft's plea is one in keeping with 
liberal philosophy where individuals are autonomous agents who 
'freely' engage in a social contract which determines their 
societal position. Her book charts in detail the experience of 
the (middle-class) woman trapped in the private sphere of 
domesticity and encumbent moral/ethical ignorance. Even though 
she emphasized the social effects of women's incarceration in the 
home 
- 
their lack of access to formal education, their gendered 
socialization into the trappings of femininity - her text focused 
implicitly on the realm of the personal relations between a woman 
and her father or husband. As Ursula Vogel argues: 
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Discrimination against women differed from the treatment 
suffered by other under-privileged groups in the 
eighteenth century... in that the reasons for exclusion 
cannot easily be rendered transparent. They are sunk in, 
and obscured by, personal relations which resist 
identification as forms of domination and subjugation. " 
This institutionalization of gender difference is grounded in the 
summoning up of natural and immutable differences. And if the 
'natural' is used by liberal philosophers to legitimate existing 
civic and social order, as it is for example by Thomas Hobbes, to 
argue for change is to summon up images of unnaturalness and 
irrationality. Wollstonecraft's case, it seems, is a priori 
denounced by the epistemological foundations of liberalism. Yet 
Wollstonecraft arguably exposes basic contradictions within 
liberal thought itself 
- 
in that its universal moral principles 
of liberty, justice and citizenship cannot be applied equitably 
to all human beings, even accepting that certain inequities, such 
as hierarchies of privilege, are built into liberal values. 
Given that certain institutions are formalized as the sites 
within which such concepts operate, the private sphere is 
sustained informally and qualities of justice or liberty cannot 
properly be gauged within its purview. 
Wollstonecraft appeals to reason - an inclusion of women 
within the 'Rights of Man' 
- 
which is effectively a claim for 
women's inclusion as part of the higher order of the human 
species, and to eschew the worst effects of biological 
reductionism. She argues, instead, that women at the present 
time lack the capacity to engage actively in political processes 
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(accepting the possibility of greater physical frailty, but not 
intellectual weakness as a correlative). More than this, in her 
concluding remarks to Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
Wollstonecraft forcefully lays much of the blame for women's 
enslaved state in the hands of man: 
From the tyranny of man, I firmly believe, the greater 
number of female follies proceed; and the cunning, which 
I allow makes at present a part of their character, I 
likewise have repeatedly endeavoured to prove, is 
produced by oppression. '2 
The language used here is more unequivocal than that used by 
twentieth century liberals, where the relationship between men 
and women is clearly situated as a power relationship, where men 
hold sway, not by virtue of their greater ability to rule, but by 
maintaining tyrannous subjection over women in their homes and 
marriages. 
I have argued briefly in this section that liberal philosophy 
is predicated upon a basic conceptual contradiction, where 
natural qualities are summoned to: (a) endorse man's superiority 
over the rest of the animal kingdom by virtue of reason; and (b) 
legitimate existing forms of social order in Western capitalism 
as most properly compatible with the human temperament of 
self-interest and competitiveness. There is evidently a degree 
of slippage between these two uses of the term 'natural', which 
occlude the nature/culture divide. To some extent this usage 
is 
adopted uncritically by liberal feminists such as Wollstonecraft 
in order to argue in similar rationalistic terms for women's 
right of access to fully determined qualities of 
human nature. 
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If man can transcend his animalistic instinctual origins to 
create a world of reason, culture and social order, then surely 
women should also be credited for the faculty of mental 
transcendence, rather than being conceived as trapped inside 
their bodies which are traditionally seen to dictate the limits 
of their cerebral responses; so like animals, they too must be 
kept under restraint. 
On the whole Wollstonecraft's plea for the rights of woman, is 
a plea for the chance for women to fulfil their socially endowed 
functions as wife, mother and moral guardian with self-control, 
and freed from the emotionalism she sees as endemic to the female 
sex in their present enslaved situation. While rationality, 
then. is conceived to be potentially genderless, Wollstonecraft 
still fundamentally accepts that sexual divisions determine 
differing social roles for men and women, and that given the 
opportunity for proper education women would be able to discharge 
their duties more effectively. In terms of 'natural' human 
instincts, Wollstonecraft seems to subscribe to the view that 
women, properly educated into their moral and civic 
responsibilities, would be able to curb men's unbridled and 
corrupt sexual appetites - in this central features associated 
with masculinity and femininity remain unexamined. Yet her 
primary demand 
- 
for the same education to be provided for women 
as is provided for men - necessarily gestures towards a future 
where women, equal in intellectual attainments, might deserve, as 
individuals, the right to enter the civil domain and to be 
economically autonomous. Her underlying argument that the 
inclusion of the rights of woman within civic rights would enable 
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women to be truly useful members of society belies the fact that 
a 'revolution in female manners'13 might pave the way for a more 
groundbreaking form of revolution. 
THE LIBERAL ELEMENT OF SECOND WAVE THINKING 
Modern liberal feminism has reaped the benefits of centuries of 
liberal feminist writings, and in a sense, all current feminist 
positions derive impetus and inspiration from such writers, so 
that this tradition lies at the heart of feminist knowledge. 
With this legacy lies the inheritance of certain tensions at the 
heart of liberalism, particularly evident in attempts by 
feminists to posit a model of female equality within a system of 
beliefs that operate on the assumed right to participate in the 
free market economy, which often overlooked the fact that for 
many women, free engagement in the economy was not viable. The 
liberal perspective on state intervention in people's lives also 
proved problematic, since state support was crucial to many 
women's lives, and any shrinkage of its services would probably 
mean that women's lives deteriorated. Most importantly liberal 
feminists were still caught in the double-bind of appealing for 
women's right to personhood, whilst attempting to expose the 
means by which women were victims of their biological sex. 
Underlying these calls, as we shall see in relation to Friedan's 
work, is an implicit affirmation that 'women's work' - mothering, 
domestic management, and nurturance, is still women's work, but 
that women should be encouraged to realize their true potential 
in public spheres in addition to these commitments. 
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Feminist writings on individuality, the state and the 
constraints of femininity reflect the continuing middle-class 
bias of liberal feminism. Friedan's portrait of the bored 
housewife, who having given up higher education for domesticity 
finds herself entrapped in self-absorption and neurosis, echoes 
Wollstonecraft's vain frail and ignorant domestic angel, and both 
only have resonance in their particular cultural/historical 
contexts as representations of privileged middle-class existence. 
The liberal belief in the universal and static qualities of human 
nature mean that the direction of liberal feminist energies is 
towards reform; and educational reform, as in Wollstonecraft's 
day, is high upon the agenda. A concept of equality is clearly 
central to liberal feminist thinking, although given that 
equality in liberal terms means equal access to a meritocracy, 
the concept demands further scrutiny. 
Betty Friedan is an important writer in the feminist tradition 
not least because of her crucial role in the formation of 
America's National Organization for Women. Writing The Feminine 
Mystique in 1963, she was to characterize the effect of nurture 
rather than nature upon women as 'sex role conditioning'. 
Friedan's analysis of what she provocatively terms 'The Problem 
that has No Name' that beset countless middle-class American 
housewives, illustrates that despite increased opportunities for 
higher education and entry into rewarding careers, women were 
turning back to the hearth in their droves. And that this urge 
to return to domesticity might have deeper resonances than the 
superficial 'answers' that were proffered by the American popular 
mass media - that women had been encouraged to transcend their 
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'natural' aspirations through education, and other 'masculine' 
goals. Friedan termed this chimerical problem the 'feminine 
mystique', which she characterizes early on in her book: 
The feminine mystique says that the highest value and 
the only commitment for women is the fulfilment of their 
own femininity. It says that the great mistake of 
Western culture, through most of its history, has been 
the undervaluation of this femininity. It says this 
femininity is so mysterious and intuitive and close to 
the creation and origin of life that man-made science may 
never be able to understand it. But however special and 
different, it is in no way inferior to the nature of man; 
it may even in certain respects be superior. The 
mistake, says the mystique, the root of women's troubles 
in the past is that women envied men, women tried to be 
like men, instead of accepting their own nature, which 
can find fulfilment only in sexual passivity, male 
domination, and nurturing maternal love... Beneath the 
sophisticated trappings, it simply makes certain 
concrete, finite domestic aspects of feminine 
existence... into a religion, a pattern by which all women 
must now live or deny their femininity. 14 
Friedan's description of the feminine mystique has disturbing 
similarities with Wollstonecraft's analysis made over one hundred 
and fifty years earlier. Yet many of the women that Friedan 
interviewed had received an education that Wollstonecraft would 
have envied. Where the two women differ is that Friedan, in 
common with many feminists of the period, pinpointed a subtler, 
less tangible oppressive force at work, which while having a 
profound effect on such women's material existence, seemed to 
stem from and operate effectively and semi-autonomously at an 
ideological level. Nonetheless Friedan does not pursue the 
ideological factors at stake to anything like the degree that 
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radical and Marxist feminists do. Liberal feminists, like all 
liberals, concentrate on individual autonomy and the right to 
self-determination with the result that although on the face of 
it Friedan is attacking the patriarchal status quo which exhorts 
women to give all their efforts to childcare and housewifery, 
there is a subtext that seems to be blaming the women themselves. 
The book is in some sense a part of the consciousness-raising 
tradition, in that she charts the reasons behind the problem that 
has no name and poses solutions which are largely related to the 
efforts of women to reconstitute their own identities. But 
unlike radical feminist efforts which focus upon individual 
female identity and experience as the first step to collective 
revolution, Friedan's revolution remains largely an individual 
one; if not achieved, she implies, women only have themselves to 
blame. While she entreated women to find creative work outside 
the home, she assumed that they would find methods to continue 
their domestic responsibilities as well. Rosemary Tong cogently 
summarizes the thrust of Friedan's argument, observing that: 
The Feminine Mystique failed to consider just how 
difficult it would be for even privileged women to 
combine marriage and motherhood with a career unless 
major structural changes were made within, as well as 
outside the family. Like Wollstonecraft, [Harriet] 
Taylor and [John Stuart] Mill before her, Friedan sent 
women out into the public realm without summoning men 
into the private domain. '5 
Liberal feminist thought commonly displays a wariness to 
affirm women's full potential for total equality, while 
maintaining that women's potential has never been fully realized. 
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Here we can identify traces of male-oriented liberal thought; 
that while the rights of the individual are sacrosanct in liberal 
philosophy, it is up to the individual to realize their own 
potential. This construction quite blatantly chooses to ignore 
the existence of other social or cultural factors which might 
make it quite impossible for an individual to acquire the means 
to realize such potential. This concept of 'Abstract 
Individualism' 
- 
that essential human qualities belong to the 
individual regardless of social context 
- 
reifies notions of 
freedom and autonomy and tends to assume that people always act 
in their own best interests. What modern liberal feminists have 
been anxious to point out is that liberalism's favourite 
mind/body binary opposition has become correlative with 
male/female distinctions contained within the blanket term 'human 
nature'. In such an equation women become synonymous with nature 
and physicality (and as such are conceived as trapped within the 
fact of their biology), whereas men are equated with the mind and 
rationality, and are therefore construed as the progenitors of 
culture. Unless such oppositions are fully interrogated and 
deconstructed the logic of liberalism dictates that women 
straddle the man/beast divide, recreating the necessary 
epistemological conditions for female subordination. 
Since liberalism has been a highly influential Western 
philosophical position, it is unsurprising that liberal feminists 
have played an important part in the formation of a specifically 
feminist discourse. Indeed, it is Alison Jaggar's conviction 
that feminism owes a great deal to the liberal tradition: 
'indeed, it owes so much that some Marxists characterize feminism 
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as an essentially bourgeois phenomenon'. 16 In order to establish 
a specifically liberal feminist political perspective it is 
evidently necessary to call into question some of' the most 
fundamental precepts of liberalism 
- 
notably the slippage of the 
mind/body divide to connote discrete qualities of sexual 
difference. In addition, something which potentially sets 
classic liberal feminists in opposition to socialist and radical 
feminists is the notion of the inviolable 'private sphere': in 
theory this would disallow them from any thorough politicization 
of women's existence in the domestic sphere, including issues 
such as marital rape and domestic violence. In practice, critics 
since Betty Friedan have found it necessary to exhibit the 
tensions present in women's domestic and sexual lives in order to 
bring issues of gender inequality to the surface. However, 
strictly speaking, liberal feminists - by virtue of their 
commitment to freedom of expression - are unable to take a hard 
line on issues such as pornography. '/ 
Because of liberalism's long history of links with industrial 
capitalism, liberal feminists tend to be reluctant to pose any 
direct challenge to capitalism, which effectively leaves the 
option of a limited intervention in the institutions which 
maintain it. This might well preclude detailed analyses of the 
family 
- 
not only as an institution which functions effectively 
for capitalism, but also as belonging to the sacred 
'private 
sphere'. The liberal feminist's strategy for social change 
is 
hence tightly restricted by the liberal's desire not to overturn 
the status quo; liberal feminists prefer the tactics of reasoned 
argument via non-coercive demonstrations and 
lobbying for legal 
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and civil reforms. Since liberals have always staunchly 
protected the individual's right to self-advancement, liberal 
feminists would generally assert that a meritocracy is not sexist 
as long as women acquired the same social and legal status as 
male citizens. Inevitably, as Friedan's book readily 
illustrates, liberal feminism is centred on the needs of 
middle-class women, and would possibly not accept class or racial 
difference as a significant handicap in the path to 
self-advancement. 
The above overview suggests that liberal feminism's powerful 
links with classic liberalism prevent any productive discussion 
of the root causes of women's oppression, since the guiding 
structures of contemporary Western society are not really 
questioned. Indeed, there is little evidence that liberal 
feminists of the past have wanted to achieve a significant break 
with traditional liberalism by calling any of its central 
precepts into question, even though their stance as feminists 
effectively does this. But liberal feminism has had an abiding 
effect on American feminist politics; especially through NOW it 
has achieved a substantial degree of success through its policy 
of 'soft' lobbying. It has never become such an influential 
political stance in Britain or in the rest of Europe, in terms of 
mainstream political engagement, though this is not to 
underestimate the impact of liberal feminist writings upon the 
embryonic stages of the Second Wave across the Atlantic. 
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LIBERAL FEMINISM AS 'SCEPTICAL FEMINISM'? 
In Britain in 1980 Janet Radcliffe Richards' The Sceptical 
Feminist was published. Offering a stance that derives its 
impetus from the liberal philosophical tradition, she adopts the 
guise of an objective commentator on contemporary feminism, 
appraising the flaws in its logic and arguments that render it an 
unpopular and therefore 'failed' movement. Although she does not 
announce herself as a liberal thinker, her mode of argument 
assigns her to such a position. Moreover, her repeated use of 
the first person plural pronoun indicates that to some extent she 
perceives herself as a feminist, however sceptical. Richards 
sees her task as a corrective one 
- 
upbraiding the more 'extreme' 
and unattractive aspects of feminism, notably lamenting many 
feminists' refusal to train their powers of reason and logic in 
debate. Richards assumes that the mode of reasoning she utilizes 
is universally accepted as the only way to solve a philosophical 
problem 
- 
she ignores many feminists' contention that reason 
itself is compounded upon a patriarchal logic which has as a 
central premise the intellectual/moral inferiority of women. 18 
Her alarm at a tendency to celebrate 'unreason' within the 
women's movement, is based on her suspicion that such a stance 
merely reinforces existing masculine and feminine divisions. 
However, other feminists might interpret such a position as a 
means by which to redefine what constitutes reasonable argument 
within a social order which denies women any such capacity. 
Effectively she argues that rather than engaging in our own 
peculiar brand of 'unreason', we should take time to learn the 
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forms of philosophical and discursive enquiry that are usually 
the male preserve. Many feminist academics might well respond by 
observing that women are steeped in such knowledges which have 
inscribed within them precepts which inhibit a thorough 
investigation of the particular experiences of the female, and 
that one of feminism's victories has been the provision of the 
opportunity to extend the boundaries of such a preserve. 
Richards is concerned that feminism's conviction of female 
intellectual and social equality ignores the possibility that, 
since we cannot know women's true potential at present, there may 
be a necessity in the future to allow for the existence of 
inherent sexual difference: 
There may be very few feminists, for instance, who would 
even admit to considering the possibility that women 
might on the whole be less capable of works of genius 
than men: for most feminists, the inherent equality of 
the sexes in all such matters is part of the official 
doctrine. 19 
If it is the case that women are handicapped in certain matters 
(through childbirth and so forth), she argues that it would be 
foolish to try to obscure these facts, since they need not 
prevent women from occupying positions of power in a feminist 
utopia. One of the central premises of her overall argument is 
that feminism needs to be more flexible in the alternatives it 
offers to women, in order to encourage a flowering as of yet 
unknown potential -a criticism that many contemporary 
feminists 
might accept. But she is uncomfortable with feminism's chief 
focus upon injustices against women, and argues that 'to fight 
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with nothing in view but the good of women is to fight for an 
unjust society'. 20 Much of her discussion is underpinned by 
fairly conventional discussions of the nature of justice, based 
on the rather inaccurate premise that feminists spend little time 
considering other forms of' social inequality and their relation 
to gender. Justice is of course a thorny problem for feminists, 
and clashes between differing strands are most manifestly felt in 
debates around class, race and sexual orientation. She 
recognizes that feminism's primary intention is to hold up to 
question all existing social institutions and customs, but 
underestimates the scope of that intention, which assumes that 
projected social transformations incorporate a changing status 
for men as well. Feminist utopias are necessarily woman-centred 
in their concerns, since one of their most important functions is 
to reflect upon the present 
- 
to gesture at ways in which things 
could be otherwise. 
Richards criticizes the Women's Movement for what she 
perceives as its indeterminacy, 21 whereas others might more 
positively characterize its non-doctrinal aspects as evidence of 
its rich diversity. She attacks what might be regarded as the 
'stereotypical' face of feminism, and argues that a feminist 
'style' 
- 
characterized as a total rejection of all conventional 
standards of feminine beauty and sexual attractiveness - leads to 
a repression of individual self-determination: 'The fact is that 
women who dress in a conventionally feminine way, or give the 
impression of caring about their appearance however little effort 
it actually takes, are regarded by many feminists as enemies. '22 
She trivializes feminists' endeavour to politicize issues of 
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representation and female sexuality, conflating debates about the 
imposed sexualization of the female with sexual pleasure itself, 
and asserting 'it can be no part of a serious feminism to argue 
that there is anything inherently wrong with the sensual 
enjoyment of sex'. 23 For her, feminist personal politics denies 
individual women their personal preference 
- 
although of course 
feminists would want to debate the extent to which such 'choices' 
are made freely. She defends the sanctity of the private sphere, 
and therefore refuses any credence to feminist problematizations 
of the public/private divide, or analyses of a dominant ideology 
which positions women in an object relationship to men 
- 
in fact 
she appears to condone such a view 
- 
'There can be no reasonable 
feminist principle which says that women ought not to want men, 
and if women want men they must be willing to be pleasing to 
them'. 24 The thrust of the book, in its attempt to rescue 
feminism from its worst excesses, addresses a reader who has 
always been the focus of liberal feminism - white, middle-class, 
heterosexual 
- 
ignoring women who do not inhabit what is a 
relatively privileged social position. 
The Sceptical Feminist typically appeals to the readers' 
common sense 
- 
assuming them to be women who may wish to assert 
their right to equality under democracy, but have no wish to 
radically transform their current status quo. However, Richards' 
reappraisal of feminism fails to take account of how such 'common 
sense' opinions come to be entrenched in our consciousness, not 
necessarily because they are the most effective wisdom available. 
The underlying assumption is that women largely want what is now 
available to them, although with a little more freedom to 
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exercise certain choices. In fact she assumes, in common with 
Wollstonecraft and Friedan, that right-minded women still wish to 
be in sole charge of' domestic arrangements and childcare. She 
concludes that feminism is an 'unpopular movement', 25 and largely 
blames feminists themselves for creating exclusionary practices, 
and advocating alternative social arrangements which antagonize 
other 'reasonable' women. 
Liberal feminists' constant recourse to reason, and commitment 
to a recognition of the rights women already theoretically 
possess, is its most problematic feature for other feminist 
perspectives. Nonetheless its long and respected history as a 
corrective element to dominant political thought cannot be 
ignored, since its fight for equality created the conditions 
whereby dissenting feminist stances could emerge. It still 
remains popular. and as Andrea Nye postulates, is often the first 
form of feminism that women encounter: 
When a woman in the United States or Western Europe 
first identifies herself as a feminist, it is often as a 
liberal feminist, asserting her claim to the equal rights 
and freedoms guaranteed to each individual in democratic 
society. 26 
In its investment in a social hierarchy that allows nominal 
equality on the basis of merit and effort, it reminds many 
feminists of early Second Wave errors in assuming that women's 
collective experience of oppression was a bourgeois one, since 
it 
addresses women who have the luxury of making choices which they 
often mistakenly assume are available to everyone. It 
is also 
too often a position from which the women's movement 
is 
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undermined, its politics trivialized, and made indistinguishable 
from an anti-feminist wave, which assumes the title of 
'post-feminism', and urges a reconsideration of the 'facts' of 
human nature 
- 
as something which 'extreme' feminism has rather 
too precipitately rejected. 
AN UNEASY ALLIANCE: THE MARXIST/FEMINIST NCA_ 
The terms Marxist and socialist become relatively interchangeable 
when describing those feminists who have endeavoured to form 
alliances with the political Left. However, critics such as 
Rosemarie Tong argue that they represent two distinct tendencies 
within feminist thought 
- 
socialist feminism having superceded 
Marxist feminism and being 'largely the result of Marxist 
feminists' dissatisfaction with the essentially gender-blind 
character of Marxist thought'. 27 Marxist feminists, she asserts, 
see class as the ultimate determinant of women's current 
social/economic status, whereas socialist feminists view gender 
and class as equally powerful oppressive mechanisms and focus, in 
addition, upon areas of sexuality and reproduction. I do not 
agree, however, that such a clear distinction can be made, and 
would concur with Alison Jaggar that 'socialist feminism is 
unmistakably Marxist, at least insofar as it utilizes the method 
of historical materialism'. 28 Currently, socialist feminism 
appears to be the preferred epithet, but this seems to be a 
response to Marxist hostility, and a move towards involvement 
with mainstream left-wing politics, rather than a symptom of 
theoretical fragmentation. The very addition of gender to the 
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Marxist theoretical equation prompts scrutiny of areas of female 
sexuality and procreation, so that a maintenance of class as the 
central determining factor of contemporary power relations seems 
untenable. Since much of the following is concerned with the 
appropriation of Marxist thought for feminist purposes, I shall 
use the term Marxist feminism in the initial stages of this 
discussion, and then proceed to use the term socialist feminist 
in the successive section 
- 
to indicate the growing split between 
feminist analyses and Marxist orthodoxy. 
Marxists do not, of course, share the liberal investment in 
maintaining the social status quo, since the conditions of social 
life for the oppressed and exploited under advanced capitalism is 
the primary subject of' their critique. Feminists hoped to 
develop Marxist critiques of a social and economic system based 
on class divisions, and fuse this with radical feminists' utopian 
call for a revolution in consciousness. In their attempt to 
merge Second Wave radicalism with Marxist analyses of the 
capitalist social formation, Marxist feminists encounter a major 
difficulty 
- 
the radical feminist concept of patriarchy as a 
universal and transhistorical system of power relations between 
the sexes seems incompatible with Marxist class analysis, which 
is historically and culturally specific, and elides the gender 
question almost entirely. Where liberal feminists still tend to 
regard the domestic sphere as the focus of women's lives, Marxist 
feminists are concerned with the fate of women workers in the 
labour market itself, as well as with examining how women's 
perceived natural function as carer and domestic labourer affects 
notions of her 'value' within the workplace. They share with 
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radical feminists a commitment to politicize the personal and 
private, by arguing that women are held in the thrall of a 
patriarchal system of relations, which may work as functional for 
capital, but predates it and therefore might be regarded as 
having a certain degree of autonomy. However, their attempts to 
forge an alliance with Marxism meant that they expended a great 
deal of their energies challenging a political agenda which 
tenaciously obscured the fact of women's oppression, and 
therefore might perpetuate it outside a capitalist social 
formation. 
Feminist interventions into Marxist thought rapidly exposed 
the fact that class-based analysis either assumes that women 
enter the class system on equal terms with men, or that they are 
of no relevance to either its maintenance or destruction. Just 
as a liberal concept of rationality presupposes a male model of 
reason, so Marxism presupposes that a male experience of 
inequities under capitalism will be the motivating force behind a 
revolution, and therefore the building block upon which to 
construct an alternative. Marxists, unlike liberals, ostensibly 
repudiate purely essentialist notions of human nature: the 
Marxian notion of praxis posits human activity as social activity 
- 
that there is a dialectical relationship between human biology 
and human society, which is constantly undergoing modifications 
through the process of history - yet this concept is not 
interrogated in relation to particular social roles of women. In 
theory, therefore, Marxist analysis of historical flux appeared 
to facilitate a consideration of the social construction of, 
gender roles, which could dispense with the biologistic 
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assumptions that lay at the heart of liberal philosophy; but in 
practice women's 'natural' social functions were assumed as 
givens. 
Marxist thought proved attractive to feminists because of its 
eschewal of universalizing notions of human nature; but more 
pragmatically, such a mode of analysis was familiar to many women 
who found their political awakening in left-wing radicalism. 
Both movements are, after all, seeking a total transformation of 
social institutions in order to end the exploitation and 
oppression of specific social groups. The Marxist consideration 
of the function of ideological processes is particularly 
conducive to feminist appropriation, as a means by which 
individuals' 'collusion' in their subordination can be critically 
reappraised. Nonetheless Marxist feminists faced a substantial 
hurdle to their project, which is that the basic tenets of 
feminism and Marxism 
- 
patriarchy versus class 
- 
appear to be 
mutually incompatible. For this reason, Marxists have at times 
been hostile to feminist critiques, characterizing the Women's 
Movement as constructing an abstract and ahistorical case of 
special pleading on behalf of women 
- 
in that woman as an 
analytical category is not compatible with social delineations 
exposed by class analysis. Feminism, it is argued, homogenizes 
female experience from a wholly bourgeois perspective, creating a 
political diversion which forestalls revolution rather than 
facilitates it. 
Such attacks primarily resulted from feminism's focus upon 
women's private lives as the crucial site of unequal patriarchal 
power relationships, a sphere which plainly has no place within 
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Marxism's economistic framework. Feminists responded by arguing 
that the Marxian analysis of labour relations is inadequate so 
long as it ignores how other forms of' unpaid, 'unproductive' 
labour 
- 
such as procreative and domestic labour 
- 
contribute to 
the stability and viability of industrial capitalism. Whereas 
Utopian Socialists of the nineteenth century such as Saint-Simon 
and Fourier (viewed by Marx as forming 'mere reactionary 
sects'29) examined the effects of gender oppression under 
capitalism, 'women's position is increasingly marginalized in 
socialist work by a focus on paid labour and class relations. 
This occurs with the rise in importance of Marxism and a 
male-dominated organized Left. '3° A central problematic for 
Marxist feminists was that women seemed to be governed by two 
semi-autonomous but mutually strengthening power mechanisms 
- 
the 
operation of a patriarchal ideology of immutable sexual 
difference within the family, and a sexual division of labour in 
the workplace 
- 
and that both had received little attention in 
the Marxist tradition. 
In the development of a Marxist feminist theory, Friedrich 
Engels' The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State 
(1884) was a crucial text. However, Engels' position on women's 
place under capitalism is ambiguous. On one level Engels assumes 
that women independently acquire class status by virtue of the 
same economic determinants as men, but on another level he infers 
that all women are proletarianized within marriage - where male 
power is regarded as analogous to that of the bourgeoisie. The 
family, therefore, represents a capitalist system of relations in 
microcosm, and it is assumed that once class is abolished, so 
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sexual inequality will disappear. In this way women's particular 
experience of oppression at a dual level is absorbed and obscured 
under a description of class antagonism, with a result that 
'there is therefore no theoretical space to develop any 
understanding of patriarchy, as either a separate or a related 
system, for sex oppression has in effect been rendered 
invisible. '31 Feminists were left to untangle the conjoined 
threads of patriarchy and capitalism in order to determine how 
far capitalism can be blamed for women's oppression 
-a state of 
affairs which manifestly existed in earlier social formations. 
Engels concurs with this view, locating the phenomenon of the 
'pairing marriage' (following broader incest taboos within 
previously polygamous tribal cultures) as heralding 'the capture 
and purchase of women'. 32 He presupposes the existence of a 
primitive matrilineal social organization that is at some point 
overthrown by a patrilineal one, and the historical landmark he 
selects for this transformation is the creation of wealth and 
private property. He argues that the possibility of the transfer 
of capital from one generation to another requires the male head 
of the family to be able to identify his legitimate heirs; but in 
common with many nineteenth-century commentators on the 
'mother-right' debate, Engels admits that we cannot trace the 
approximate moment in history when such an overthrow was 
achieved, other than to claim that it falls within prehistoric 
times. 
Engels implies that despite the 'prehistoric' origins of the 
patriarchal family form, it had become an instrument for 
capitalism. For this reason, later feminist debates around 
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women's specific status in the spheres of the family and in 
commodity production, were held to obscure the more 'important' 
analytical tool of class division, especially debates around the 
question of whether all women constituted an oppressed class in 
themselves. The calculated avoidance by classic Marxists of 
gender issues, creates a theoretical slippage, whereby women's 
oppression predates and yet becomes organic to capitalism; from 
feminists' perspective, women's subordination is in danger of 
becoming implicitly linked to biological destiny. 'Women's 
realms' as reproducers, carers and nurturers within a monogamous 
family relationship are left untouched by Marxist analysis in its 
concentration on the public sphere of labour and the accumulation 
of capital. The 'private sphere' 
- 
the obverse of' the labour 
market 
- 
becomes hermetically sealed as outside the framework of 
materialist analysis, outside the relations of' production and 
ultimately 
- 
given Engels' vague interrogations into the field of 
prehistory 
- 
beyond history itself. In common with liberalism 
woman's social role was by implication seen as rigorously bounded 
by her biological identity and nature; while males' superior 
rationality or thirst to transform nature by the action of praxis 
was the key to civilization. A central feature of contemporary 
Marxist feminist thought has been to render up a viable 
theoretical framework that could at once incorporate female 
experience outside the welter of the labour market, a framework 
that acknowledged women's unique relationship to familial and 
ideological forces, and yet could counter what was regarded as 
ahistorical tendencies within radical feminist politics. 
A starting principle for Marxist feminists was that female 
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domestic labour 
- 
reproducing and maintaining the workforce 
- 
should be considered an aspect of' production (or reproduction), 
which worked to the benefit of capital, whether it was strictly 
functional or not. In addition, it was asserted that women's 
role in the labour market was hugely influenced by this domestic 
identity, and made their relationship to production distinctly 
different from men's. Although Marxist analysis concentrated on 
relations of production within the labour market, 'no Marxist 
theory provides a satisfactory historical account of the sexual 
division of labour'. 33 The sexual division of labour was a 
concept developed by Marxist feminist revisionary work, but one 
in which other feminist factions had a clear vested interest 
- 
not least because it highlighted the necessity of foregrounding 
the effects of' both ideological and material processes upon 
women. All feminists observed that female labour is concentrated 
in low paid bands, such as cleaning, nursing and childcare; 
whereas Marxists assumed that women's exclusion from the public 
sphere was the primary source of' their oppression (even though 
this oppression was deemed unworthy of further analysis). What 
is most problematic for contemporary feminists is that women have 
always been present in the labour force; and now more women enter 
full-time occupations, a sexual division of labour still 
prevails. 
The supposed propensity of women for domestic and caring roles 
influences dominant attitudes to women within the labour market, 
and informs the 'choices' women have in employment, to the point 
where one can identify an area of 'women's work', deemed 
qualitatively different from men's. Women who undertake paid 
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labour still tend to suffer the effects of low pay, or the 
insecurity of part-time or outwork, which they often endure 
because of additional commitments of housework and childcare. 
Recent equal pay legislation has had a negligible effect on 
women's pay conditions, primarily because the majority of women 
workers are concentrated in a handful of jobs 
- 
such as nursing '.. 
and primary education 
- 
containing very few male workers, and 
equal pay legislation stipulated that women should receive the 
same wage as men for comparable work. It was a simple matter for 
employers to 'regrade' jobs held by women, in cases where they 
were similar to those done by men, so the act became 
self-defeating 
- 
perhaps only serving to further entrench the 
ideology of the sexual division of labour within the sphere of 
employment, where certain jobs appeared to merit lower wages 
because they were generally performed by women. 34 
Feminists have observed that the concentration of women within 
'service' jobs seems to reflect the division of labour in the 
household, where women primarily care for and service the 
dominant male. This suggests that it is only possible to fully 
examine the feminization of certain forms of waged labour in 
relation to an analysis of the ideology of family life and 
domestic responsibility, which feeds upon biologistic assumptions 
about natural sexual divisions. In an article on the sexual 
division of labour within the medical profession, Eva Gamarnikow 
suggests that the doctor-nurse-patient relationship is analogous 
to the father-mother-child hierarchy of the home. Historically 
the nursing profession has been regarded as suitable women's 
work, requiring care and similar domestic skills, which are the 
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desired moral attributes of the 'good woman' in the home. Since 
domestic labour has no exchange value, women's domestic skills in 
the labour market gain low financial rewards: the masculine ideal 
of a 'woman's place' perpetuates and covertly justifies the 
unequal value ascribed to men's and women's work: 'The 
occupational ideology of nursing thus genderised the division of 
labour: it associated science and authority with doctors and 
caring 
- 
putting science into practice 
- 
with women. '35 
Similarly, in lower and middle schools where most women teachers 
are to be found, the caring and socializing aspects of the work 
take precedence over the educational role. In addition to the 
ideological representation of the 'natural' divisions in domestic 
labour, we might also identify an 'ideology of naturalism' 
informing the structures of waged labour itself', where the 
'patriarchal' relations of the family are recreated to similar 
effect, and gendered ideological patterns repeat themselves. 
The concept of a 'family wage' - where a man's earnings are 
presumed to be sufficient to support an entire household - 
provides further material reasons for retaining women's pay at a 
lower level: their wages are deemed an additional 'luxury': 
although few families have in fact depended upon the 
male wage, the belief that they do underlies our present 
sexual division of labour in a fundamental way and 
has, 
furthermore, been influential in determining the attitude 
of the labour movement to women's wage work. 
36 
As Barrett suggests above, the chief paradox of the 'family wage' 
is that a relatively low proportion of families fit the 
ideological 'model': single female parents are left close to the 
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poverty line, or dependent upon an ex-husband's alimony payments. 
Women who choose to raise a family alone have to face the 
economic reality that they would most probably be better off 
married. Yet such logic still carries enough weight to be used 
as a powerful weapon by both political parties and the labour 
movement alike. 
The fact that for working-class families the sexual division 
of labour is potentially divisive 
- 
if lower-paid women are 
regarded as taking away men's 'rightful' jobs in a time of 
recession 
- 
is an important area of analysis for feminists. It 
profoundly affects the utility of a Marxist model of labour 
relations when it is working-class men themselves who are brought 
into direct conflict with their fellow women workers, although 
this situation is only advantageous to the bourgeoisie, and is 
ultimately sustained by the notion that women are secondary 
status workers, able to undercut the higher wage demands of men. 
The labour movement has always defended the male labourer's 
unquestioned right to earn his family wage; for this reason 
women's wage labour tends to be viewed as a disruptive, 
competitive element in the labour market, instead of as a reason 
for legislating for wage parity in real terms across gender (or 
indeed racial) divides. 
The history of gendered labour conflict stretches back at 
least as far as the nineteenth century, when trade unions 
attempted to close their ranks to a growing female labour force, 
and effectively quashed the efforts of women to campaign for 
emancipation in the workplace. 37 Given the predominance of male 
labour issues in the trade union movement, equal pay was never a 
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high political priority, which means that issues of gender are 
still treated as relatively unimportant. Therefore Marxism and 
the labour movement tend to fuel the common misconception that 
women remain in the home, sustained by a single male breadwinner, 
thereby consigning women to a secondary labour status, which 
conceivably remains unchanged even after a Marxist socialization 
of relations of production. In this context it is obvious that 
the Marxist gender-blind analysis of wage relations is grossly 
inadequate for feminist purposes, not only because it disregards 
the hidden economic functions of domestic labour, but also 
because the theoretical framework denies any importance to 
questions of sexual/racial division at work. 
Marxist feminists have concluded, therefore, that in a very 
real sense the patriarchal/familial ideology permeates the wage 
labour structure as effectively as it polices women's private 
lives: 
In assessing the factors which might account for the 
position of women as wage labourers it is impossible to 
escape the conclusion that family structure and the 
ideology of domestic responsibility play an important 
part. 38 
The power of social representations of the family cannot be 
underestimated, especially if' they are reaffirmed by Marxists, by 
the absence of such considerations in their theoretical 
frameworks. Legislation will remain particularly ineffective so 
long as trade unions decide it is in their members' interests to 
militate for the inalienable rights of the man to earn a 
family 
wage. In this atmosphere of gendered conflict, capital will 
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continue to reap the benefits of exploiting cheap female labour, 
when a dominant familial ideology confirms that in the 'natural' 
order of things, women belong in the home. 39 Women workers are 
predominantly viewed as the 'reserve army' of labour, to be drawn 
upon in times of economic buoyancy or national crisis, and 
expected to return to their homes in times of mass unemployment 
- 
despite the fact that since the eighties: 
Women could no longer be described as a 'reserve army of 
labour'; they had become the regular troops. They were 
not swept in and out of the workforce by fluctuations of 
the market. They stayed in, but paid a high price for 
the privilege. as their wages, hours and conditions ebbed 
and flowed, beyond their own control. 4° 
The sexual division of labour is perpetuated most effectively at 
an ideological level, since ostensibly women can make the choice 
to engage in a fulltime career, but unlike the male experience of 
work. women's choices often have to, at the least, be informed by 
a recognition of their 'natural' obligations within their 
families. Marxist feminists urged an awareness of the effects 
one's personal life can have upon one's social existence, and 
such a stance demanded further investigation of the family and of 
the radical feminist concept of overarching patriarchal power. 
Marxists tend to implicitly assume a 'universal history of the 
family': 41 the family is subsumed within the economic framework 
of capitalism as a pre-given structure, hinting at acceptance of 
the notion of fundamental, eternal differences between the social 
functions of men and women. Marxist theory asserts a distinction 
between waged labour ('exchange value') and domestic labour ('use 
- 
114 
- 
value'), where waged labour is almost exclusively defined as 
'work', thereby pushing the question of the economic value of 
domestic labour outside its purview. Any theoretical link 
between domestic and waged labour is effectively blurred by 
locating domestic labour within the realms of 'personal 
relations', where patriarchal ideology condones the view of 
marriage as allowing a husband access to his wife's labour free 
of charge. Engels distinguished between the bourgeois family 
structure as a means by which the head of the household secures 
paternity and inheritance, and the proletarian family 
- 
the 
'sex-love' match 
- 
as representing largely egalitarian values. 
Although it is true that working-class women are usually wage 
labourers, this distinction ignores the fact that working women 
are still more than likely to be dependent upon their husband's 
'family' wage, and considered duty-bound to perform all 
domestic/caring functions. Marxist feminists set out to show how 
the family 
-a form which predates capitalism - does in actuality 
fulfil an economic role within capitalism in the relations of 
production and human reproduction. Having pinpointed the 
'invisible' economic aspect of women's domestic labour, it is 
therefore essential to analyse relations of 'reproduction' and 
the means by which Marxism's separation of use value from 
exchange value concretizes women's subordinate social status. 
From a feminist perspective, there is clear evidence that 
economic relations of production overspill into domestic 
labour: 
Since the production and reproduction of' labour power 
take place substantially within the family through the 
labour of the housewife, then it is clear that her labour 
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is in one way or another crucial to the generation of 
surplus value. 42 
Domestic labour, in other words, underpins capitalist profit 
margins, by recreating the availability of labourers, and 
providing a haven from the alienating effects of waged labour 
which cushions them and reinforces the separation of the two 
'worlds' of private and public 
- 
although it would be impossible 
in our present social arrangement to calculate the value of such 
a service in monetary terms. The public/private divide also 
strengthens capitalist relations, if one sees the private sphere 
as containing the vestiges of patriarchal power relations 
- 
where 
male dominance is endorsed by society 
- 
presumably because it 
blunts the edge of the alienation felt by the male worker in the 
public domain. Even if' radical feminism's description of 
patriarchal power relations requires an explicit historical edge 
to contribute to Marxist feminist work, it still facilitates a 
revisionary critique of Marxism's contradictory assumption that 
the family is at once functional for capital in some indirect 
way, while having a degree of autonomy by virtue of preceding it. 
Accordingly Marxist feminists would argue that a reduced form of 
patriarchal relations still functions within the family, which 
determines and controls women's procreative functions as well as 
strengthening justification for the sexual division of labour in 
the workplace. 
While Marxist feminists would wish to highlight the economic 
importance of the household, they must simultaneously explode the 
popular biologistic myth that 'home-making' is something to which 
women naturally aspire. In order to do this it is important to 
- 
116 
- 
historicize the family form, to show how flexible it is to the 
needs of dominant social forces, and how it reproduces itself 
most effectively through ideological representations which may or 
may not correspond to people's lived realities: 
'The family', however, does not exist other than as an 
ideological construct, since the structure of' the 
household, definition and meaning of kinship, and the 
ideology of' 'the family' itself, have all varied 
enormously in different types of society. 43 
In order to avoid the mystificatory, emotive connotations of the 
term 'family', feminists such as Michele Barrett and Mary 
McIntosh refer to the 'family-household system' or a 'familial 
ideology'. `` The ideological and material relations influencing 
the family-household system are apparently mutually strengthening 
and not easily separable. For the working classes, the household 
might be the site of major divisions, where all men benefit from 
the privileges bestowed upon them by the fact of their 
masculinity, and women are subordinated both at work and in the 
home. 
In their analysis of relations of production, Marxists have 
therefore avoided the issue of women's labour almost altogether. 
The problem is that as such an analysis depends on their 
ascription of class divisions, can feminists be sure that the 
Marxist description of class antagonism has a direct relationship 
to women's social experiences? As a consequence, much debate has 
been generated around the problems of relating gender divisions 
directly to class structure, and upon adjudicating between the 
relative importance of either structure. For feminists, the 
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conception of the family unit, headed by the (male) breadwinner, 
tends to obscure and a priori deny women an independent social 
status in public life. The institution of' the family itself 
provides an obstacle for theories of women's entry into class 
relations, since class is primarily designated by the family 
breadwinner's earning potential, and since it is assumed that the 
breadwinner is male, it is a correspondingly gendered analytical 
division. Before feminists interrogated the relationship between 
women and their class status, its complex nature had largely been 
ignored. Sociological theory generally assumed that women should 
be situated within the family unit, meaning that the family, 
apart from the (male) breadwinner, remained outside the scope of 
class analysis. 
one problem with this simplistic sexual role division is that 
the notion that most women's place is still largely in the home 
is a function of a particular ideological representation, and 
ignores the material conditions of working class women in 
particular, who constitute a significant proportion of the labour 
market. As Jackie West points out, the first step is for 
feminists to expose the chasm between the ideological 
representation of women in the workplace versus their perceivable 
material conditions, and to do this requires a shifting 
theoretical position: 
Without an adequate theoretical appreciation of women's 
direct relationship to and experience of productive and 
market forces, we continue the mistaken tradition of 
allocating women to a wholly special place in our society 
which so easily becomes a 'problem' area requiring 
entirely different tools of enquiry. 43 
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While traditional class analysis only succeeds in evading the 
question of women's class position by ascribing the man's class 
to his entire family, applying a feminist perspective to their 
'secondary' or 'derived' status is equally problematic. Within a 
Marxist discursive formation, women need a 'special' place, in 
the sense that at present they have none. Therefore, no progress 
can be made without rupturing the entire debate on class status, 
and perhaps concluding that in its existing form it is inadequate 
to account for the unequal position of women, or racial 
outgroups, compared to that of their presumed 'equals' in the 
workplace. 
Feminists might feel that one could more accurately accept 
that it is families, not individuals, who have a particular 
standard of living, insofar, as Barrett observes, 'An aspect of 
women's relationship to the class structure is that it is 
mediated, to some extent at least, by the configuration of the 
family, dependence on men, and domestic labour. '46 What, in 
terms of traditional class analysis, is the status of an 
unattached woman, for example? Does she retain her father's 
class position? If this is the case, does gender (and race) 
constitute an internal hierarchy within given class positions? 
It is clear that all people deemed to be members of' the same 
social class do not have equal access to comparable jobs at equal 
rates of pay, but that women and people of colour tend to find 
their bargaining power weakened. If, in fact, few women spend 
all their adult life in the home dependent upon a male 
breadwinner, it must be the case that, in a family with both a 
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male and female earner, a woman's supplementary wage improves the 
whole family's standard of' living. By virtue of her involvement 
in waged labour, a working woman ought to be regarded, at least 
on an abstract level, as independent of her relationship to the 
family. An advance on the feminist concept of a 'derived' class 
for women (derived, in other words, from her husband or father) 
might be to perceive them as occupying a distinctive place within 
class. Class, after all, does not imply a homogeneous status for 
all its occupants: it must be seen as divided into age, skill, 
ethnic group and sex. 
It is certain at least that women's class position is affected 
by their dual role as domestic/wage labourer 
- 
especially by the 
fact that the importance of the latter is ideologically 
suppressed. Within the labour force women are likely to have 
less upward mobility because of the ties of mothering/caring 
(even if these 'ties' can be resolved by fulltime childcare, they 
are still perceived as 'natural' by employers, who may be 
prejudiced against women who do not regard them as such) 
- 
in a 
sense they are proletarianized by virtue of the fact that they 
proliferate in low status jobs (as do racial outgroups). In 
common with men, a woman's projected position in the labour 
market is influenced by her education and (father's) class 
background; but unlike men, a woman's actual labour status is 
also determined by the way her relationship is mediated through 
her dependence upon a husband and her assumed domestic 
responsibilities (not to mention how gender socialization affects 
her own view of her career potential): 
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For working-class women this may result in simultaneous 
direct exploitation by capital via their own wage-labour, 
and indirect exploitation via vicarious dependence on the 
wage of a male breadwinner. For bourgeois women this may 
result in simultaneous ownership of, yet lack of' control 
over, capital. 47 
In view of the numerous complex factors which may restrict 
women's entry into full employment, it seems inevitable that any 
feminist discussion of class must insert sub-categories of both 
gender and race or ethnicity: a purely 'class-based' analysis in 
traditional terms effaces the mechanism behind women's continued 
subordination/negation in their dual positions of domestic/wage 
labourer. 
Sexism, like racism in the workplace is an ideology which a 
change in the economic base will not necessarily transform. 
Capitalism has successfully maintained the right to exploit the 
cheap labour of women and ethnic minorities by retaining their 
function as a 'reserve army' of labour which can be moulded to 
suit the fluctuating requirements of' capital. Major contemporary 
left-wing arguments have held that women are structurally part of' 
the working class, and that their future is likewise determined 
by the fate of capitalism (although this contention is undermined 
by the continued existence of a sexual division of labour in 
socialist states). Yet the left has consistently failed to 
champion the basic rights of women and minorities in the same way 
that it has protected the rights of the (white) working man. 
Even though many union organizations have structures within which 
racial and sexual inequality may be addressed, until the 
'breadwinning' wage for men alone is analysed, such improvements 
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can do little to change the real position of working women and 
people of colour. This is not to say that feminists should 
ignore the demonstrable fact that some women are more privileged 
than others. 
The difficulties confronting feminist analyses of class, the 
family and the sexual division of waged labour expose how crucial 
an examination of ideology is to all these theoretical 
strategies. Marxist feminists were not alone in a growing 
conviction that the perpetuation of a society divided along 
gender lines is primarily assisted by the action of ideological 
apparatuses, which naturalize such social divisions as essential 
for the personal happiness of its members. Marxist feminist 
debates consequently came to focus on representation in addition 
to the economic base, and upon the effects of gender 
socialization and the construction of' female sexuality. These 
issues reconnect Marxist feminists to other feminist political 
strategies, and the issues of ideology and sexuality are explored 
in detail in Chapters Four and Five, in order to emphasize these 
connections. 
MOVING AWAY FROM ORTHODOXY 
- 
PROBLEMS IN MARXIST FEMINIST 
ANALYSIS 
Marxist or socialist feminism has always been a stronger tendency 
in Britain than in the US, where radical and liberal politics 
proved more popular. 48 According to Ginette Castro, Socialist 
Worker's Party women in the USA tried to hijack radical and 
liberal women's groups for their own purposes, capitalizing upon 
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the unstructured formation of many of such groups. 49 Whether or 
not she exaggerates the case, commentators on feminist activity 
on both sides of the Atlantic chart serious tensions between 
radical and socialist feminists, leading in Britain to a 
destructive split in feminist politics around 1978 
- 
the year of 
the last National Women's Liberation conference, held in 
Birmingham. An important and recurring point of dispute was the 
question of inclusion of or collaboration with male political 
sympathizers, prompted by radical feminists' doubts that men had 
anything to contribute to women's liberation in its developmental 
stages. 5° The very fact that left-wing feminists endeavoured to 
accommodate gender issues within a pre-existing male-oriented 
framework seemed to suggest to radicals a symbolic collusion with 
the enemy, and a consequent dilution of feminist politics by the 
addition of class considerations. 
The issue of men's involvement in feminism has of course been 
a contentious one, and radical feminists are most often 
characterized as operating separatist strategies 
- 
at least at a 
political level 
- 
in order to create a movement sustained and 
expanded by women alone. Socialist feminists' theoretical 
wel al 
alliances with Marxism was viewed from other feminist quarters as 
not just a political engagement with men, but as an affirmation 
of male discourse, which others had discredited as exclusionary 
at its core, and therefore irredeemable for feminist purposes. 
Many feminists have additionally recorded the practical 
difficulties of forming liaisons with male activists who tend to 
dominate and structure debates to their own purposes. But the 
problem for socialist feminists seemed to be primarily in getting 
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Marxist men to take their revisionary materialist model 
seriously, as well as countering entrenched male prejudices about 
female political participation 
-a prejudice that seems to have 
existed within socialist organizations since the nineteenth 
century: 
Women were seen as a reactionary force in society. 
There was disagreement as to whether they were naturally 
or socially conditioned to be conservative, but there was 
a general fear that women constituted a threat to 
socialism. This was based more on their 'undue' 
influence over their husbands or over their children than 
on their own negative influence on socialist politics. 51 
It appears to be the case that socialist men were interested in 
matters of gender, but that they seemed to be drawn to forms of 
feminist analysis removed from a Marxist framework. Lynne Segal 
supports this view, and argues that in Britain in recent years, 
'a socialist feminist project which attempts to connect up a 
feminist analysis and strategy with a more traditional socialist 
analysis... has often proved less popular than radical feminism 
with men on the left and in the Labour Party. '52 This ironically 
suggests that contemporary left-wing men prefer to characterize 
feminism as an autonomous bourgeois movement, which devotes its 
energies to specifically 'female' issues surrounding sexuality 
and domesticity, rather than a position which intervenes in and 
offers critiques of current male-dominated political positions. 
Socialist feminists nonetheless encouraged male/female 
discussions on the grounds that patriarchal structures will never 
be abolished while men retain their investment in their 
perpetuation, and therefore feminism should be an educative 
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process for both sexes to indicate that class privilege is just 
one stronghold among others that needs to be relinquished. 
By the end of the seventies, feminists with firm Marxist roots 
were still attempting to enhance radical (and liberal) feminist 
positions by giving them a materialist theoretical structure 
which would ally them with left-wing politics. However, among 
those who preferred to call themselves socialist rather than 
Marxist feminists, there was a growing unease that Marxism's 
class-based analysis of oppression could not be simply 
appropriated to analyse women's oppression, even though such 
analyses allowed closer scrutiny of the effects of unequal social 
divisions among women themselves, and 'by the end of the decade 
many if not most socialist feminists were convinced that 
patriarchy was at least as basic a structure as capitalism. )S3 
By the early eighties many socialist feminists, especially in 
Europe, had structured their arguments coherently enough to 
assert that capitalism, male dominance, racism and imperialism 
were mutually interdependent mechanisms of oppression, so that 
one could not isolate theoretical solutions to one without 
considering all the others (sexual orientation would be a later 
category in the socialist feminist scheme of things). 
In the past decade socialist feminism has striven to produce 
more adequate methods of defining the nature of oppression, and 
counteract the abstract ahistorical connotations acquired by the 
term 'patriarchy'. An historical edge was required in order to 
demonstrate that patriarchy is inscribed in both the economic and 
ideological structures of contemporary Western society, 
illustrating a degree of shared experience between women, that 
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cut across class and race boundaries: 
Women share common experience of oppression which, 
though, they may be mediated by class, race and 
ethnicity, nevertheless cut across class lines. All 
women are liable to rape, to physical abuse from men in 
the home, and to sexual objectification and sexual 
harassment; all women are primarily responsible for 
housework, while all women who have children are held 
primarily responsible for the care of those children; and 
virtually all women who work in the market work in 
sex-segregated jobs. In all classes, women have less 
money, power and leisure time than men. $4 
Socialist feminists do take class divisions seriously, rather 
than claiming, like their radical sisters, that all women form 
part of an oppressed underclass. In this their work proved 
attractive to working-class women, who had generally felt 
alienated by the middle-class dimensions of radical and liberal 
feminism. Their appropriation of' Marxism's commitment to 
historical specificity meant that they were able to begin to 
unpack the unwieldy concept of patriarchy, and make connections 
between this seemingly timeless system of domination and a 
capitalist social reality. Although the rhetoric of shared 
sisterhood is beguiling as a slogan, it can be offensive to those 
women who do not have access to the privileges of their more 
prosperous and enlightened 'sisters' - who tended to gloss over 
the day-to-day material hardships of women's lives in favour of 
concentration on representations of femininity which generate 
false consciousness. After all, once it is established that all 
women confront a society that divides and privileges on the 
basis 
of gender, one has to further examine how other social identities 
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such as class and race can handicap different women in different 
ways. 
There necessarily remains a prevailing problem 
- 
one shared by 
many feminist strands 
- 
and that is how to adequately articulate 
the means by which women internalize their own oppression. In 
its political guise, socialist feminism must resist Marxism's 
implicit agenda where sexual difference remains unscrutinized, in 
order to argue that there can be no reason to maintain the 
public/private distinction in political theories of oppression. 
This suggests an expansion of the revolutionary agenda to 
incorporate a 'revolution in consciousness' as a vital ingredient 
to achieve social transformation; in that without destablizing 
the social/ideological construct of femininity, women's material 
conditions of existence will remain the same: 
A particular household organization and an ideology of 
familialism are central dimensions of women's oppression 
in capitalism and it is only through an analysis of 
ideology that we can grasp the oppressive myth of an 
idealized natural 'family' to which all women must 
conform. 55 
A revolution in consciousness, however cannot be attained by the 
powerless overthrowing the material conditions of their 
oppression. And in this sense socialist feminists share the 
radical feminist awareness of the need for 'consciousness 
raising' activities, though they might want to extend these 
far 
beyond the confines of a discrete female subculture. 
This seemingly free appropriation of Marxist discourse for 
specifically feminist purposes predictably provoked 
harsh 
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criticisms from hard-core (male) Marxists. From a classic 
Marxist perspective feminist questions are at odds with the 
class-based nature of Marxist critiques. To set women apart as a 
class (or classes) of their own was to introduce divisive and 
diversionary debates to a political framework which depended on 
unity within class regardless of gender; a revolution in the 
material conditions of existence would supposedly achieve 
liberation for working-class men and women alike. Furthermore, 
because of feminism's tradition as middle-class defenders and 
thinkers, any attempt to pursue a feminist perspective within 
socialism was seen as bourgeois treachery. It was largely a 
question of a clash of priorities between socialist feminists and 
classic Marxists, where feminists' foothold in Marxism was 
compromised by their aim to forge links between gender and class 
oppression: 
Women have systematically argued that gender relations 
cannot be subsumed under the categories of class and the 
economy and that an autonomous or semi-autonomous body of 
theory needs to be developed to explain the domination of 
women by men. 56 
Feminists highlighted the conceptual problems of classic Marxist 
class analysis and showed that women's relations to class were at 
best equivocal; they probed the so-called 'private sphere' of the 
home in order to assess the extent to which domestic labour 
(including reproduction of the workforce) might be viewed as 
functional for capitalism, and exposed the prevailing 
sexual/racial inequalities within the labour market itself. It 
was in a real sense impossible for classic Marxism to assimilate 
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such critiques of its own analytical structure unless it was 
prepared to transform its own definitions of the real source of 
oppression. 
The editorial of a 1986 issue of Feminist Reviews7 reflects a 
sense of identity crisis among socialist feminists, in face of 
Left-wing allegations that feminism has lost its political 
commitment and steadily drifted nearer the Right. The editorial 
collective of Feminist Review attribute this partly to the 
existence of a 'generation gap' in contemporary feminism: 
The women involved in the formative period of socialist 
feminism in Britain were nearly all highly educated, 
white and middle class, their politics indebted to the 
1960s student revolt and its legacies. Young feminists' 
formative experiences are of chronic unemployment, a 
massive dismantling of public services and provision, and 
a more right-wing, embattled and confrontational 
political culture. In this history gross social 
divisions have been given new and painful meaning. 58 
Feminists were aware that they may have rested on their radical 
laurels, and have not kept abreast of changing political 
realities 
- 
leaving them both incapable of challenging New Right 
assaults on women's rights, and rendering them unattractive to 
many politically-aware women since the eighties. There has been 
an increased recognition that socialist feminism can no longer 
give precedence to matters of class and production at the expense 
of important issues such as racial difference, homophobia, 
sexuality, ideology and culture. More than ever feminists have 
to fill the analytical gaps in political theory, which still 
resolutely ignores the specific needs and demands of women. 
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Socialist feminism has political resonance, asserts the Feminist 
Review collective, precisely because it perceives Western society 
as containing more than one system of domination: 
In contemporary Britain we can identify capitalism as an 
economic system based on the exploitation of the labour 
of the working class. We can identify imperialism, based 
on the exploitation and subordination of whole peoples, 
races and ethnic groups. And we can identify the system, 
call it sexism, patriarchy or a sex-gender system, based 
on the power of men over women. 39 
Socialist feminist discourse has, arguably, a greater 
potential to examine the workings of' all three oppressive 
structures and be able to highlight their complex inter- 
relationship, whereas Marxism continues to be largely race/gender 
blind. In practice the clashes between questions of class, race, 
gender and sexual orientation are still prevalent in the Women's 
Movement, where different priorities create differing analyses of 
patriarchal/imperialist power. However, socialist feminists did 
facilitate an exploration of race issues, which enabled them to 
make connections with black feminists who previously felt 
themselves marginalized or ignored. Nonetheless, some white 
feminist's acknowledgement of their own past theoretical 
ethnocentricity has provoked the criticism that white feminists 
still persist in disregarding the different meaning that 
institutions such as the family can have for black women, and 
might therefore be construed as persistently racist. 60 
Perhaps it is socialist feminists' growing interest in matters 
of female sexuality and identity that announcesthe most 
significant rift between their work and that of Marxism, despite 
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their attempts to demonstrate how such factors are fundamental to 
the economic base of society. At this end of the socialist 
feminist spectrum, we can witness a strong link with radical 
feminism. Personal politics seemed to warrant closer materialist 
analysis, in order to show that the public/private distinction 
maintained in all phallocentric political discourses is founded 
on the ideology of male dominance, and contributes to a 
maintenance of the equilibrium of such dominance. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems, then, that classic Marxism, in common with classic 
liberalism, is of strictly limited use to contemporary feminist 
thought, in that fundamental to both dogmas is the assumption 
that woman is socially subordinate to a politically, materially 
and ideologically dominant man. If deeper scrutiny of such 
theories as Marxism bears witness to the fact that woman is 
persistently associated with a transhistorical, all-consuming 
notion of nature, it is at times difficult to see the benefit of 
attempting to 'tack on' feminism to such monoliths, when it seems 
that the question of women's social position can at best remain a 
supplement. The socialist feminist project has been to some 
extent a negative project, which has resulted in many cogent 
criticisms of the Left, but few major developments in thought 
which affirm the useful purpose of Marxist analysis, or 
acknowledge the contribution of other feminist strands to their 
own debates. Many feminists would still defend the necessity to 
appropriate and reappraise 'masculine' discourses, if only to 
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subvert them so as to be better able to question and criticize 
existing patriarchal political structures. However, as Annette 
Kuhn points out, this often results in the 'woman question' being 
clumsily inserted into the bedrock of academic disciplines as a 
side-issue, but never fully assimilated as an integral feature. 61 
Meanwhile, the women's movement was being rocked by 
intra-feminist disputes: 
Arguments between socialist and radical feminists shook 
the women's liberation movement at times. Yet feminists 
on both sides saw eye-to-eye and campaigned together on a 
number of specific issues, and for most of the time, the 
movement managed to remain a singularly heterogeneous 
body, in which radical and socialist feminism 
co-existed. 62 
Although I have signalled clear links between socialist and 
radical feminist politics, socialist feminism acquired a 
reputation for having 'ghettoized itself' from interaction with 
non-socialist-feminist debates'. 63 A major criticism was of 
their apparent collusion with men and male-oriented discourse; 
but in their recognition that issues of sexuality, ideology and 
reproduction are fundamental areas for the investigation of 
women's oppression, they were fairly close to radicals, although 
the terms of their analysis differed. 
Both liberal and socialist feminists suffer to some extent 
from their links with male discourse, where they are often viewed 
as the supplement, and by extension as of lesser importance than 
their originary doctrine. In order to recognize that both 
socialist and liberal feminism have been instrumental in the 
development of feminist thought, it is necessary to critically 
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reappraise the status of supplement, and to regard this position 
potentially as one of strength. Here we might usefully employ 
the insights of two male poststructuralist thinkers 
- 
Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Derrida 
- 
and argue that a notion of 
supplementarity can be interpreted as something which further 
decentres the logic of a pre-existing originary 'truth' by 
denouncing its limits, and therefore destablizing its claims to 
empirical hegemony. 
Within both Marxist and liberal bodies of knowledge one 
opposition is deemed to lie at the origin of social formations 
and that is a divide between nature and culture 
- 
an opposition 
which Derrida claims, 'is congenital to philosophy. '64 Of course 
feminist attempts to explode such a logic 
- 
in common with all 
forms of oppositional discourse 
- 
can only have recourse to the 
philosophy of such a logic itself, a double-bind which is both 
positive and negative. Positive in that feminism as supplement 
destabilizes the truth claims of such discourses, by analysing 
uninterrogated concepts such as 'nature'; negative in that 'we 
can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not 
already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit 
postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. '65 Reason 
polices its own boundaries, so that a critique of the 
phallocentricity of reason can only occur from within: we 
therefore'have 'only the recourse to strategems and 
strategies. 166 
Perhaps radical, black and lesbian feminists have been more 
aware of the power of the strategy, resulting in their refusal to 
accept repudiations of their perspectives by mainstream 
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philosophical/political discourse, by in turn refusing to take 
them 'seriously'. The main business of these feminisms has 
always been to give voice to the silences in our Western 
epistemological tradition, focusing on the 'private' spaces of 
female experience, especially the dark continent of female 
sexuality. Chapters Four and Five further investigate feminist 
perspectives on ideology and sexuality respectively, in order to 
show crucial points of connection between feminist strands that 
can be exploited for meta-theoretical purposes 
- 
thence to inform 
a more cogent feminist politics. But firstly the liberal and 
Marxist feminist traditions need to be set against the 
iconoclastic tendencies of radical, lesbian and black feminism. 
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CHAPTER TREE 
RADICAL- LESBIAN AND BLACK FEMINISMS 
Where liberal angels and Marxist cadres have hesitated to 
tread, radical feminists have marched. While inadequate 
thought on the reasons for action, and the location of 
targets, have undoubtedly posed problems for the 
remainder of the movement, radical feminism has alerted 
us to many wrongs. Moreover, it is a virtue that, by its 
very existence, it keeps the issue of the politics of 
sexuality and sexual preference alive. ' 
I have decided to consider radical, lesbian and black feminism 
within one chapter, primarily because they are strictly 
contemporary phenomena, whereas both Marxist and liberal feminist 
tendencies have roots that extend beyond the Second Wave. Black 
and lesbian women clearly were active in earlier suffrage and 
reformist campaigns, but it is arguably only in the sixties that 
they fully articulated the need to identify ethnicity or sexual 
orientation as a significant factor of their oppression as 
women. 2 Such divisions questioned the validity of an 
all-embracing concept of sisterhood, and point to a significant 
reaction against the dominant formation of feminist thought. As 
the Women's Movement grew, a 'mainstream' of white, heterosexual, 
bourgeois thought came to embody its possible definitions, marked 
by a seeming reluctance to address the degrees of social 
acceptance and privilege that white bourgeois, heterosexual women 
enjoy at the expense of other groups of women. 
Radical, black and lesbian feminism all signal attempts to 
create a discursive arena freed from the tyrannies of' 
male-oriented political discourse. This can be set in opposition 
to much of the work produced by socialist and liberal feminists 
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which in part endeavours to wreak something from the bare bones 
of existing phallocentric forms of knowledge. The radical stance 
is often inaccurately taken to be synonymous with lesbian 
feminist politics; in truth the dominant issues foregrounded by 
radical feminism were often subjected to heterosexist or 
ethnocentric analysis, and both lesbian and black feminists were 
critical of what they perceived to be significant gaps in radical 
theory. Nonetheless radical feminism's ground-breaking work in 
investigating the spheres of female sexuality and female 
socialization, provided the impetus for the creation of a new 
kind of feminist theoretical space, facilitated by radicals' 
negation of phallocratic political hegemony. 
New calls to sisterhood emphasized the conviction that the 
oppression of women as women ran deepest in contemporary society, 
and consequently demonstrated a failure to recognize that race or 
class divisions were themselves intrinsically gendered, or that 
women as a group were divided into constellations of oppressor 
and oppressed. In this sense, developing feminist forms of 
knowledge themselves created a need for the epithets 'black' or 
'lesbian' to be supplemented to the term feminism, in that these 
two broad-based groups added a vital and neglected component to 
existing feminist positions which denied the overarching 
supremacy of a methodology based upon the notion of a homogenized 
'underclass' of women. The facts of race, sexual orientation or 
class meant that many women perceived that the nature of their 
subordination was at least two-pronged; the feminist implication 
that sisterhood meant pooling one's experience and recognizing 
our shared oppression by men, was quite simply offensive, not 
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least in its inference that enlightened feminists could never be 
guilty of perpetuating such power imbalances themselves. Black 
feminists had close connections with civil rights movements, and 
lesbian feminists had drawn strength from the radicalism of the 
gay liberation movements: involvement in such groups might well 
have proved equally liberating and affirmative of their identity. 
In a sense radical, black and lesbian feminisms might all be 
dubbed 'radical' if we take the word to signify going to the root 
or foundation of established thought. All three loose groupings, 
to a greater extent than any feminist movements which predated 
them, were prepared to rock the foundations of contemporary 
philosophical and political thought; in this they share certain 
features with other developing oppositional political movements 
of the sixties and seventies: 
In addition to the CND, the emergence in the 1960s of 
other social reform and environmental groups - including 
those campaigning for the legalization of abortion and 
homosexuality, and against capital punishment - helped to 
create a climate of reform in which feminism could 
flourish. 3 
Nonetheless, radical feminism found little hope for coalition 
with such groups, which were deemed to be founded on sexist (and 
racist) principles; in addition radical feminists favoured the 
small group formation, rejecting firm links within or outside 
feminist politics. On the whole, radical feminist politics 
announced the transition from earlier twentieth century women's 
rights movements with a liberal or socialist legacy, to the new 
women's liberation movement, which was characterized by its 
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decentralized, localized and anti-elitist organizational 
principles 
- 
something which liberal and Marxist feminists have 
also integrated into their political practice. 
Before embarking on a closer investigation of the politics of 
these three strands of feminism, it is perhaps necessary to 
reiterate that all such distinctions are to a large extent 
contingent. This problem is further compounded by 'a common 
misconception that the radical-socialist divide reflected a split 
between lesbians and heterosexuals', 4 and therefore such 
associations have made radical feminism 'a scarecrow with which 
to frighten women away from feminism. '5 It would be equally 
preposterous to assert that black and lesbian tendencies operate 
on the grounds of exclusive consideration of either race or 
sexual orientation. For instance, black feminists also address 
the problems of being lesbian within the black community and 
confronting instances of homophobia, just as they confront the 
dominant racist and (hetero)sexist ideologies perpetuated within 
society at large. 6 
RADICAL FEMINISM 
Radical feminism emerged as a powerful oppositional discourse 
during the late sixties. It flourished during a period of marked 
upsurge in radical political agitation - for example the student 
and civil rights movements - and challenged the epistemological 
basis of both Marxism and liberalism. Radical feminists, 
possessing no single core doctrine which informed their theories, 
were fragmented from the start, a process exacerbated by their 
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preference for small group formation, where each individual woman 
could find a voice, and where all tasks could be shared out 
equally. The groups devised their own consciousness raising 
strategies, and produced manifestos independently of one another, 
operating as distinct political 'cells' who might or might not 
forge coalitions in cases of direct action. One result of such 
discrete, and free-floating political activity was that it 
provoked a degree of criticism from more centrally organized 
feminists 
- 
such as the liberal tendency that comprised the 
membership of NOW in the States 
- 
and also a large amount of 
parody from the mass media. 
Radical feminism's 'invisibility' as a structured organization 
was, however, perceived to be a strength by its adherents: they 
do not subscribe to any one tradition in political thought and 
are therefore at liberty to constantly reinvent themselves. 
Although it would be fair to assert that radical feminist 
politics has been most influential in its work upon issues which 
closely affected women's personal life and physical and mental 
well-being, it is much more difficult to isolate a central 
governing principle informing radical feminist work. Perhaps 
anthologies such as Robin Morgan's Sisterhood is Powerful (1970) 
and Koedt, Levine and Rapone's Radical Feminism (1973) most 
effectively do justice to the sheer range and heterogeneity of 
radical feminist perspectives, although it is difficult to 
identify a representative range of radical feminist writings 
still in print. Especially in its embryonic period, radical 
feminist writing showed a commitment to the experiential, and it 
is rare to find proponents debating or contesting the meaning of 
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their radicalism among themselves, or announcing a radical 
feminist tradition 
- 
since they rarely credit the sources of 
their ideas.? 
Radical feminists appear to pride themselves on being 
notoriously difficult to define, and this is in part an effect of 
their commitment to denying that one voice can speak for the 
many. However, Bonnie Kreps provides a useful characterization 
of radical feminism as a tendency: 
which chooses to concentrate exclusively on the 
oppression of women as women (and not as workers, 
students, etc. ). This segment therefore concentrates its 
analysis on institutions like love, marriage, sex, 
masculinity and femininity. It would be opposed 
specifically and centrally to sexism, rather than 
capitalism. 8 
Much of their energies were focused on discussions around gender 
as a social construct from which permeates all other forms of 
material and ideological female oppression. In order to explore 
the nature of such oppression more thoroughly, radicals 
concentrated on the experiences of' the individual woman in 
society, often using writing as a vehicle to communicate their 
own narratives of pain, and to convey their passionate belief 
that sexism lies at the heart of women's oppression. For 
radicals the problem for women is quite categorically men; and 
even male sympathizers to the women's movement are treated with 
suspicion, on the grounds that they still wield the power to be 
potential oppressors. Since every aspect of women's social and 
private lives is deemed to have been latently infected by the 
curse of male domination, all forms of male oriented knowledge, 
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including the use of language, is liable to scrutiny. This 
necessarily includes all male analyses of oppression including 
Marx's characterization of capitalism which, in common with 
Marxist feminists, they recognized could not account for the 
tenacity of female exploitation across history and cultures. 
Accordingly, they tried to confront the seeming universality of 
female oppression by positing a universalizing notion of 
patriarchy. 
Such feminists were convinced that a female revolution in 
consciousness was the most crucial primary step towards a social 
revolution, and their wholesale commitment to consciousness 
raising is testimony to this. Consciousness raising was 
conceived as the most effective means of encouraging all women to 
acknowledge their entrenched secondary status, by accepting that 
no aspect of their lives 
- 
particularly their personal lives 
- 
was innocent of patriarchal influences: 
Everything, from the verbal assault on the street, to a 
'well-meant' sexist joke your husband tells, to the lower 
pay you get at work (for doing the same job a man would 
be paid more for), to television commercials, to 
rock-song lyrics, to the pink or blue blanket they put on 
your infant in the hospital nursery, to speeches by male 
'revolutionaries' that reek of male supremacy - 
everything seems to barrage your aching brain, which has 
fewer and fewer protective defenses to screen such things 
out. You begin to see how all-pervasive a thing is 
sexism 
- 
the definition of and discrimination against 
half the human species by the other half. Once started, 
the realization is impossible to stop, and it packs a 
daily wallop. To deny that you are oppressed is to 
collaborate in your oppression. To collaborate in Your 
oppression is a way of denying that you're oppressed - 
particularly when the price of refusing to collaborate is 
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execution. 9 
This is part of Robin Morgan's impassioned introduction to 
Sisterhood is Powerful, and demonstrates the emphasis of radical 
feminism on enlightenment and from thence revolution; but it also 
seems to carry an explicit threat to women who perhaps do not 
conceive of their oppression in quite the same terms. 
Nonetheless, consciousness raising added a new dimension to the 
growth of feminist politics, which gave momentum to the 
conviction that all women should become involved in political 
activity, and the development of strategies to counter 
oppression. Consciousness raising offered women the opportunity 
to share and analyse experiences which were previously 
discredited as having no currency in wider political debates. 
The smallness of such groups encouraged this sense of a personal 
touch, which was and remains the trademark of the radical 
endeavour. 
It is difficult to generalize about the range of activities or 
debates that took place by means of CR methods, but the anonymous 
essay 'Consciousness Raising' in Radical Feminism10 offers some 
insights into typical aims of the process. These guidelines 
suggest that a period of three to six months should be devoted to 
the articulation of members' personal experiences, before these 
are analysed in 'feminist' terms. This is then followed up by 
establishing activities and self-help groups, such as reading 
groups, child care centres, and organized protests. There are of 
course problems with a structure which relies upon individual 
self-knowledge, not least that it is compatible with the dominant 
ideology of abstract individualism, which deflects from 
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collective activity 
-a clearly stated end result of CR. Carol 
Williams Payne is just one writer who expressed her 
dissatisfaction with the CR project, pointing out that although 
discussions centred on personal problems, 'we never tried to 
relate these problems to the structural problems of women in 
society nor did we think about how they could be dealt with 
beyond the personal level of these particular women in their 
particular situations. 'll A democratic 'structureless' group 
does not of course guarantee equitable discussion, and can just 
as easily allow the most vocal members to take over and create an 
unacknowledged internal hierarchy, where power relationships hold 
sway more tenaciously for being denied: as Joreen remarks, 'there 
is no such thing as a structureless group. '12 One 'invisible' 
structure was that of membership criteria, where certain groups 
could hold sway over the range of issues discussed in their cell, 
by means of blocking the entrance of, for example, heterosexual 
married or partnered women. Such a quota is established in the 
1969 manifesto of 'The Feminists', a New York cell. 13 
While socialist and liberal feminists embarked primarily on a 
discussion of social structures and women's unequal position 
within them, radicals tended to focus on the personal lives of 
women, an area to which consciousness raising inevitably directed 
their attention. Important aspects of women's lives such as 
marriage, childcare, sexuality, health and work could not be 
readily considered within a mainstream, sociological framework, 
and the radical slogan, 'the personal is political' sought to 
elevate these issues to a matter of urgent political concern. 
This resulted in a concentration on grassroots mobilization, 
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rather than on refining a coherent political theory; many radical 
activities focused on the development of a 'woman's culture' 
through explorations into literature, art, music, and health, 
although it could be argued that such endeavours risk leaving the 
dominant culture uninterrogated. But such quests for a 
pre-existing authentic woman's culture affected radical 
'theoretical' positions, which were expressed in diverse forms, 
ranging from what might approximate to a mainstream theoretical 
stance, to fiction, art and music, in the quest for a body of 
knowledge and tradition freed from the shackles of male 
interference. 
Perhaps more than any other branch of modern feminist thought, 
radical feminism's activities transformed the foundations of what 
could be defined as 'political', not least because 'our theory is 
that practising our practice is our theory. '14 In other words, 
radical feminist writings are consciously deemed inseparable from 
group tactics. rather than as a discrete contribution to an 
abstract philosophical position. Theory and practice, personal 
and political combined were to be the means by which women might 
transform their lifestyles, at the same time as militating for 
social transformation. The belief that radical feminism needs 
'to question every single aspect of our lives that we have 
previously accepted as normal/given/standard/acceptable and to 
find new ways of doing things', 15 resulted in a search for 
alternative lifestyles removed from the stifling effects of 
patriarchy. Communes, businesses, women's festivals and other 
women-only concerns were established to allow women to pursue and 
construct their own identities unfettered by pre-given social 
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institutions such as the family, marriage and domestic labour. 
All radical feminists seemed to agree upon the need for 
separatism, but the scale of separatism varied considerably, 
ranging from political separatism (women-only discussion groups, 
dealing purely with issues that affect women), to complete 
separatism (communes, etc. ) 
- 
or as complete as was economically 
or practically viable. 
Separatism is one of the most lambasted features of radical 
feminist policy. Other feminists, although they too believe in 
political separatism to some degree, tend to view certain radical 
'extremes' as denying that any successful feminist social 
transformation should be directed at changing men's lives too. 
This form of separatism is regarded as reaffirming the dominant 
conflation of' biological and gender difference, which identifies 
essential and distinct features of male/female psychology. 
Despite evidence that radical feminists concur with other strands 
that gender difference is a social construct and therefore 
subject to change, debates 
- 
particularly around issues of male 
violence and sexuality 
- 
have a tendency to lapse into a 
biologism which suggest that men are innately aggressive. 16 In 
addition, the commitment to promoting a women's culture can also 
have a similar effect, since often this amounted to a celebration 
of aspects of femininity which had previously been cast in 
negative terms 
- 
for example, being irrational, emotional, 
intuitive, nurturant and passive - rather than a rejection of the 
rigidity of such qualities. Communal living was the ideal to 
render male assistance redundant, and to varying degrees, 
lesbianism or celibacy was seen as the preferred form of sexual 
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orientation; many factions held penetration during sexual 
intercourse to be intrinsically an act of dominance and 
aggression by the male. 
Of course radicals' all embracing concept of patriarchy can 
lead to a sense of the inevitability of the male will to power. 
Furthermore, if the female body and its function as vessel for 
human reproduction is seen as one of the chief reasons for female 
subordination, the only progress towards a feminist utopia might 
be seen as a technological revolution, where women are no longer 
handicapped by their biological processes. This is Shulamith 
Firestone's position in The Dialectic of Sex (1970), where she 
asserts that 'the division yin and yang pervades all culture, 
history, economics, nature itself; modern Western versions of sex 
discrimination are only the most recent layer. ''? Patriarchy, 
for Firestone, is therefore a system of' power which exploits 
women's biological incapacity, and it is this fundamental 
handicap that must be removed to transform our current social 
order. In some respects, Firestone is in agreement with other 
radical and socialist feminists - that is. that the construction 
of* the family and the institutionalization of monogamous 
heterosexuality as the desired norm are crucial factors in 
women's oppression. Firestone therefore advocates the necessity 
of removing the biological bond between mother and child, through 
socializing childcare and domestic arrangements, and thereby 
rendering the male/female parenting role redundant: 'to free 
women thus from their biology would be to threaten the social 
unit that is organized around biological reproduction'. 18 
Although she demands the use of technology, most of Firestone's 
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accompanying demands 
- 
the end of monogamy, incest taboos, 
childhood sexual restraint, the nuclear family. the 
reproductive/productive labour binary 
- 
are aimed at redefining 
the meaning and therefore ideological impact of such social 
'givens'. The chief objections to her particular feminist utopia 
are that to deprive women of their 'right to choose' in favour of 
reproductive technologies is to submit our current attenuated 
liberty into scientific processes which are at present in the 
hands of men. 19 
Firestone's work, though it has survived in print to the 
present. has not been as influential upon radical feminist 
politics as other texts 
- 
perhaps because the crux of her 
analysis of subordination is that female biology is at fault, 
rather than the system of male dominance, which interprets 
reproduction as a reason for social disadvantage. Certainly the 
most famous early radical feminist work is Kate Millett's Sexual 
Politics (1969), a book that has been comprehensively attacked by 
literary critics and modern feminists alike, but which is still 
compelling in its attempt to create a revolutionary feminist 
perspective from a very raw state of bricolage 
-a heady mixture 
of literary criticism, historical survey and political polemic. 
The fusing together of' the words 'sexual' and 'politics' opened 
up new theoretical possibilities for feminist debate, enabling 
the assertion that all things 'private' and 'personal' in women's 
lives were affected by the politics of' the state and patriarchy, 
and that the chief weapon of resistance for feminism was to 
politicize those sacred spheres of liberal individualism: 
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The word 'politics' is enlisted here when speaking of 
the sexes, primarily because such a word is eminently 
useful in outlining the real nature of their relative 
status, historically and at the present. It is 
opportune, perhaps today even mandatory, that we develop 
a more relevant psychology and philosophy of power 
relationships beyond the simple conceptual framework 
provided by our traditional formal politics. Indeed, it 
may be imperative that we give some attention to defining 
a theory of politics which treats of power relationships 
on grounds less conventional than those to which we are 
accustomed. 20 
Millett's assertion has the ring of a prophetic statement in the 
light of contemporary feminist thought, and the way it has moved 
towards a more complex examination of the power structures which 
place women as subjects in particular oppressive relationships. 
In common with Millett, Germaine Greer in The Female Eunuch 
(1970). concentrates mainly on the business of raising universal 
feminist consciousness, rather than providing a clear agenda for 
change. on the basis that woman 'could begin not by changing the 
world, but by reassessing herself'. 21 While Millett embarks on a 
scathing critique of the violent and offensively sexualized 
imagery of women in novels by male literary lions of the 
twentieth century. Greer initiates her enquiry by looking at the 
construction and fetishized naturalization of the feminine body. 
However. both have a similar end in view: to analyse the way the 
female body has been situated in a discourse of normative 
feminine structures in order to posit a radical fracturation of 
such discourse. Greer's view of a positive revolutionary stance 
is one analogous with the situation of the proletariat outlined 
in classic Marxist thought, and her solution is for women to 
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withdraw their labour. This heralds another important aspect of 
feminist methodology; that women's work. classically viewed as 
something they are naturally equipped to do, is reconstrued as 
cheap. or often free labour, whose reward is long overdue. 
In varying degrees, Greer and Millett see the solution as a 
revolution in consciousness which can also serve to awaken men to 
their own internalized position as oppressors, whereas Mary 
Daly's view of patriarchy is that it is tenacious enough to 
resist such 'pseudo-feminist' rhetoric: 
However possessed males may be within patriarchy. it is 
their order; it is they who feed on women's stolen 
energy. It is a trap to imagine that women should 'save' 
men from the dynamics of demonic possession; and to 
attempt this is to fall deeper into the pit of 
patriarchal possession. It is women ourselves who will 
have to expel the Father from ourselves, becoming our own 
exorcists. 22 
Daly's work is more far-reaching than that of Millett, Greer or 
even Firestone, in the sense that she attempts to combat sexism 
at its very roots in the language one uses to articulate one's 
oppression, by punning on and expropriating negative gendered 
words: 'In order to re-member our dis-spelling powers. Hags must 
move deeper into the Background of language/grammar', 23 to create 
a feminine language which consolidates a separatist vision of a 
female future. More recently feminist linguists have argued that 
processes of linguistic signification are more complex than 
Daly's inference that words and concepts have a fixed one-to-one 
relationship, and that what is needed is a more wide ranging 
study of language which links modes of speech as well as writing 
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to women's multifarious and possibly conflicting social 
identities, in a much broader based interrogation of the means by 
which meaning is socially and culturally, as well as 
linguistically embedded. 24 
Radical feminism is potentially more wide ranging than either 
socialist or liberal feminism 
- 
not least because it often 
explores means by which women can reconceive their relationship 
to the current social reality, in order to resist it. Rather 
than putting all its energies into either reform or future 
resistance, it implicitly argues for constant acts of rebellion 
within both personal and public lives, to revivify the movement. 
But perhaps the emergence of radical feminist politics as a 
position which recognizes no preordained parameters, determined 
its current fall from grace, in face of more sophisticated 
analyses of women's oppression. Nonetheless, although there is 
less evidence of organized radical feminist activity in the 
nineties 
- 
in terms of publications and journals and academic 
profiles (the British journal Trouble and Strife, and the USA's 
Off Our Backs are two exceptions) 
- 
the continued debates around 
women's health. pornography and sexual violence are largely due 
to radical feminist studies in these fields. 
One of the best known radical feminists still actively 
militating for changes in censorship legislation, campaigns 
against male sexual violence and prostitution is Andrea Dworkin - 
a woman whose books are widely read and publicized, and who is 
generally accessible and compelling in her arguments. For some 
feminists she represents an 'extremist' position, which naively 
attributes a direct relationship between images of women and 
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sexual violence 
- 
for instance between pornography and rape: 
Pornography is the propaganda of sexual fascism. 
Pornography is the propaganda of sexual terrorism. 
Images of women bound, bruised, and maimed on virtually 
every street corner, on every magazine rack, in every 
drug store, in movie house after movie house, on 
billboards, on posters pasted on walls, are death threats 
to a female population in rebellion. 25 
Although Dworkin's stance on pornography remains uncompromising, 
many recent feminists are reluctant to cast the debate in such 
black and white terms. Some lesbian and socialist feminists, for 
instance, feel that a tightening of censorship laws would hit 
hardest at groups who already feel the sting of restrictive 
legislation. In addition, some gays and lesbians argue that 
pornography can be empowering; that 'gay porn offers images of 
desire which a hostile society would deny and are therefore real 
encouragements for a positive sense of self. '26 It has been 
often noted that a stance against pornography such as Dworkin's 
creates unholy alliances with moral majority pressure groups, 
whose intentions in stopping the flow of pornographic material 
are far from sympathetic to feminism. Dworkin's role on the 
Meese Commission, which was set up under President Reagan to 
determine the impact of pornography on society and to recommend 
means by which the spread of pornography could be contained, is 
one example of' such a contradictory alliance. 2' 
Radical feminists have often been criticised for re-casting 
women in the role of passive victims of their biological impulses 
- 
more so because anti-porn and sexual violence debates often 
appear to slip into essentialist assumptions about the fixity of 
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aggressive male sexual impulses. Nonetheless, as I shall go on 
to discuss in Chapter Five, radicals in particular helped to 
explode some fairly tenacious myths about femininity, and were at 
the forefront of theoretical examinations of the construction of 
female sexuality. Anne Koedt's essay, 'The Myth of the Vaginal 
Orgasm'(1970), was a crucial step towards rethinking the means by 
which heterosexual desire is constructed exclusively around male 
needs, particularly discussions around the issue of whether all 
penetrative sex is currently symbolic of patriarchal 
colonization. " Doubtless such debates on the one hand prompted 
common assumptions that radical feminism is a solely lesbian 
political stance, even though radical analyses of female 
sexuality did not always include lesbian perspectives. 
Nonetheless, they were instrumental in introducing to the 
feminist agenda a candid and often combustible approach to the 
subject. 
CRITIQUES OF RADICAL FEMINISM 
The most common criticisms of radical feminism are that its view 
of patriarchy remains uninterrogated; that many of its arguments 
lapse into biologism of a reductive kind, and that its focus on 
women's personal experiences renders it politically ineffectual, 
or at worst prescriptive - if, for example, it is seen to argue 
that 'lesbian sexuality does serve as a paradigm for female 
sexuality. '28 Although writers such as Millett and Firestone 
have appropriated a Marxist model of historical materialism for 
their own radical use, the notion of' patriarchy as the central 
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system of female subordination is most problematic for socialist 
feminist thinkers. Its polemical strength has been recognized by 
writers such as Rosalind Coward, who agree that the use and 
appropriation of such a term 'has given a theoretical basis for 
the specificity of women's oppression'. 29 However, she argues 
that it is an inadequate formulation from which to discuss the 
dynamics of sexual relations in their specific, various and 
changing historic forms: 
For the tern 'patriarchal' implies a model of power as 
interpersonal domination. a model where all men have 
forms of literal, legal and political power over all 
women. Yet many of the aspects of women's oppression are 
constructed diffusely, in representational practices, in 
forms of speech, in sexual practices. This oppression is 
not necessarily a result of the literal overpowering of a 
woman by a man. 30 
A universalist concept of patriarchy, then, is regarded as a trap 
for feminism: it can lead us down avenues of biological 
essentialism (an avenue pursued by Mary Daly, and other radical 
feminists who are often dubbed cultural feminists, in their 
primary celebration of women's power as a sub-culture), or it 
leaves us with a naive and unwieldy notion of power relationships 
which cannot theorize itself out of the subtle and stubbornly 
'naturalized' effects of a patriarchal ideology. 
It now seems to present-day feminist commentators that early 
radical feminism (which rapidly split into several factions 
itself) over-simplified the causes of female oppression in its 
assertion that gender difference had arisen as a universal, and 
ahistorical, system of male domination. Goals to end patriarchy 
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might be either a utopian vision of androgyny or more typically 
perhaps, a movement towards total separatism. Radical feminists 
seemed to be the first group to utilize the term 'patriarchy' as 
shorthand to designate the means by which women are oppressed. 
It was used relatively unproblematically to signify the 
subordination of all women by all men; because of its 
ahistorical, cross-cultural and universalizing tendencies it was 
held to imply that all men were irredeemably the enemy and that 
women's subordination was inevitable. In other words, women are 
perceived as an oppressed class in their own right, regardless of 
social, cultural or racial distinctions. This argument has been 
latterly exposed as both contradictory and circular within the 
terms of radical feminist aims itself, since it returns feminists 
to the realm of biologistic assertions - precisely those used to 
strengthen so-called patriarchy in the first place, when the 
stated goal of most radicals is to expose the social construction 
of gender roles and definitions. 
The term can however be used for more positive purposes, one 
of which is a willful resistance of all phallocentric categories 
of knowledge. including notions of historicism and cultural 
specificity. For radicals, patriarchy is the means for 
articulating the way in which every aspect of a woman's life 
appears to be tainted by male domination. It is for this reason 
that they are accused of failing to recognize that different men 
have differing degrees of access to power, and of denying the 
possibility that some men are sympathetic to feminist issues and 
do not consciously wield their potential power. Radicals largely 
argue that all men profit from patriarchal systems of oppression 
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and therefore all men are answerable for its continuance 
- 
for 
this reason, the policy of individual acts of resistance by women 
in their personal lives was seen as an important precursor to 
collective activism. Although such a position can be deemed weak 
and a recipe for epistemological fracturation, it might also be 
characterized as one of the most potentially far-reaching 
oppositional strategies devised by feminists 
- 
especially when it 
is accompanied by a call to separatism. As I have already 
asserted. separatism is to some degree a factor of all feminist 
positions: in the case of radical feminism it is woven into the 
fabric of their work, even though most writers seem to envisage a 
time when social sexual divisions are eradicated. 31 Patriarchy 
is used by radicals as the most forceful evocation of oppression 
because they maintain that: 
the pathology of oppression can only be fully 
comprehended in its primary development: the male-female 
division. Because the male-female system is primary, the 
freedom of every oppressed individual depends upon the 
freeing of' every individual from every aspect of the 
male-female system. 32 
Although the use of the terns male-female as opposed to 
masculine/feminine is potentially misleading, read in context, 
this particular manifesto addresses the problem of cultural 
definitions ascribed to sex roles. The notion that sexual 
difference underpins all other systems of oppression in society 
is a seductive one for feminists, in that its institutions seems 
to be among those most resistant to change in contemporary 
society, and those most neglected by male-oriented oppositional 
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politics. 
Radical feminism, although not a strongly visible force in the 
academic institution, has survived as an aspect of current 
feminist activism, especially in grassroots work maintaining rape 
crisis centres, women's aid and other support networks for women 
- 
as well, of course, in work around issues of pornography and 
prostitution. Although the methods and principles of radical 
feminism render it to some extent incompatible with other 
feminist theories, this is not because it is resolutely 
anti-theory, as is often suggested, but rather that theory and 
practice are viewed as each a product of the other, and therefore 
mutually strengthening. In recent years, the publication of 
works which include questions of the legacy of radical feminism, 
suggest that radical politics is experiencing a modest 
renaissance. 33 Radical feminism arguably had a more profound and 
sustained effect on the development of American second wave 
feminism than it had in Great Britain where 'socialist and 
Marxist feminists were the virtual "midwives" of the British 
women's liberation movement': 34 however, radical feminist 
tendencies forced those feminists allied to mainstream political 
factions to recognize that mere reformism had not proved 
successful in conquering female oppression. 
Much of what was regarded as most extreme about radical 
feminism has been variously ridiculed and dismissed by the other 
voices comprising the Women's Movement. Perhaps because radical 
feminists concentrated on cultural awakening rather than 
theorizing and scholarly debate, its features (often exaggerated 
beyond all recognition) were regularly pilloried by the mass 
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media as a means of defusing what could have been regarded as 
quite a significant and concerted onslaught by feminists upon the 
establishment. Most people if asked to define feminism today 
would produce a definition which vaguely resembles the radical 
feminist agenda, and many women writers have described radical 
feminism as a phase in the Women's Movement which alienated many 
of its more 'decorous' members. Lisa Alther's Kinflicks (1976) 
itself contains an episode which, in the context of the book as a 
whole, appears to be intensely parodic. 35 
It is an attractive notion to assert, as radical feminists 
often do, that every society has two cultures: the dominant male 
one and the barely visible female one, and thus pinpoint the need 
to celebrate the features of a female sub-culture as the source 
of women's strength, and a point of departure from which to 
organize a sustained threat to male supremacy. Radical feminism, 
perhaps more than any other strand has tried to define feminist 
politics as a complete way of life, from sharing experiences in 
consciousness raising sessions, to living under degrees of 
separatism in communes and collectives. This seeming refusal to 
compromise on the part of many of its advocates is seen to be its 
most intimidating aspect, in that, 'radical feminism reminds 
women of their own moments of exploitation or abuse, and these 
memories are not welcome'. 36 Separatism can suggest that women's 
interests will always be in direct opposition to men's, and this 
is a most unpalatable stance for feminists allied to mainstream 
politics who do not readily see women as a discrete 'class' of 
their own. It might also be regarded as racist, in its 
assumption that black women share the experiences of white women, 
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whereas many may quite naturally see their alliances as split 
between all women and men of colour. For black, lesbian and 
socialist feminists alike, the radical notion of sisterhood 
-a 
bond which cuts across all other boundaries 
- 
is untenable and 
blurs the evident fact that women too can function as oppressors 
of other women. Black feminists particularly resent radicals' 
wholesale attack on the familial institution, since on another 
level, the family acts as a haven for women of colour from a 
racist 'public' domain. Radical feminists have taken such 
criticisms seriously, and despite clear evidence that some 
writers do ignore issues of race and sexual orientation in a glib 
assumption that white bourgeois heterosexual reality is women's 
reality, their record of attempting to encourage all women to 
have a voice is better than that of socialists, as the most 
well-known anthologies of radical feminist writing testify. 
LESBIAN FEMINISM 
I have argued that radical feminism, more than any other 
tendency. focused upon issues surrounding female sexuality and 
the female body 
- 
and for this reason may seem peculiarly 
compatible with lesbian concerns. Matters of women's health, 
work, and issues of contraception and abortion were overlaid, at 
a more abstract level, by sustained analyses of the ways women 
internalize and act upon sexualized representations of 
femininity. The Stonewall Rebellion in New York in 1969 
announced the emergence of the Gay Liberation movement as a 
political grouping who adopted the militant tactics successfully 
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used by other radical factions in the sixties. The spread of 
slogans such as 'Gay Is Good', and the beginnings of gay pride 
parades, was itself a form of consciousness raising which allowed 
people to derive strength from the knowledge of a shared 
identity. Collective gay action was a call for full visibility 
and equal human rights, and no longer a meek plea for tolerance. 
The gay movement aimed to combat all forms of social 
invisibility, which had previously condemned homosexuals to the 
margins, deemed as either sick or perverted; they also identified 
the means by which homosexual identity was perceived to determine 
one's wider social identity. In common with feminists the 
crucial factors at stake were effects of both ideological 
representation, and the social and material practices which 
affirm and perpetuate its influence. Lesbian feminism aimed to 
fuse the positive aspects of gay and feminist politics, whilst 
offering critiques of both 
- 
particularly sexism endemic in the 
Gay Liberation Movement, and covert homophobia rife in Women's 
Liberation. 
For lesbian feminists the problems of female sexuality and 
sexualized images of women were crucial to their analysis of 
women's oppression; what they objected to about straight feminist 
political writings was the emphasis upon male-female 
relationships, at the expense of any focus upon woman-identified 
concerns. This is sometimes interpreted as a deliberate attempt 
to alienate heterosexual women, by positing a model of women's 
liberation which questions the political viability of 
heterosexual relationships; occasionally they are even accused of 
splitting the women's movement in the seventies, allegedly by 
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their 'proselytizing... in the name of feminism itself'. 37 
Although some lesbian feminists undoubtedly felt that to further 
revolution, all women should become at least 'political lesbians' 
(which might entail the choice to remain celibate), few seem 
primarily interested in policing women's sexual preference. 
Lesbian and gay men's initial concern was with transforming the 
social processes which meant that their sexual choices were 
liable to surveillance and control, and to end the association of 
homosexuality with mental or physical illness. Although gay men 
and women might well be deeply critical of the way 
heterosexuality is situated as the central normative 'natural' 
social structure, they do not necessarily conclude that all 
heterosexual men and women are acting in bad faith. 
In the early seventies, some of the statements issued by 
American lesbian groups such as The Furies or Radicalesbians 
provoked a profound unease among straight feminists. Both 
groups, notionally a part of' radical feminist politics, 
criticized aspects of feminist analysis which focus almost 
exclusively upon heterosexual relations, and whose critique of 
female sexuality blindly pursues an uninterrogated heterosexual 
model. For lesbian feminists, the term lesbian itself is seen as 
in need of positive reappropriation: as the epithet so often 
indiscriminately hurled abusively at women who fail to 'conform', 
it comes to signify for lesbians the pariah who rejects 
conventional notions of feminine propriety. Nonetheless, many 
straight feminists persisted in seeing only its 'negative' 
connotations, and became defensive in the light of exhortations 
for all women to become 'lesbians'. Radicalesbians' argument in 
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'The Woman Identified Woman' (1970) may well on one hand be 
interpreted as an example of such a demand; but it is chiefly 
concerned with the way heterosexual feminists assume a 
pseudo-patriarchal perspective on lesbianism, conceiving them in 
purely sexual terms. However the central thrust of the 
Radicalesbians' argument appears to be that all sexual categories 
are a symptom of a patriarchal ideology that might well be 
transformed after a social revolution; but, that in the interim 
women should make other women the focus of all their political 
and emotional energies, not least in order to fully appreciate 
the effects of the dehumanization of male sexual categorization: 
'Women resist relating on all levels to other women who will 
reflect their own oppression, their own secondary status, their 
own self-hate. '38 Although Radicalesbians are relatively 
uncompromising on the question of where one's sexual allegiances 
should lie, it is clear that their primary concern is with 
homosocial rather than sexual bonding in a society which 
endeavours to reinforce the view that lesbians and 'normal' women 
have little in common. 
Heterosexual feminists tended to ignore lesbians' implied 
critiques of heterosexuality as an institution, and channelled 
their energies into refuting any notion that lesbian sexual 
relationships are the only true model for liberated womanhood. A 
common defensive position was an insistence that feminism's wider 
agenda must accommodate a redefinition of all personal 
relationships and sex role play, therefore creating the 
possibility that man can be other than 'enemy' in the personal 
sphere. Anne Koedt in her essay 'Lesbianism and Feminism' (1971) 
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establishes what she claims are points of disagreement between 
radical and lesbian feminists 
- 
one being lesbian feminists' 
reputed conviction that they form the vanguard of the Women's 
Movement, and that their sexual choices in themselves constitute 
a revolutionary act. Koedt is clearly antagonistic towards what 
she regards as a lesbian policing of sexual boundaries, although 
she seems to have some fairly sedimented ideas of what authentic 
'feminist' lesbian sexual practice should entail, and disallows 
anything she defines as sex role playing: 
The organized gay movement seeks to protect the freedom 
of any homosexual, no matter what her or his individual 
style of homosexuality may be. This means the protection 
of the transvestite, the queen, the 'butch' lesbian, the 
couple that wants a marriage license, or the homosexual 
who may prefer no particular role. 39 
This is reminiscent of a sexologist's check list, complete with 
inaccuracies (her equation of transvestitism with homosexuality). 
Her attack on role-playing within homosexual encounters suggests 
that there is an 'authentic' form of homosexual expression that 
can transcend the 'patriarchal' stigma attached to such roles. 
Of course this begs the question as to whether role-play 
- 
for 
example, butch/femme configurations 
- 
necessarily carries the 
same meanings as it does in heterosexual relationships, and 
whether the roles correspond to masculine/feminine ones in terms 
of the degrees of access to material and social privilege they 
connote. Within lesbian feminist circles, arguments about the 
desirability of role-playing within gay relationships still rage, 
also informing recent critiques of lesbian sadomasochistic 
- 
162 
- 
practices. 
Koedt seems to have a fairly clear idea of what constitutes a 
politically correct form of homosexual relationship, by virtue of 
her list of unacceptable sexual identities; but nowhere does she 
hint at means to liberate heterosexuality from its present 
inequities. Neither does she consider whether any relationship 
can currently be free from the dynamics of power inequality 
- 
such as race, class or age 
- 
or the possibility that all 
homosexual 'roles' are ultimately defined and contained by a 
'hetero-reality'. Radical feminists have been adept at analysing 
the problems of heterosexuality, but reluctant to translate their 
findings into a coherent agenda for change, wary of appearing 
prescriptive or moralistic. Yet Koedt and others failed to 
perceive how homophobic their arguments became when they felt at 
liberty to determine and categorize the dynamics of lesbian 
behaviour, just as sexologists had done before them. Koedt 
particularly objects to women behaving like 'men' or vice versa; 
although since as a radical she supports the eventual elimination 
of' patriarchally defined gendered sex roles, her argument becomes 
distressingly circular 
- 
caught up in a mesh of patriarchal 
logic. Disregarding for a moment questions of the advisability 
of establishing 'codes' of sexual practice, the inability of such 
writers to define a positive form of sexual expression, implies 
that the field of sexuality still required much further and more 
complex analysis. Koedt's essay is symptomatic of how straight 
feminists, on the defensive against the 'lavender peril', became 
contradictory in their arguments around sexuality, contenting 
themselves with often counterproductive attacks upon lesbians - 
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many of whom as feminists, shared their central aims. 
The Radicalesbians' evocation of the 'woman identified woman', 
is intended to be more than a depiction of sexual preference; 
they sought to end the competitiveness that divided women in 
patriarchy, thence to strengthen political and personal bonds. 
Their essay certainly implies that heterosexuality is a 
destructive force in women's lives, but suggests this is the case 
at present because of the tenacity of the patriarchal sex role 
system. The urge to categorize identity through sexual 
orientation, would disappear, they argue, in a androgynous utopia 
where the social meanings attached to such 'roles' had vanished. 
In her essay 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence' 
(1980), Adrienne Rich extends the notion of the woman identified 
woman, talking instead of a 'lesbian continuum'; 40 thus further 
displacing the focus on sexual love and prioritizing the strength 
and love to be gained from female friendship and support 
networks. This aspect of lesbian feminism, which has become 
especially prominent in the analysis of literary texts, allows an 
important focus on something which has been noticeably absent in 
much heterosexual feminist thought - that is the social and 
political importance of female bonding. 
In a foreword to this essay, Adrienne Rich states that the 
piece: 
was written in part to challenge the erasure of lesbian 
existence from so much of scholarly feminist literature, 
an erasure which I felt (and feel) to be not just 
anti-lesbian, but anti-feminist in its consequences, and 
to distort the experience of heterosexual women as well. 
It was not written to widen divisions but to encourage 
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heterosexual feminists to examine heterosexuality as a 
political institution which disempowers women 
- 
and to 
change it. 4' 
Rich reiterates the point that lesbianism, for many straight 
feminists, is chiefly a sexual category, and analyses this in 
relation to what she regards as a serious omission in mainstream 
feminism. That is. that most feminists have failed to critically 
evaluate the status of heterosexuality as a sexual preference 
which cannot be innocent of political or ideological 
ramifications 
- 
not least its privilege to determine the deviant 
status of' all unproductive 'marginal' sexual orientations, and 
the way the denaturalization of other forms of sexual expression 
consolidates and strengthens patriarchal ideology. She asserts 
that the assumption of the normality of a heterosexual existence 
(lived within the parameters of monogamy and the institutional 
family form), enables the perpetuation of social and political 
control over women and sexual 'outgroups'. Rich's (and other's) 
extensions of the term lesbianism to embrace a lesbian continuum 
enables analyses of both positive and negative aspects of female 
bonding 
- 
such as mother-daughter relationships 
- 
which act as 
buffers in a patriarchal society, while often reaffirming the 
patriarchal status quo from generation to generation. 
The institution of 'compulsory heterosexuality', Rich argues, 
facilitates the worldwide sexual exploitation of women from the 
pimp's 'protection' of the prostitute, to the battered wife's 
feeling of dependency and guilt towards her husband; and most of 
all services the supposed uncontrollability of the male sexual 
drive 
-a mythification which endorses male sexual aggression: 
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Women learn to accept as natural the inevitability of 
this 'drive' because they receive it as dogma. Hence, 
marital rape; hence, the Japanese wife resignedly packing 
her husband's suitcase for a weekend in the kisaeng 
brothels of Taiwan; hence, the psychological as well as 
economic imbalance of power between husband and wife, 
male employer and female worker, father and daughter, 
male professor and female student. 42 
Accordingly, Rich asserts that there is a 'nascent feminist 
political content in choosing a woman lover or life partner, in 
the face of institutionalized heterosexuality'. 43 This 
statement, equating the fact of lesbianism with feminist 
politics, is of the variety which has heterosexual feminists 
rushing to their own defence. Yet in her afterword she concludes 
that: 
I never have maintained that heterosexual feminists are 
walking about in a state of 'brainwashed false 
consciousness'... In this paper I was trying to ask 
heterosexual feminists to examine their experience of' 
heterosexuality critically and antagonistically to 
critique the institution of which they are a part, to 
struggle with the norm and its implications for women's 
freedom. 44 
But this remains a statement of intent within a piece intended as 
a work in progress; the problems of resolving the theoretical 
differences between lesbian and heterosexual feminists are still 
developing. Whether one sees heterosexual women as colluding 
with the heterosexual institution and lesbian women as 'outside' 
of its confines is a moot point. It seems doubtful. given our 
present social framework, that any woman has the luxury of 
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freedom from 'heterosexual'/patriarchal constraints, or that all 
heterosexual women actively collude whereas all lesbians are in 
the process of sexual revolution. 
As the Rich article shows, the lesbian feminist movement has 
grown and shown increased theoretical sophistication over the 
last decade 
- 
and it is lesbian feminism that has most 
categorically asserted that 'Heterosexism is the set of values 
and structures that assumes heterosexuality to be the only 
natural form of sexual and emotional expression'. 45 Certainly 
writers such as Koedt seem to exemplify the reasons why lesbians 
found a need to identify themselves increasingly as lesbian 
rather than radical feminists. Although the radical movement has 
always been regarded as predominantly lesbian in its politics, 
there are many instances of homophobia, which at best ignore 
lesbian issues, and at worst displace lesbians as the 
unrepresentative deviant few in the movement, perhaps exposing 
fears that many women would find them an unattractive aspect of' 
feminism. Radical feminists seem to have been on the whole 
reluctant to address instances of their own heterosexism - Anne 
Koedt's famous article 'The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm' being a 
case in point, since presumably lesbian women have already had 
their consciousness raised in that respect, and would not be 
heartened by her throwaway conclusion that 'lesbian sexuality 
could make an excellent case... for the extinction of the male 
organ '. 46 
Lesbians could not but be aware that their private lives and 
object choices were susceptible to wider public scrutiny and 
condemnation; and since feminists were committed to politicizing 
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the personal, lesbians felt that feminist politics should equally 
address this problem, if it was believed to be the case that the 
private sphere mirrored broader abstract systems of power and 
subordination. However, feminism's supposed liberalism towards 
the matter of sexual orientation made homophobia within the 
movement much harder to confront, as was the subject of racism, 
and the problems peculiar to lesbians still tended to be ignored. 
Lesbians made bad publicity for feminism; they should be 
tolerated but remain theoretically invisible 
- 
although of course 
'invisibility"outside of the gay scene was a central problem for 
lesbians: 'Gay people really are oppressed, although their 
oppression is a peculiar one since it rests partly on the 
possibility of always remaining hidden and invisible'. 47 In 
perceiving 'out' lesbians as a threat to feminism's coherence, 
heterosexual feminists colluded with the patriarchal mainstream. 
and provoked doubts as to whether a feminist revolution would 
transform the social status of homosexuals. 
Heterosexual feminists, while busily dissecting stereotypes of 
the feminine, omitted to analyse the whole representative arena 
of stereotypical images of the homosexual. Although motherhood 
was a central issue, the problems confronting lesbian mothers, 
who face the constant threat of having their children taken away 
from them, was rarely discussed. Even if childcare was 
socialized along the lines of socialist and radical feminist 
thinking, what lesbian or gay man could feel assured that such 
socialization would also outlaw the heterosexual norm? Lesbians 
were left to debate such questions largely amongst themselves, 
while heterosexual feminists pursued the 'main' objectives of the 
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movement. Their relationship with feminism's 'mainstream' 
remained volatile: when not seen as aggressively self-righteous, 
they were heroized as gatekeepers of the model relationship where 
jealousy, power struggles, violence and oppression had no place. 
The more lesbians debated their political stances, the more 
differences they seemed to expose within their own ranks 
- 
'on 
the one side was the "lesbian continuum" and woman bonding, on 
the other the fetishistic specificity of key codes, leather, and 
coloured handkerchiefs'. 48 
In recent years, debates on the politics of role-playing have 
again figured prominently in lesbian feminist circles, where the 
the split is between two main camps 
- 
those who see role-playing 
as empowering and transgressive, and those who maintain that it 
results in the inevitable return to patriarchally defined 
mechanisms of power. The revolutionary lesbian feminist Sheila 
Jeffreys is fiercely critical of 'role-playing' lesbians, 
especially those who engage in sadomasochistic practices: 
Once the eroticizing of otherness and power difference 
is learned, then in a same-sex relationship, where 
another gender is absent, otherness can be reintroduced 
through differences of age, race. class. the practice of 
sadomasochism or role playing. So it is possible to 
construct heterosexual desire within lesbianism and 
heterosexual desire is plentifully evident in the 
practice of gay men. The opposite of heterosexual desire 
is the eroticising of sameness, a sameness of power, 
equality and mutuality. It is homosexual desire. 49 
Jeffreys' book, Anticlimax (1990), defines all heterosexual and 
gay male relationships as sites of the enactment of unequal power 
relationships - the erotic need for one partner to be subordinate 
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to another. Sadomasochism, she asserts, is contrary to a 
feminist agenda for change, since it reinscribes power politics 
within people's personal lives. She claims that some lesbians 
have been seduced by libertarian politics, but argues that women, 
as essentially socially powerless, should have no investment in 
creating power play in woman-to-woman relationships. Although 
the 'ideal' form of lesbian sexuality is never expressed, it is 
implied as the opposite to all other forms she lists in her book 
(heterosexuality, gay male sex, paedophilia, transsexualism and 
so forth). as being the only recourse feminists have to 
revolution and the only ethical stance any woman can take. 
Not surprisingly other lesbians take Jeffreys' arguments to be 
doctrinaire and analogous to women's social purity movements of 
the last century. S° Joan Nestle is representative of the other 
pole of lesbian politics, who defends butch-femme roles as giving 
lesbian sexuality a physical presence, rather than pandering to 
the heterosexual preference for lesbians to remain discreetly 
invisible. In common with other lesbians who emphasized the 
playful, parodic qualities of butch/femme existence, she 
emphasizes its erotic potential: 
Butch-femme relationships, as I experienced them, were 
complex erotic statements, not phony heterosexual 
replicas. None of the butch women I was with, and this 
included a passing woman, ever presented themselves to me 
as men; they did announce themselves as tabooed women who 
were willing to identify their passion for other women by 
wearing clothes that symbolized the taking of 
responsibility. " 
Nestle and others felt that 'vanilla' lesbians spent far too much 
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time analysing their political function, and failed to address 
the fact of lesbian's sexual desire for other women, which had 
little means of' expression in a heterosexist society. She argues 
powerfully that butch/femme identities were negotiable and 
flexible, and that a woman could freely adopt either role 
according to the desire of her and that of her partner. Nestle 
denies that gay role-play bears any direct relationship to 
heterosexual dynamics; rather it is a playful merging of 
identities which transforms and radicalizes the originary 
meanings of masculinity and femininity, releasing an erotic 
potential that redefines the possibilities of lesbian sexuality. 
The possible conflicting meanings that could be derived from 
adopting a role or style, posed problems for those lesbian 
feminists who struggled to be 'politically correct'. 52 By 
rejecting certain styles of dress, for example, lesbians still 
found themselves trapped within dominant meanings of the style 
they adopted 
- 
with the consequence that during the seventies 
'everyone looked butch'53 in their disavowal of things feminine. 
For some lesbians, it is clear that the dogmatism of' lesbian 
feminist 'lavnecks' (lavender rednecks) was intrusive and 
oppressive, another symptom of de-emphasizing sex; whereas they 
determined to produce more sexually explicit material in a 
celebration of woman-to-woman desire. The eighties saw a new 
generation of lesbians who, reflecting the diversity of positions 
feminist and gay politics had spawned, rejected any notion of 
uniformity in their portrayal of a lesbian identity. They 
reintroduced a heterogeneous lesbian 'chic', creating phenomena 
such as the 'lipstick lesbian', and inciting a return to 
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butch-femme debates. 34 coupled with discussions about the 
political acceptability of sadomasochistic practices-53 In the 
slow demise of feminist political activity many struck up new 
allegiances with gay men, particularly with the growing problem 
of AIDS and the new militancy it prompted in the form of 'Queer 
Nation' 
- 
committed to direct action around broader lesbian and 
gay issues (the term 'queer' being chosen, because 'gay' is often 
taken to just signify male homosexuals). 
Moving into the nineties, the most important theoretical 
developments in lesbian thought have been the emergence of gay 
and/or lesbian texts. which appropriate aspects of postmodernist 
thought, in order to rethink the politics of identity. This is 
understandable, given the lack of space that feminists have given 
lesbian perspectives in the past, and the emphasis seems to be on 
a celebration of heterogeneity, although lesbian thought still 
carries with it the ravages of its political past: 'Lesbian 
theory is also rife with its own insecurities: its practitioners 
are acting under a compulsion to tell the truth, to record, to 
evangelize. and to be politically correct. '56 Feminism at its 
most homophobic tended to stereotype the lesbian viewpoint (in 
the singular), which can then be consigned to a token position on 
the margins of its philosophy, and lesbians have responded to 
this over the years by creating their own definitions separate 
from heterosexual feminists. Many lesbians, nonetheless, still 
maintain broader feminist allegiances, and their contribution to 
the increasing sophistication of feminist thought has been 
crucial, particularly in the work they have produced on 
sexuality, and on re-readings of' cultural productions. 
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BLACK FEMINISM 
Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone are just two examples of 
white radical feminists who make analogies between the social 
position of women and the subordinate position of racial and 
ethnic minorities in Western culture. Firestone states quite 
categorically that 'racism is sexism extended'; 57 Millett 
observes that 'It was the Abolitionist Movement which gave 
American women their first opportunity for political action and 
organization'. 58 The anti-slavery and emerging women's movements 
were seen to be mutually strengthening allies in Millett's 
historical summary. and this had been previously reinforced by 
pioneer white feminists. Millett goes on to assert that: 
Slavery was probably the only circumstance in American 
life sufficiently glaring in its injustice and monumental 
evil to impel women to break that taboo of decorum which 
stifled and controlled them more efficiently than the 
coil of their legal, educational and financial 
disabilities. 59 
While it is certainly the case that American feminists were 
involved in the Abolitionist Movement, Millett's use of the term 
'women' in this quote obscures the fact that she is only talking 
about white women; and that black women active in reformist 
movements at the end of the nineteenth century were rarely ever 
allowed a voice at public meetings, and were certainly not held 
to possess the equal right of suffrage with white women. As Bell 
Hooks points out.. 'when it seemed black men might get the vote 
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while they [white women] remained disenfranchised, political 
solidarity was forgotten and they urged white men to allow racial 
solidarity to overshadow their plans to support black male 
suffrage. '" The same passionate Abolitionist women revealed 
themselves to be uncompromisingly racist in their views; 
appealing for an end to slavery did not amount to advocating 
human equality in social and political life. 
Patriarchy and imperialism caught black women in a tenacious 
double-bind. Whether they chose to opt for racial or sexual 
solidarity. either allegiance would only address hall' of the 
problem. Indeed. experience had shown black women activists that 
either ally tended to subsume the black female voice, so that 
feminism seemed to refer only to the needs of white women, and 
civil rights only addressed the oppression of black males. Bell 
Hooks traces the history of' American black women's political and 
historical invisibility to the inception of slavery 
- 
and in 
terms of the effects of patriarchal/imperialistic oppressive 
structures. they remain at the bottom of the social pile. In a 
spirited rebuttal of' the analogies drawn by white feminists 
between black experience and female subordination, Belt Hooks 
argues that such parallels effectively exclude black women as a 
category in any analysis of gendered of racial oppression: 
Like many people in our racist society white feminists 
could feel perfectly comfortable writing books or 
articles on the 'woman question' in which they drew 
analogies between 'women' and 'blacks'. Since analogies 
derive their power, their appeal, and their very reason 
for being from the sense of two disparate phenomena 
having been brought closer together, for white women to 
acknowledge the overlap between the terns 'black' and 
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'women' would render this analogy unnecessary. By 
continuously making this analogy. they unwittingly 
suggest that to them the term 'woman' is synonymous with 
'white women' and the term 'blacks synonymous with 
'black men'. What this indicates is that there exists in 
the language of the very movement that is supposedly 
concerned with eliminating sexist oppression, a 
sexist-racist attitude toward black women. 61 
It is this linguistic conflation which Hooks upholds as symbolic 
of' the invisibility of- black women in most analyses of social 
life. What she alerts us to most. strongly is that although white 
feminists tacitly 'assumed that identiifying oneself* as oppressed 
freed one from being an oppressor' 
, 
b2 such women still retained 
racist assumptions which weaken their notion of a universal 
sisterhood. since women of' colour were always already erased. In 
common with lesbians, black women recognized that white 
heterosexual feminists conceived of the womens movement as their 
'own' 
- 
and the consideration of women who experienced oppression 
not only because of the fact of their biological sex, was 
implicitly seen as detracting from the main business of' feminism. 
Since the predominantly radical feminist trend in the USA and 
the socialist feminist tradition in the UK were advocating 
nothing less than a transformation of" the entire social fabric of 
Western life through a revolution in consciousness, it is clearly 
a fatal flaw in 1970s feminist politics not to recognize the 
dynamic interrelation between issues of' race and gender for black 
women. Given that their vision of' a transformed society did not 
explicitly include racial equality, it gave the lie to the 
assumption that. the social status of' all women in American 
society (for instance) was the same. While it. homogenized female 
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experience, it also alienated those women who arguably suffered 
most due to the racist/sexist framework embedded within Western 
society. White women involved in radical political groups during 
the 1960s and 1970s had had to come to terms with the sexist 
structuring of' such organizations and had departed, concluding 
that the social revolutions envisaged beneath the rhetoric were 
actually entirely male-oriented. But they offered little solace 
to their black sisters. in that they all but denied that they 
could be racist, or that their analysis of' female oppression was 
flawed and narrow in its focus. 
During the seventies. white feminist's commitment to 
discussions of the effects of sexism only, was to a large extent a 
reaction against the patriarchal structuring of political groups 
which effectively outlawed discussion of issues relevant to 
women. For this reason it was commonly felt that, for an interim 
period at least, analyses of' 'related' issues, such as class and 
race. needed to be shelved to make space for this neglected area 
of study. Of course such a division denies any investigation of' 
the complex and diverse means by which women are positioned in 
society as subjects bounded and contained by ascriptions of their 
class. race. gender and sexual orientation. What black feminists 
have made abundantly clear is that 'women's issues' considered 
without a conscious acknowledgement of other oppressive 
mechanisms at work in society, does not even work productively at 
a theoretical level, and neither does it accord with most women's 
lived experiences of oppression. Feminists assuredly need to 
foreground social injustices which only affect women, but without 
a thorough awareness of' the differences that divide women into 
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sometime oppressors, as well as part of the oppressed, feminism 
remains the domain of the white. bourgeois, heterosexual woman, 
and its political scope is necessarily curtailed. To some extent 
modern feminism considered itself' an 'organization' which is 
simply concerned to question all women's basic right. to equality, 
and that therefore the specific problems confronting black women 
and women from other ethnic outgroups could be satisfactorily 
accommodated within a gender-specific framework. neglecting the 
complexities of racist oppression as it affects - in both 
material and ideological terms - all people of' colour. In short, 
to retain clear discursive boundaries between anti-racist and 
feminist movements precludes any analysis of the complex ways 
power operates. by situating both women and black people 
collectively as essent_i aI lj interior or. 
Hooks locates modern t'eminism's central problem as a failure 
to interrogate the dynamics of power: if feminism at some level 
wishes to wrest power from men, the meaning of such power 
relations require transformation: 
Women's liberationists, white and Flack, will always be 
at odds with one another as long as our idea of 
liberation is based on having the power white men have. 
For that power denies unity, denies common connections, 
and is inherently divisive as a natural order that 
has 
caused black and white women to cling religiously to the 
belief that bonding across racial boundaries is 
impossible, to passively accept. the notion that the 
distances that separate women are immutable. " 
Here she implies that divisions between black and white 
feminists 
are sustained because patriarchal notions of racial and class 
177 
division are left intact, despite the fact that feminists are 
largely committed to radical social change, which anticipates a 
dismantling of imperialist and capitalist social realities. Here 
she highlights a tension that I have already hinted at in my 
examination of lesbian feminist critiques: that feminists do not 
consistently deny such social divisions' validity, and that 
therefore a future feminist utopia might be one which retains 
certain aspects of a social hierarchy intact. 
Black feminists writing in the 1970s and 1980s have found 
little analysis that enables them to theorize about the black 
female experience, or upon the ways that negative images of black 
women are perpetuated throughout cultural history. In a very 
real sense black feminists had little option but to work outside 
the preordained parameters of the 'mainstream' women's movement, 
and start from scratch; rediscovering a history of black women in 
the USA and Europe and creating a discourse that incorporates 
both the problems of race and gender. Because of all these 
problems, coupled with the fact that there are still a lamentable 
shortage of black female academics in the institution (a material 
reality that is rarely protested against by white women), black 
feminism is still in a period of relative infancy. With 
reference to the specific problems encountered by black feminist 
literary critics, Barbara Smith observes that: 
There is no political presence that demands a minimal 
level of consciousness and respect from those who write 
and talk about our lives... there is not a developed body 
of black feminist political theory whose assumptions 
could be used in the study of black women's art. When 
black women's books are dealt with at all, it is usually 
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in the context of black literature which largely ignores 
the implications of sexual politics. When white women 
look at black women's works they are of course 
ill-equipped to deal with the subtleties of racial 
politics. A black feminist approach to literature that 
embodies the realization that the politics of sex as well 
as the politics of race and class are crucially 
interlocking factors in the works of black women writers 
is an absolute necessity. 64 
In the field of literary theory, black feminists have devoted 
their efforts to producing a black positive methodology, which 
also confronts the absence of' women writers of colour in literary 
criticism produced by white women. bs Black voices and experience 
are at best under-represented and at worst excluded from 
discussions which produced a feminist theoretical stance that 
affords a partial and ethnocentric discussion of questions of 
gender. More recent black feminists have subsequently argued 
that as a consequence, white feminism does not simply ignore the 
specificity of the black female experience, but also occludes and 
distorts the nature of those problems peculiar to black female 
existence. 
Even in-the late seventies the chief obstacles facing a 
developing black section of the women's movement was the inherent 
racism of white feminists. In Britain, Pratibha Parmar reports 
an incident where she and Kum-Kum Bhavnani submitted an article 
on 'Racism and the Women's Movement' to Spare Rib which argued 
that the women's movement had never taken seriously the issue of 
racism within its ranks, and pointing out the anomalous 
relationship of black women to feminism. The article was 
rejected by the collective who stated, 'We didn't really feel 
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your article could form a basis for discussion inside the 
feminist community as it betrays so many misconceptions about the 
movement's history. '66 Clearly the rejection is based on the 
inference that a select group of (white) women are the keepers of 
feminism's history, and are in the powerful elitist position to 
suppress critiques of their own hegemony, and maintain intact 
unequivocal 'truths' about feminism. The use of the word 
'community' belies the inequitable, exclusionary formation of 
many white feminist groups. Unfortunately it seems to be the 
case that white feminists have been responsible solely for 
stunting the growth of black feminist theorists in what can only 
be interpreted as a wish, conscious or internalized, to limit the 
purview of any feminist perspective to an ethnocentric one, which 
in attempting to strengthen the rhetoric of community and 
universal sisterhood, evades debates which threaten to rupture 
such fictional unity. Black feminists in the USA and Europe 
point out that such a specious form of cohesion is bought dear, 
when it highlights traces of an imperialist power struggle within 
a movement that purports to deconstruct male-oriented power 
principles. 
White radical and socialist feminists were committed to an 
attack on the male dominated social system - whether they happily 
termed this patriarchy or not 
- 
and consequently focused upon 
institutions which shored up patriarchy, ' such as the family. 
Conversely, black feminists were faced with the reality that the 
family form was more often than not the only cushion against 
systematic racism in the public sphere, even if the familial 
ideology outlined by white feminists also held sway over black 
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communities. In addition black feminists set out to combat the 
tenacious myth that black communities were largely matriarchal in 
their form, and therefore emasculated black manhood, depriving 
him of his 'rightful' role as head of the household. Analyses of 
the matriarchal structure of the black family in the USA 
circulated during the sixties, and Angela Davis cites Daniel 
Moynihan's The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, 
published by the US Department of Labor in 1965, as a powerful 
and influential example of such a thesis. Moynihan had linked 
contemporary social and economic problems of the black community 
to their matrilocal structure, and called for the introduction of 
male authority in the black family system. Such a position 
ascribes women greater power than they can conceivably have had, 
and fails to take account of the evidence that black women. like 
most working-class white women, never had the luxurious position 
of angel in the house, but always had a clear cut economic role 
to perform. 67 
It was pointed out by black feminists that the origins of the 
matriarchy theory lay in the legacy of women's labour during 
slavery, where many were required to perform tasks identified as 
masculine in the white consciousness of men and women's work: 
To explain the black females' ability to survive without 
the direct aid of a male and her ability to perform tasks 
that were culturally defined as 'male' work, white males 
argued that black slave women were not 'real' women but 
were masculinized sub-human creatures. It is not 
unlikely that white men feared that white women, 
witnessing the black female slave's ability to cope as 
effectively in the work force as men, might develop 
ideas 
about social equality between the sexes and encourage 
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political solidarity between black and white women. 68 
If black women were seen as a potential threat, the real economic 
situation belies such a vision of strength since, 'at the very 
time sociologists proclaimed the existence of a matriarchal order 
in the black family structure, black women represented one of the 
largest socially and economically deprived groups in America'. 69 
Such a thesis could potentially divide the black community, 
prompting black men to blame black women for their 
'emasculation', and not a sexist and imperialist economic system 
which exploited black women's labour as the cheapest. Black 
women might well be their family's 'breadwinner' by default; but 
perspectives such as Moynihan's demonstrate how black men were 
encouraged to believe that their 'natural' role as household head 
had been usurped, and black women's 'femininity' compromised. 
An imperialist system had designated black women unfeminine 
and even sub-human. therefore the representations of womanhood 
black feminists concentrated upon were those that excluded them 
as women (positing the white woman as the paradigm of feminine 
beauty), or which situated them as purely sexual creatures, 
available to black and white men alike. Mainstream feminist 
images criticism paid scant attention to representations of women 
of colour, and black feminists were accordingly critical of an 
analytical model which sought to claim the right to redefine what 
it is to be female, while ignoring black women's endeavours to 
gain the right to be identified as 'human'. White women were, in 
addition, regarded as instrumental in the perpetuation of such 
imagery, derived from the slave era, which tacitly accepted and 
reinforced the differences between white and black women as if 
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they were immutable. Images criticism was bound up with 
accounting for the seemingly timeless and universal construction 
of the feminine as passive, frail, but white, ignoring black 
women's relationships to such images, or for American black women 
one of their incontrovertible sources: 'the controlling images of 
black women that originated during the slave era attest to the 
ideological dimension of black women's oppression'. 70 Black 
women were characterized as unfeminine, promiscuous, a woman who 
cannot be raped because she herself is indiscriminately sexually 
voracious; this is set against the view of black men as the 
rapist incarnate. Feminist 'Reclaim the Night' marches which 
often passed through predominantly black areas in America angered 
black women as evidence that the stereotype of the sexualized 
black man prevailed among white women unscrutinized. ' 
Similarly, debates around reproductive rights in the seventies 
were greeted with much scepticism by black feminists, who still 
retained the memory of the rising popularity of the eugenicist 
movement in the early years of the twentieth century. In the 
United States the Eugenics Society 'could boast that at least 
twenty-six states had passed compulsory sterilization laws and 
that thousands of "unfit" persons had already been surgically 
prevented from reproducing. '72 Although white feminists 
vigorously campaigned for legal abortions, they failed to 
acknowledge that the chief source of the problem was among women 
of colour who comprised 80% of the mortality rate from illegal 
abortions in the years preceding its decriminalization in the 
States. 73 Black women in both Britain and the States wanted 
other measures to be tabled in tandem to abortion legislation - 
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matters such as that of compulsory sterilization, since 
sterilization abuse, when figures were obtained, was seen to be a 
widespread problem, as was the use of Depo-Provera, with its 
incident risks of breast and cervical cancer. 74 
Black feminists such as Parmar recognize that just as some 
issues raised around sexual difference lead us back to the old 
essentialist arguments utilized to maintain women in a 
subordinate and quantitively different role, so the notion of 
'blackness' can carry essentialist overtones. A black feminist 
movement established on the grounds of certain irreconcilable 
differences with white women, has then to come to terms with its 
own range and diversity: 'racial identity alone cannot be a basis 
for collective organizing as the black communities are as beset 
with divisions around culture, sexuality and class as any other 
community'. 75 The will to categorize differences between women 
in order to deflect from the sometimes oppressive and offensive 
notions of 'sisterhood' has resulted in an 'identity politics' 
within feminism, which though productive in its positive 
affirmation of heterogeneity, threatens to divert the essence of 
feminist debate away from the aim of radicalizing a viable 
political stance, towards the internal politics which almost 
always seem to assert a hierarchy of authenticity. Many 
feminists now recognize the need to critique all essentialist 
notions of 'self' as something absolute and unchanging, in favour 
of an 'anti-humanist' concept of subjectivity. 76 
Bell Hooks puts forward the idea of 'solidarity' to replace 
the overused term 'sisterhood' because, 'the emphasis on 
Sisterhood was often seen as the emotional appeal masking the 
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opportunism of manipulative bourgeois white women', 77 shielding 
the bald fact that women can and do oppress women. She further 
argues that the call for sisterhood on the basis of common 
oppression as women is a call to acknowledge the nature of' our 
victimization and to celebrate as victims rather than push for a 
rejection of such subject positioning. Ultimately, bonding as 
'victims' implies there is no place for strong assertive women 
(the recurrent stereotypical view of black women in popular 
Western mythology) in the Women's Movement. She perceives that: 
Ironically, the women who were most eager to be seen as 
'victims', who overwhelmingly stressed the role of 
victim, were more privileged and powerful than the vast 
majority of women in our society. '8 
The concentration on a shared status as victim, she argues, 
prevents women from analysing the complexity of their own 
responses to other women, as well as men; in particular the way 
sexism, racism, classism and homophobia are perpetuated and 
naturalized within social groupings to the extent that 
'Sisterhood became yet another shield against reality, another 
support system. "y But even today, when there is a recognition 
on one level that women's social experiences are affected by the 
processes of racism and imperialism, there is a sense that the 
movement 'belongs' to the dominant white, heterosexual faction, 
who are in the privileged hegemonic position of being able to 
'invite' other voices, and 'place themselves in the position of 
"authorities" who must mediate communication between racist white 
women (naturally they see themselves as having come to terms with 
their racism) and angry black women whom they believe are 
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incapable of rational discourse. '8° 
Black and lesbian feminist tendencies have been instrumental 
in constructing a methodology which is able to take account of 
the effect of other totalizing social factors upon women. If 
what can be defined as feminist theory remains the prerogative of 
the white mainstream, black feminists are doubly disadvantaged by 
an educational system that has historically allowed them limited 
access to higher education. Many black feminist writers might 
not 'qualify' as intellectuals in the patriarchal sense; in 
addition they 
-are always trying to write themselves out of a 
tradition which has previously successfully absorbed oppositional 
black perspectives: 
Reclaiming the Black feminist intellectual tradition 
involves much more than developing Black feminist 
analyses using standard epistemological criteria. It 
also involves challenging the very definitions of 
intellectual discourse. 81 
Most feminists intend to transform current epistemological 
definitions, and both black and lesbian feminism have usefully 
extended the boundaries of feminist discourse. to demonstrate 
that a patriarchal ideology also supports a racist and 
heterosexist one, which white heterosexual feminists need 
themselves to counter and actively reject. 
Many radical and socialist white feminists now accept that 
they were misguided in situating sexism as the 'oldest' form of 
oppression, since this implies that gendered oppression deserves 
attention before problems of racism, classism or homophobia - 
'suggesting a hierarchy of oppression exists, with sexism in 
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first place, evokes a sense of competing concerns that is 
unnecessary'. 82 While many 'mainstream' feminists attempt to 
incorporate black and lesbian perspectives into their analyses, 
there is still much theoretical work to be done before the point 
is reached where the patriarchal meanings of such differences are 
no longer entrenched in feminist thought. Meanwhile lesbian and 
black feminists are variously 'accused' of being the maverick 
groups who fragmented the women's movement; here is, for example, 
Lynne Segal's statement that the eighties 'has been a decade of 
increased fragmentation within the women's movement, with the 
emergence of divisions between women and the growth of Black 
feminist perspectives'. 83 Although Segal devotes a few pages of 
Is The Future Female? (1987) to a consideration of black 
perspectives, her statement might be interpreted as implying that 
such a fragmentation is necessarily destructive, and a fault of 
black women. The degree of' 'unity' that ever existed within the 
Women's Movement is, as I have already suggested, a subject of 
controversy; but it seems clear that what unity existed, did so 
at the expense of black, lesbian and working-class women. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IDEOLOGY, DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL PRODUCTIONS 
The concept of ideology is an intractable one for Marxist 
feminism, not least because it remains inadequately 
theorized in both Marxist and feminist theory. Although 
feminists have frequently posed ideology as central to 
women's oppression this very centrality is presented as 
self-evident rather than argued for. ' 
As Michele Barrett suggests above, Marxists, feminists, and in 
particular Marxist-feminists have attempted to add strength to 
their analyses of oppression 
- 
whether perceived as class or 
class/gender oriented 
- 
by developing a more complex theory of' 
the functions of ideology, in an endeavour to account for its 
problematical interrelation with material 'social reality'. She 
is correct, however, in her observation that feminists, when 
confronting the fundamental theoretical problem of' how to account 
for the tenacity of gender differentiation and its subtle and 
diffuse operation in societal structures, have summoned up the 
concept to mean anything from 'false consciousness' to an 
'unconscious' internalization of dominant social values. This 
position is gradually changing with the growing sophistication of 
feminist methodologies; but often this amounts to borrowing 
rather than redefining a post-Althusserian model of ideology. 
This model allows ideological processes a 'relative autonomy' 
from the economic base, but either assumes that ideology acquires 
a certain 'materiality' of its own (without accounting for the 
means by which such a materiality is achieved), or ignores the 
problem of the relationship of superstructure to base altogether. 
An exploration of the relationship between infrastructure and 
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superstructure is, however, crucial in the elaboration of a 
feminist political stance which retains a sense of the role of 
feminism in grassroots, issue-based struggle as well as its 
discursive role within an abstract theoretical battleground. 
Barrett outlines some of the problems resulting from 
conflicting definitions of ideology, but herself fails to argue 
for its centrality in such a way as to get feminists out of a 
critical impasse. She refers to the 'ideology of gender', but 
having worked from an Althusserian position, neglects to suggest 
how an ideology of gender can be positioned in relation to other 
examples of Ideological State Apparatuses which Althusser 
outlines in 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' (1969). 
I would contend that the concept of an 'ideology of gender' is 
too unwieldy, and effectively embraces all Althusser's working 
categories (as would an ideology of racism, or heterosexism) - 
this is a crucial point which I will comment on further during 
the course of this chapter. 
I argued in Chapter One that the primary analytical problem 
for all feminist theorists is the means by which we articulate 
the previously unarticulated, given the absence of attention to 
social identities ascribed to women in existing theoretical 
frameworks. It has been recognized that there is a paucity of 
viable concepts available for feminist appropriation without 
extensive redefinition; and yet Marxist analyses of the functions 
of ideology have been adopted relatively intact. Marxism 
is one 
perspective which has proved attractive to many feminists: 
its 
analysis of the capitalist social formation as predicated upon 
class conflict appeared amenable to the inclusion of 
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considerations of gender inequality, even though such an 
incorporation serves to expose the limitations of Marxist thought 
in the context of' gender-based inquiry. 
Feminists since the 1970s have encountered mammoth problems in 
their efforts to locate and identify the mechanisms by which 
desired and distorted images of femininity are perpetuated in 
society. More specifically, there is still a pressing need to 
address the means by which such images become equated with 'fact' 
or common sense, as they are communicated through schools, the 
law, the media. literature; and inform an individual's 
conceptions of, and attitudes to sexual difference. A notion of 
the effects of' 'ideology' 
- 
even if- that notion remains 
ill-defined in the form of 'images of women' 
- 
has become a vital 
tool for feminist criticism in areas where feminist forms of 
knowledge have proliferated within the academic institution, 
especially in the realms of literary theory, film theory and 
cultural studies. Before I assess feminist approaches to 
ideology in more detail, I shall outline the process by which 
early Second Wave feminists identified representations of 
'femininity' 
- 
an elusive, fluid but tenacious construct - as a 
central contributory factor to women's material subordination. 
In addition, I shall provide a working summary of Althusser's 
description of Ideological State Apparatuses which, I shall argue 
at a later stage, might be more fruitfully supervened by 
Foucauldian and feminist analyses of discourse and power. 
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. 
ST S AND RADICAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
A position analogous to the Marxist account of the effects of 
ideological insertion is summoned by early radical feminists to 
account for the widespread, though chimerical nature of 'sexism'. 
The extensive use made of the abstract terms 'stereotype' and 
'patriarchy' serves to illustrate this point. Both concepts were 
crucial in the struggle to establish a resistant feminist 
discourse, yet both tended to be mustered as if they were 
self-explanatory, and not as a tentative point of access to a 
thorough understanding of the way gender inequality is 
perpetuated in the current social formation. The early writings 
of radical feminists 
- 
especially in America, where the radical 
tradition had a stronger hold 
- 
display a marked reluctance to 
adopt the analytical frameworks or 'jargon' of established 
patriarchal academic discourse. This anti-theory tendency, 
coupled with many feminists' disenchantment with left-wing 
male-dominated hierarchies, resulted in an almost wholesale 
rejection of Marxist perspectives. The writings of American 
feminists actively involved in grassroots agitation, such as 
those collected in Robin Morgan's Sisterhood is Powerful (1970) 
and Koedt, Levine and Rapone's Radical Feminism (1973) evince an 
unwillingness to express themselves in a mainstream 'theoretical' 
fashion at all. This is partly a result of the non-hierarchical 
organization of early consciousness-raising collectives which 
attempted to give all women, regardless of educational background 
a voice within the movement; but it also indicates a 
concentration on material instances of women's subordination. 
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mediated through individual experiences recounted by movement 
women. This is not to suggest that non-material aspects of 
sexism are altogether neglected, but that issue-based discussions 
(on abortion, contraception, the family and so forth) tend to be 
conflated with a consideration of the means by which material 
subordination is sustained at a 'meta' level, designated as 
'patriarchy'. The result is that early feminist work often gives 
the impression that 'sexism' is always conscious, purposeful and 
can therefore be eradicated by outlawing certain social 
practices. 
There are well-documented problems with this feminist 
appropriation of the term patriarchy, when it is left crudely 
analogous to its original definition of 'father-right' - not 
least that it fails to take account of the social realities of 
advanced capitalism - and these conceptual problems have been 
addressed in earlier chapters. For the purposes of this chapter, 
the radical feminist use of" 'patriarchy' clearly implies that all 
men actively subordinate women, but fails to pay more than token 
regard to the likelihood that men have different degrees of 
access to mechanisms of oppression (men of colour, for example, 
find themselves 'outside' dominant patriarchal representations of' 
masculinity). The following passage exemplifies this stance: 
All men are our policemen, and no organized police force 
is necessary at this time to keep us in our places. All 
men enjoy male supremacy and take advantage of it to a 
greater or lesser degree depending on their position 
in 
the masculine hierarchy of power. 2 
Such a position evokes the reality of individual male 
dominance 
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in the private sphere of' home and family (acknowledged by most 
feminists as the crucial site of women's oppression), but does 
not allow for the possibility that changes in personal power 
relations will only be effected by intervention at the level of 
'public' manifestations of power. 
Patriarchy, in common with ideology, is viewed as inscribed 
within the totality of the social formation; unlike ideology 
however, it is implied that an overthrow of patriarchy (enacted 
primarily at the localized level of the individual's rejection of 
her 'appropriate' domestic/sexual role) would necessitate a shift 
in the representation of women, and consequently a renegotiation 
of current social positioning. Patriarchy, in this context, 
signifies more than the rule of men; it connotes a ruling body of 
individual men who directly influence social relations and who 
could be quite simply dethroned in favour of' more egalitarian 
(power) structures. Stereotypes and gender socialization are 
seen, therefore, as contingent effects of" patriarchy 
- 
and are 
consequently perceived as the product of conscious intention on 
the part of the powerful (men) to maintain their position at the 
expense of the powerless (women). 
Admittedly, I am taking common features of certain radical 
feminism and to some extent parodying them; but the point of 
taking the sub-text of such a formulation to its logical 
conclusion is still ultimately valid. The way patriarchy is used 
in such work gives the term a material effect which is untenable, 
given that patriarchy works effectively even when, for example, a 
woman heads a government. Ultimately stereotypes are seen as 
transformable into more 'realistic' images of women, as if they 
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can simply take on the 'positive' effects of' a 'role-model' given 
some judicious revision from a feminist perspective. 
'Stereotype' and 'patriarchy become caught somewhere between 
their implied status as transcendent and elusive or invisible, 
and as material, visible and transferrable. The anti-theory 
drive of' the 1970s has resulted in a theoretical muddle for 
feminists of the 1980s and 1990s of quite serious proportions. 
Michele Barrett and others have tried to navigate a way through 
such a cul-de-sac by talking of a 'patriarchal ideology', 3 which 
concentrates analysis upon how women and men represent the 
'realities' of gender inequality to themselves and act upon it in 
their material practices, as well being subjected to ideology's 
gendered central Subject. I do not wish to write off radical 
feminist analysis of the stereotype, or suggest its significance 
as a representation of* power relations embedded in patriarchy is 
totally redundant. Images and representations of femininity are 
still central features of' contemporary feminist theory, and a 
revisionary reading of radical texts demonstrates that they shed 
important insights upon the effects of ideology. 
What Greer, Ellmann, Millett, Brownmiller and others share 
through their explorations into the construction of femininity 
and the stereotypes used to enforce desired images of the female 
form, is an awareness of the power of 'gender ideology', in 
tandem with a sense of its apparent immutability. It has long 
been accepted that overturning stereotypes - for example using 
scantily-clad men in advertisements to target women - simply does 
not work, in that the image may be analogous but the meaning 
differs substantially. Men simply do not function as objects of 
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desire; their gendered subject position in society is deeply 
entrenched. Germaine Greer perceives the perpetuation of the 
female stereotype as a function of consumption, mediated through 
the less tangible process of' desire 
- 
for men the 'woman' becomes 
a commodity; and for women she is the unattainable seamless 
hallmark of perfection: 
Because she is the emblem of spending ability and the 
chief spender, she is also the most effective seller of 
this world's goods. Every survey ever held has shown 
that the image of an attractive woman is the most 
effective advertising gimmick... 'The gynolatry of our 
civilization is written large upon its face, upon 
hoardings, cinema screens, television, newspapers, 
magazines, tins, packets, cartons, bottles, all 
consecrated to the reigning deity, the female fetish. Her 
dominion must not be thought to entail the rule of' women, 
for she is not a woman. 4 
Greer hints here at a disjunction between the power of the female 
image and the powerlessness of women. In Sexual Politics Kate 
Millett goes further, and actually situates gendered power 
relations at the level of ideology 
- 
gesturing towards its role 
in the interpellation of subjects: 
Sexual politics obtains consent through the 
'socialization' of' both sexes to basic patriarchal 
polities with regard to temperament, role, and status. 
As to status, a pervasive assent to the prejudice of male 
superiority guarantees superior status in the male, 
inferior in the female. The first item, temperament, 
involves the formation of human personality along 
stereotyped lines of sex category ('masculine' and 
'feminine'), based on the needs and values of the 
dominant group and dictated by what its members cherish 
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in themselves and find convenient in subordinates: 
aggression, intelligence, force, and efficacy in the 
male; passivity, ignorance, docility, 'virtue' and 
ineffectuality in the female. This is complemented by a 
second factor, sex role, which decrees a consonant and 
highly elaborate code of conduct, gesture and attitude 
for each sex. In terms of' activity. sex role assigns 
domestic service and attendance upon infants to the 
female, the rest of human achievement, interest, and 
ambition to the male. The limited role allotted to the 
female tends to arrest her at the level of biological 
experience. ' 
Millett's interpretation of the overarching impact of' gender 
socialization analyses the way in which a dominant ideological 
perspective on gender polarizes the sexes into having two 
distinct desired roles within the social formation. 
This hypothesis, which she terms 'notes toward a theory of 
patriarchy', implicitly allows for the consideration of 
class/racial hierarchies in addition to a sexual one, 6 and 
therefore enables her to speculate that males outside the 
dominant group are also 'subjected' to gender socialization 
without it guaranteeing them the same access to power. By 
suggesting that 'masculine' attributes socialized in males are 
positioned as the desirable hegemonic ones, she points to a 
paradox confronting all feminists: which is that all males have 
access to power over females in the domestic sphere. Another 
paradox outlined by Millett is one which has troubled feminists 
ever since: that women's socially constructed role has always 
derived its credibility from the 'fact' of female biology. ' 
Although a Marxist analysis of the base/superstructure 
bifurcation of society allows us to interrogate networks of power 
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and subordination as effects of culture and 'civilization', such 
a position inherits the biologistic reductionism of its object of 
study. Marxist perspectives on class struggle situate women as 
outside 'public' power relations; although it is evident that 
women have always had a public presence in the labour force under 
capitalism, their role as domestic labourers and reproducers of 
the labour force is deemed to be their only functional one. 
Despite an acknowledgement of the part reproduction plays in 
relations of production, it is still accorded only peripheral 
significance by Marxists; it was left to Marxist feminists to 
emphasize that the role women perform in reproducing 'themselves' 
(i. e. other women/domestic labourers) is equally vital. 8 
Millett, writing in a veritable vacuum, tends to assume the 
validity of a quasi-Marxist position rather than attempting a 
'marriage' between this and her own perspective. Her endeavour 
to historicize patriarchy effectively problematizes the Marxist 
historical approach, but she does not pursue the implications of 
this. She is also not often credited for her awareness of the 
complexity of constructing a theory of patriarchy which counters 
the assumption 'that patriarchy is endemic in human social 
life': 9 certainly we find evidence of the prevalence of such 
assumptions in Friedrich Engels' The Origins of The Family, 
Private Property and the State (1884). Millett, on the whole, 
gives a very positive account of this text as a contribution to a 
theory of sexual revolution, 10 especially its descriptions of the 
patriarchal and bourgeois manifestation of the institutions of 
marriage and the family. However, she rightly points out that 
Engels' view of patriarchy - as enacting power over bourgeois 
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women by rendering them chattels to be passed from father to 
husband in the circulation of wealth and property 
- 
disregards 
the effects of patriarchal power relations at other levels: 
Engels ignores the fact that woman is viewed, 
emotionally and psychologically, as chattel property by 
the poor as well as, and often even more than, the rich. 
Lacking other claims to status, a working class male is 
still more prone to seek them in his sexual rank, often 
brutally asserted. 11 
Millett, in common with other feminist thinkers, found that 
Engels might yield possibilities for feminist appropriation, not 
least because he focuses on the familial institution as integral 
to women's oppression. Nonetheless, she observes above that the 
degree of female subordination is regarded as class-specific; yet 
feminists required a framework which could account for the 
seemingly universal acceptance of female inferiority. 
Althusser's revision of Marx's concept of ideology, and his 
problematization of its relation to materiality seemed a more 
fruitful point of departure. It is necessary, therefore, to 
critically assess Althusser's account of Ideological State 
Apparatuses as relatively autonomous mechanisms of oppression, 
before continuing our survey of feminist interventions in this 
area. 
ALTHUSSER AND IDEOLOGY 
Prior to feminist approaches to ideology, Louis Althusser had 
already problematized the Marxist theory of the maintenance of 
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relations of production under capitalism. In his essay 'Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses', he attempts to modify the 
classic Marxian account of the status of superstructure (law and 
the state/ideology) as subordinate to the infrastructure 
(economic base), which is viewed as the determining instance for 
superstructural processes. The initial proposition of 
Althusser's thesis is that in order to maintain its existing 
relations of production, capitalism needs to reproduce the 
conditions of production, and that this reproduction cannot 
simply happen at the localized level of each individual 'firm'. 
or productive unit. At the very least, capitalist enterprises 
depend upon one another for raw materials, new machinery and so 
on; in addition each unit requires other 'raw material' such as 
labour-power, whose 'reproduction' takes place outside the sphere 
of production. In order to reproduce itself, labour power not 
only requires sufficient wages for food, clothing and 
child-rearing, but also an appropriate form of education. 
This model of conditions of' reproduction already moves us 
beyond the scope of the Marxian economic base to the meta-level 
of the state itself. which not only provides the skills, via 
schooling, appropriate for labour power to reproduce itself in a 
way that functions for capital, but also imparts 'rules' of good 
behaviour to its citizens: 'rules of morality, civic and 
professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect 
for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the 
rules of order established by class domination. '12 In other 
words, the state intervenes in the reproduction of labour-power 
at a crucial level 'outside' the realms of production 
'proper', 
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and enforces submission to a code of' behaviour which serves the 
interest of capital and also naturalizes the division of labour 
in its present form. The state guarantees reproduction of the 
status quo 'in forms which ensure subjection to the ruling 
ideology or the mastery of its "practice", 13 dependent upon the 
class status of the individual. Already we can observe that 
Althusser is depicting a profound interrelationship between the 
economic base and the superstructure, where the material 
conditions of production are reinforced actively and coercively 
by a dominant ideology which simultaneously reproduces its own 
ideological framework as inevitable and immutable. 
Althusser points out that the relationships between 
infrastructure and superstructure have, in traditional Marxist 
terms, been construed as either a relationship of 'relative 
autonomy' on the part of the superstructure. or in terms of a 
'reciprocal' action of' superstructure upon the base. Departing 
somewhat frone these interpretations, he probleniatizes the 
conception of base/superstructure from a dual-level perspective, 
since such a model implies a necessary hierarchical arrangement 
of' one above the other. Instead, the superstructural elements of' 
power, whose component parts comprise the state, are considered 
in terms of the way they consolidate a particular (capitalist) 
status quo, which represents to itself and its subjects a desired 
social reality concretized in material practices. Primarily, 
Althusser distinguishes between the effects of' state power and 
the state apparatus - state power being analogous to that 'class' 
who maintain dominance via an abstract power network (the state 
apparatus), which could conceivably remain intact after a seizure 
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of power by another social group. 
In addition to the State Apparatus (which he describes as 
repressive since it ultimately 'functions by violence', 14 whether 
physical or non-physical in form), he distinguishes Ideological 
State Apparatuses that emanate from and feed back into the 
Repressive State Apparatus. These are diverse, plural and 
operate as 'a certain number of realities which present 
themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and 
specialized institutions'. 15 and which function by means other 
than active or l angi ble repression: 
It' the ISAs [Ideological State Apparatuses] 'function' 
massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies 
their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as 
the ideology by which they function is always unified, 
despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the 
ruling ideology, which is the ideology of 'the ruling 
class'. 1b 
It is evident that Althasser is thus establishing close links 
between the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) as a centralized 
unit of' power containing components such as the government, the 
administration. the army, the police, the courts and prisons, and 
the mediatory processes of the 1SAs, which consolidate the unity 
of' state power whilst containing and repressing contradictions 
that are the effects of ongoing class struggle. 
Althusser's 'empirical list' of ISAs includes the following: 
the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the 
legal 
ISA, the political ISA, the trade union ISA, the communications 
ISA and the cultural ISA. Even though it is clear that some of 
these ISAs are also sites of struggle against a dominant 
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ideological perspective, he maintains that no class could hold 
state power for long without transforming both the RSA and the 
ISAs. Both are instrumental in the replication of specific 
relations of production, and therefore more fundamental than the 
acquisition of dominance. Consequently, each ISA contributes to 
the perpetuation of the RSA in ways proper to its function 
- 
which clearly implies that ideology has a direct interventional 
relationship with people's material conditions of existence. In 
this respect it is apparent that Aithusser's model moves towards 
a definition of' base/superstructure as inseparable in practice; 
or as effects of each other 
- 
in that material reality is itself 
mediated and subject to transformations by the effects of 
ideology. and changing economic needs dictate subtle ideological 
shifts (the effects of a wartime economy upon the 'reserve army' 
of female labour would be a case in point). 
A vital distinction for feminists, perhaps, is Althusser's 
account of the creation and maintenance of separate private and 
public spheres. The RSA is seen to function primarily in the 
public domain, whereas a large part of the ISA"s effects are felt 
in the private sphere of the family-household system. The 
ideological processes which function most effectively in the 
private sphere inform those institutions which are seen to 
pre-date capitalism, such as the family, property relations and 
the sexual division of labour. Further, he avers that it is the 
state (the ruling class) which determines the very boundaries 
between 'public' and 'private' - boundaries which are left intact 
by analysts such as Marx and Engels. Part of the agenda of the 
modern Women's Movement has been precisely to redefine these 
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boundaries in an effort to demonstrate that the existing division 
serves patriarchal interests. Many feminists' clarion call for a 
'revolution in consciousness' demands an interrogation of the 
concepts 'public' and 'private' as part of a broader programme of 
redefining gender roles themselves. 
Interestingly. Althusser cites the family and education ISAs 
as the most dominant and effective ideological apparatuses in a 
mature capitalist formation. This signals an immediate parallel 
with feminist endeavours to foreground these two institutions as 
having important material and ideological effects upon the 
positioning of' women as functioning overtly in the private sphere 
- 
their role as wage labourers in the public sphere being largely 
neglected. It is argued that it is in the 'natural' apolitical 
site of the family that ideology most successfully effaces its 
own effects. Althusser makes a similar assertion about the 
function of education: 
The mechanisms which produce this vital result for the 
capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed 
by a universally reigning ideology of the School, 
universally reigning because it is one of' the essential 
forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology which represents 
the school as a neutral environment purged of ideology. '' 
Of course Althusser is aware that within the broad spectrum of 
the educational ISA can be contained a range of contradictory 
impulses 
- 
for example, where a school teacher attempts to 
encourage her/his students to recognize that education mediates a 
dominant ideological perspective which hides beneath the guise of 
common sense or self-evident 'truth'. Oppositional 
ideologies 
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present conflicting perceptions of an individual's relation to 
'reality' and therefore expose the contradictions upon which the 
dominant ideology is founded. Feminists, in order to construct a 
viable oppositional ideological strategy, have first to recognize 
that Marxist theories of ideology themselves operate within what 
Michele Barrett vaguely terms an 'ideology of gender'. The 
recognition that all Marxist theories of ideology 
- 
even 
Althusser's 
- 
situate ideology as 'determined in the last 
instance by the class struggle', '8 prompts feminists to find new 
means to conceptualize the effects of a social formation which 
they perceive as equally determined by the perpetuation of 
notions of gender and racial difference. 
Perhaps Althusser's concluding thesis is the most engaging for 
feminists. In his assertion that ideology interpellates 
individuals as subjects in a way that profoundly affects our 
material existence. he offers a position parallel to more recent 
poststructuralist theorists. Therefore ideological processes, in 
the way they mediate and negotiate the repressive aspects of the 
State Apparatus are perceived as achieving a 'materiality' of 
their own. In other words, ideology does not just operate at the 
level of 'ideas', in that ideas exist within and are given 
meaning by our actions, which insofar as they are 'social 
actions' are themselves ritualized in ways that are delineated by 
a particular ISA. We are already 'hailed' or interpellated as 
subjects by means that allow us to be 'identified' in the social 
formation by the 'double-mirror effect' of an ISA which 
implicitly contains at its centre the Subject par excellence 
(e. g. a projection of God in the religious ISA, or the idea of 
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the model family which is summoned in the functions of the 
welfare state) to which we are subjected. From this 'Subject' we 
obtain our meaning in relation to all other subjects 
- 
accordingly. individuality itself is viewed by Althusser as an 
effect of the operation of ideology. 
In poststructuralist terminology the construction of* a 
discrete individuality is seen as an effect of discourse, as I 
shall later explore. Meanwhile, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that Althusser's model of Interpellation 
- 
which necessitates the 
mutual recognition of subjects, (central) abstract Subject, and 
the subject's recognition of her/himself 
- 
requires extension to 
accommodate the view that women operate in the present social 
formation as subject/object in a paradoxically unstable subject 
position. For example. feminist critics of film and popular 
culture have analysed the effects upon a woman interpellated by 
the 'cultural ISA' who. watching images of women on television or 
in films, recognizes herself as object in relation to the 
(masculine) dominant subject's gaze: 
In film, on television, in the press and in most popular 
narratives men are shown to be in control of the gaze, 
women are controlled by it. Men act; women are acted 
upon. This is patriarchy. 19 
The required subject-position offered by such representations is 
predominantly as object of desire, countered by 'negative' images 
of unfemininity which seem to warn the female viewer of the dire 
consequences of not fully entering into dominant ideological 
definitions of acceptable female behaviour. Nonetheless recent 
feminist commentators, in addition to exposing the effects upon 
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women (materially and ideologically) of the male control of the 
'gaze', have also turned their attention to the ways in which 
women have contested such meanings, disrupting the master 
narratives of the dominant ideology. Althusser's observation of 
the dual effects of ideology 
- 
upon consciousness and as 
dictating a range of actions 
- 
has proved attractive to Marxist 
feminists who have recognized that a feminist revolution requires 
not only equal access to material power processes, but also more 
importantly a sustained attack upon dominant ideological 
mechanisms. by demythologizing their perceived 'naturalness'. 
MARXIST-FEMINIST APPROACHES 
For current feminists, there is a growing consensus of the need 
to establish a stronger analytical position from which to assess 
the means by which existing 'patriarchal' power structures seem 
to be self-perpetuating. From such a perspective the 
quasi-biological account of patriarchy's 'universality' might be 
countered. and its success as a dominant ideological force 
examined and undercut. Following Althusser, feminist theorists 
have rejected the prevailing Marxist notion that ideology 
constitutes a distortion of reality by the ruling class, or 
indeed that ideology acts as a direct reflection. in ideas, of' 
the determining economic base. Instead it is argued that 
ideology achieves a relative autonomy from the economic 
level 
(even if this is a determining factor in the last instance). 
Emphasis shifts instead to the relationship of ideology to 
lived 
experience: as the representation of the imaginary relationship 
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of individuals to the real conditions of their existence. The 
subject is constructed and reproduced in ideology and 'reality' 
is therefore perceived as a series of' intersubjective social 
situations and relations. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Michele Barrett saw this 
shifting Marxist perspective on ideology as more amenable to 
feminist appropriation: 
The influence of this theoretical revolution on Marxist 
feminist work has been considerable. It has opened up 
for 'legitimate' discussion the question of the 
construction of masculine and feminine subjects and the 
relation of the sexual division of' labour to capitalist 
production. It has facilitated the feminist challenge to 
an orthodox Marxism that relegated the oppression of 
women to the theoretical, and hence political, 
sidelines. 20 
The adoption of' post-Althusserian notions of ideology is one of 
the means by which socialist feminists have attempted a 
theoretical 'marriage' with mainstream Marxists. However, such a 
merger necessitated a revision of the conceptual framework used 
to describe relations of production, in order to foreground the 
important role of women as 'reproducers' of the existing and 
future workforce. To a certain extent, an economistic model of 
women's oppression has been rejected in favour of arguing that 
ideological processes are themselves instrumental in reproducing 
gender divisions within the capitalist social formation. The 
acknowledgement of the all-pervasive effects of' institutionalized 
sexism upon the functioning of the Repressive State Apparatus 
effectively transforms Marxist discourse in a way that has cast 
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into doubt the harmony of such a marriage. There is, as Barrett 
points out, a risk that feminists might lapse into a naively 
functionalist account of gendered power relations 
- 
one which 
sees women's oppression as directly governed and maintained by 
state intervention. 21 
A concentration upon ideological processes specifically raises 
doubts about the possible historical specificity of such a 
project which 'remains subject to the risk of' universalism'. 22 
Feminists have concentrated upon two major areas 
- 
familial 
relations and the development of masculine and feminine 
subjectivity 
- 
neither of which is accommodated by Marxist 
orthodoxy, which itself 'universalized' such areas by tending to 
accept at least some aspects of' family life and gendered identity 
as social givens. Even Engels, for all his attempts at 
historical specificity in his account of the development of the 
bourgeois family form, implies a 'natural' sexual division of 
labour; he anticipates sexual freedom based on the expression of 
'real love' when capitalism is overturned, but gives no further 
indication of a changed social/economic function for women. 23 
His analysis accords the family a history of its own. The 
account of the mutation of the family from 'prehistorical' 
mother-right to property-owning patriarchy, which facilitates, 
but is not itself a direct effect of, capitalist exploitation, 
fails to interrogate the nature of the relationship between a 
capitalist social organization and the family. Engels reaffirms 
the public/private division - one governed by profit, the other 
by sexual slavery - and, as Annette Kuhn argues, utilizes two 
conflicting models of history: 
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although Engels' analysis of' the social relations of 
family forms does inscribe history as a crucial 
component, the model is founded in an epistemology 
different from that articulated in an analysis which 
treats of the dynamic of transitions between different 
modes of production within 'civilization'. What this 
means in effect is that although Engels' notion of the 
social relations of' patriarchy is a historical one, 
nevertheless it cannot be mapped unproblematically onto 
the social relations characteristic of a mode of 
production. The two histories are, so to speak, out of 
step. 24 
In evaluating the 'private sphere' 
-a sphere demarcated and 
identified by the capitalist state apparatus, but one also 
marginal ized by Marxists 
- 
feminists find themselves caught 
between two ideological positions which both show a tendency to 
consign the family to the realms of prehistory, and therefore 
outside the parameters of conventional political theory. 
Thus re-emerges a recurring problem for all feminists 
- 
the 
clash between a notion of 'sexual politics' and the necessary 
redefinition of' 'politics' itself. Political analysts assert 
that politics deals with power relations at a macro level only, 
leaving such institutions as the family uninvestigated. Barrett, 
writing her new introduction to Women's Oppression Today in 1988, 
confesses that her attempt to integrate Marxism and feminism is 
informed 'with a much greater sense of the desirability of this 
at a political level than I would now express-'2s Her changed 
stance reflects the growth and diversity of the feminist 
enterprise in recent years, where the emergence of increasingly 
heterogeneous feminisms have provoked related investigations into 
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the nature of oppression by race and sexual orientation, and 
which transforms the nature of feminist discourse even further 
beyond the scope of classic Marxism. 
Barrett's recent pessimism about the place of feminism in 
relation to Marxist analyses of class struggle is an 
acknowledgement that it cannot simply be slotted into a 
preconceived theoretical enterprise which denies it any 
intellectual or epistemological credibility. Feminism 
potentially destabilizes the tenets of Marxism: once theories of 
ideology are held up for examination, no tool of political 
enquiry can be left unscrutinized. Barrett originally attempted 
to construct a quasi-Marxist model for feminism while leaving its 
exposure of the gendered priorities contained in such a 
methodology largely unquestioned. In 1988 she has concluded that 
feminism and Marxism are epistemologically poles apart because 'I 
would tend now to locate feminism even more firmly within a 
liberal. humanist tradition-126 In making this categorical 
assertion, however, she is ignoring the work done by many modern 
feminists from an anti-humanist. or poststructuralist 
perspective. In addition, she also ignores the possibility that 
if we take liberal humanism to have arisen with the onset of 
capitalism, and as still remaining the dominant position today, 
all oppositional discourses are to some extent contained within 
it, or collapse within its conceptual criteria. One might well 
equally conclude that Marxism. which cannot by its own 
formulation conceive of itself as 'outside' the coercion of 
dominant ideological processes. has imbibed much of the liberal 
tradition of abstract thought, notably in its characteristic 
- 
210 
- 
blindness to the operations of sexual/racial divisions in 
society. Feminism, at least by its theoretical 'unorthodoxy' has 
taken steps to question the epistemological roots of Western 
phallo(/ethno)centrism. 
Nonetheless, Women's Oppression Today still provides the 
fullest and most thought-provoking account of the effects of a 
gendered social system, and for that. reason Barrett's 
appropriation of' post-Althusserian concepts of ideology provides 
a useful point of departure. Barrett, importantly, highlights 
the means by which earlier feminist writers have attempted to 
explore the ways the material conditions of women's lived 
experience have historically structured the more 'abstract' or 
'mental' aspects of their oppression, but have often fallen at 
the first hurdle of biology. Procreation, and its differing 
consequences for men and women, are often summoned as the eternal 
root cause of' female oppression. The essential problem is the 
way sexual difference appears to be inscribed at every level of 
the social formation (in its material practices and ideological 
processes) and gives the impression that the 'reality' of gender 
difference is virtually as irrevocable as the anatomical 
distinctions which give credence to it. Notions of the 
naturalness of sexual difference clearly filter into Marxist 
discourse, where the 
the configuration of 
dehistoricized. In 
categorically states 
as subject to social 
Women were oppressed 
status of women in the domestic sphere, and 
the bourgeois family form is virtually 
opposition to this view, Sheila Rowbotham 
that 'The nature of female subordination is 
change as any other kind of subordination. 
before capitalism. But capitalism has 
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changed the nature of female oppression. '27 
Barrett, in common with Althusser, denies ideology in itself 
any materiality, while acknowledging the material effects of 
ideology as it is realized in social practices (hence a degree of' 
reciprocity between what Marx would define as infrastructure and 
superstructure): 
It is impossible to understand the division of labour, 
for instance, with its differential definitions of 
'skill', without taking into account the material effects 
of gender ideology. The belief that a (white) man has a 
'right' to work over and above any rights of married 
women or immigrants has had significant effects in the 
organization of the labour force. Such a belief has 
therefore to be taken into account when analysing the 
division of labour, but its location in material 
practices does not render it material in the same way. 28 
Barrett situates an 'ideology of gender' which plays a 
significant role in the relations of production, but observes 
that 'it is far more difficult to argue that it plays a crucial 
part in the essential reproduction of raw materials, 
installations and machinery'. 29 The phallocentricity of the 
Marxist analytical model presents such a difficulty. but one 
could agree with Althusser that 'what happens at the level of the 
firm is an effect, which only gives an idea of the necessity of 
reproduction, but absolutely fails to allow its conditions and 
mechanisms to be thought. '30 In other words, modes of production 
themselves need to be considered at a macro-level, whence their 
conditions of existence are perceived to thrive upon a 
sexual/ethnocentric division of labour, where women and racial 
outgroups are concentrated in low-paid low-status jobs in 
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relation to their (white) male counterparts. If we take the 
example of' the clothing industry, involving the production of 
commodities by (mainly non-white) female outworkers or women 
working in sweatshop conditions, it is crucial to acknowledge 
that it depends upon the exploitation of cheap labour. The 
conditions under which these women work 
- 
lack of trade union 
collectivization, low pay etc. 
- 
are a result of' their femaleness 
(they might become outworkers because of childcare and other 
domestic responsibilities), and their ethnic status which might 
make access to better-paid jobs difficult. By asserting that 
these factors have no direct effect on reproduction, Barrett 
risks marginalizing considerations which she otherwise accepts 
are central to feminist analysis. 
Sheila Rowbotham argues that 'The segregation of' male/female 
roles is thus materially as well as ideologically part of the way 
in which capitalism is maintained. '31 This does not amount to a 
claim for the materiality of ideology, but declares that if 
gender difference informs the fabric of society, and ideology 
serves to strengthen the effectiveness of customary practices, 
then feminists must concentrate their efforts into defining the 
parameters of the dominant ideology, and constructing a more 
effective opposition. It ideology operates by connoting the 
'natural' order of things, it is vital that feminists renew their 
efforts to expose its distortions and contradictions. It is of 
course crucial that women do not lose sight of the issue-based 
struggles confronting women, and tackle these problems by action 
against the perpetuation of such material practices. But they 
must be wary of attempting to broach such prejudice exclusively 
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on an issue basis, when an 'ideology of gender' is constantly 
perpetuating the 'reality' and 'naturalness' of inequitable 
sexual and racial divisions. The meta-level effects of dominant 
ideological processes can successfully defuse the 'victories' 
gained in localized spheres, such as equal pay and 
anti-discriminatory legislation. 
Barrett never really develops the problematic concept of an 
'ideology of gender'. which gives us little idea of how such an 
ideological process functions, or what definitions of 'gender' it 
utilizes. If we return to Althusser's 'empirical list' of ISAs 
it is clear that it would be most unsatisfactory to simply add 
'gender' on. since gender itself is inscribed within each of' 
these ISAs, and gender inequality is instrumental to the status 
quo represented by the unity of' RSA. Similarly. we might want to 
incorporate ideologies of race and heterosexuality which also 
position men and women as subjects in ways that reproduce social 
inequalities as repressively as class does. Althusser's Marxist 
perspective is of a social totality founded on the notion of 
class difference; feminists also view sexual/racial difference as 
militating factors maintaining the whole social organization. It 
is clear, then, that any feminist appropriation of a Marxist 
model of inequality necessarily requires certain fundamental 
adjustments to counter gender/race blindness endemic to it. 
Sheila Rowbotham, writing before Barrett, gestures towards a more 
radical break with existing theories: 
Rather than straining Marx's categories of exploitation 
and surplus value, worked out to explain commodity 
production, into the family mode of production and 
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quibbling about the use of oppression and exploitation in 
this context, we have to analyse women's labour in the 
home on its own terms and develop new concepts. 32 
There appears, therefore, to be tensions among socialist 
feminists concerning the desirability of appropriating a Marxist 
model of oppression at all; nonetheless there is tacit agreement 
upon the fact that Marx's categories, as they stand are scarcely 
adequate. 
This overview of radical and socialist feminist33 approaches 
to 'ideological' issues suggests that there is more common ground 
between them than first appears: 
Both reformists and revolutionaries have to contend with 
the fact of a class antagonistic society: and feminists 
must similarly realize that the oppressive social 
division between men and women. though not a class 
division, at the very least represents a fissure in the 
groundplan of human society which must be charted before 
it can be bridged. 34 
Both perspectives identify gaps in male theoretical frameworks, 
and accept that a revolution in consciousness is central to their 
critical agenda. The first steps to such a revolution are to 
expose the contradictions inherent in the dominant ideologies of 
contemporary life because, 'an analysis of gender ideology in 
which women are always innocent, always passive victims of 
patriarchal power, is patently not satisfactory. '35 In the 
ensuing sections on feminist criticism and discourse, we shall 
see how more sophisticated approaches to ideology and 
subjectivity allow pathways through such contradictions. The 
development of the 'images' approach to cultural productions 
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enabled women to recognize that ideologies of gender are 
inscribed in discourse and indirectly serve to perpetuate 
'patriarchy'. These 'consciousness-raising' approaches, despite 
initially focusing on the means by which women act in 'bad faith' 
and internalize their own subordination, serve to foreground the 
abstract concept of consciousness itself. They launched an 
interrogation of how men and women are interpellated as masculine 
and feminine subjects through material/cultural practices. Later 
critics explore the seductiveness of an acquired subject position 
which is reassuringly 'natural' and 'obvious', arguing that 
attempts to simply expose these positions as false and unnatural 
risk offering women yet another prescriptive set of 'rules' to 
live by. 
CULTURAL PRODUCTIONS AND FEMINIST CRITICISM 
Michele Barrett claims that she 'can find no sustained argument 
as to why feminists should be so interested in literature, or 
what theoretical or political ends such a study might serve'. 36 
One is tempted to respond by observing that the growth in 
feminist literary criticism is partly an historical accident: the 
sexual division of subject choices in higher education 
effectively concentrated female academics in 'Arts', especially 
English Literature. In addition seventies feminist pathfinders 
dedicated their attention to the sphere of representation, in 
their attacks on the grossly distorted images of ideal-type women 
which bombarded female consumers from billboards, TV advertising 
and contemporary fiction. As to what theoretical ends such a 
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study might serve, with hindsight we can chart the extent to 
which feminist analyses have intervened in traditional critical 
practice and in male-oriented theoretical speculations. 
establishing for feminists a partially 'respectable' place within 
the academic institution. This 'place/placing' has of course 
negative aspects for feminism, rendering it potentially 
vulnerable to absorption by male theory, thereby defusing its 
political edge. 
The 'political' ends are perhaps less easy to articulate, 
unless one reaffirms the use of 'political' in the radical 
feminist sense. In the case of' literary studies, the 
intervention in the canon itself 
- 
the destabilizing and 
questioning of the qualities of greatness and aesthetic value 
- 
can be viewed as a political stance, in its implications for the 
future of the discipline. One might also posit two other 
'political' features of feminist literary criticism. Firstly, 
the introduction of women's writing courses on degree programmes, 
while falling foul of accusations of ghettoization, inserts a 
wider range of writings by women into literary studies and 
results in the wider circulation of certain women's texts. 37 
Secondly, feminist critics have fought hard to expose the depths 
of sexism within the academic institutional framework itself: in 
the sphere of literary/cultural studies, the majority of students 
are still women, but phallocentric practices are still inscribed 
within such discourses. These factors in themselves constitute 
no small victory. and enable future developments in feminist 
scholarship. 
It is perhaps wise to point out that a section on feminist 
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criticism in the field of literary and cultural productions will 
scarcely do the immensity of the work produced over the past 
twenty years justice. The amount of texts which have appeared in 
this sphere must surely far outweigh the feminist research output 
in other subject areas. In the context of' this thesis, there is 
not space to chart precise distinctions between 'schools' of 
thought, and the distinctions made in Chapters One to Three serve 
as general points of demarcation. By using the example of 
feminist criticism, I am more concerned to illustrate that all 
feminist scholarship should be perceived as contributing to the 
development of feminist politics, and would emphasize that the 
interventions of feminist discourse in the academic institution 
is itself a political measure. Feminist analyses of literary 
texts and popular culture are especially amenable to such a link, 
since their raw material comprises processes of* communication and 
representation. and addresses the relations of the female subject 
to some of the most subtle and pervasive patriarchal ideological 
processes. Feminist criticism constitutes an oppositional or 
resistant ideology, which by exposing 'objectivity' as a smoke 
screen for male-oriented subjective responses. attempts to 
demythologize representational practices themselves. By 
announcing its own ideological intentions, feminism questions the 
status of 'neutrality', although its critics tend to characterize 
such a stance as an excuse for a lack of rigour and discursive 
precision 
- 
or worse, as a means of foregrounding features of 
texts which are traditionally regarded as peripheral or 
non-existent. 
Many feminists in the academic institution today have a high 
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theoretical profile, and have to contend with negative responses 
from within their own ranks. This backlash is largely a reaction 
to the age-old double bind for feminist politics 
- 
that to 
situate feminism within such a powerful and well-established ISA 
as the education system is necessarily to make compromises in 
order to have a voice at all. To insert oneself into a 
male-ordered discourse which denies the validity of' one's 
position is itself ironic 
- 
since the terms of' the host discourse 
serve to discredit any oppositional stance, just as such 
opposition is intended to undermine pre-existing tenets. It 
could therefore be argued that feminism in the institution has to 
some extent 'been "de-radicalized", supporting the status quo 
rather than working to undermine it '. 38 But to maintain this is 
to assume the existence of a radical space for feminism 
elsewhere, untainted by dominant social pressures. There is some 
justification for the fear that feminism as a social movement has 
become divorced from the academic face of' feminism, and that 
feminist theory in the 1990s has lost its radical impetus. 
However, partly as a result of its own refusal to enter 
mainstream politics, women's liberation cannot be clearly 
identified as a collective movement; its agenda has become 
fragmented and its energy dissipated. In contrast, the presence 
of feminist perspectives in certain scholarly disciplines could 
be viewed as a position of strength. Feminist research should 
therefore be exploited for its political potential, and used to 
develop a methodology which focuses on agendas for change within 
and without the academic institution. Although the presence of 
Women's Studies options in higher education might smack of 
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tokenism, signalling no real change in the priorities of such 
institutions, it at least provides a platform for a new 
generation of feminists to interrogate the power structures at 
work within education, and 
- 
by extension 
- 
society. Louis 
Althusser argued that education is the chief reinforcement agency 
of the dominant ideology, and many feminists would reinforce the 
view that any interventions in this area are politically 
essential, even if current contributions seem at times elitist or 
obscurantist. 
The earliest Second Wave attention to cultural productions was 
directed at the male literary 'greats', and the most influential 
text to emerge during this period is Kate Millett's Sexual 
Politics 
- 
which she herself admitted was, in its combination of 
literary and social criticism, something of a 'hybrid'. Her 
justification for such an approach heralds the work of recent 
cultural critics: 'I have operated on the premise that there is 
room for a criticism which takes into account the larger cultural 
context in which literature is conceived. '39 She constructs a 
spirited reaction against the hegemony of the American New 
Critics. but has been criticized by later feminists for her 
rather naive conflation of author and character, 40 to the extent 
that the social realities of female subordination are by 
implication directly communicated to the reader via the text. 
Although later feminist critics have been inspired by her work, 
and have continued to develop a study of literary texts 
in a 
broader cultural/historical context, they have tended to move 
away from the naive reflectionism evident in some of 
her textual 
analysis. While Millett gives a polemical account of' the 
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functions of patriarchy and the power of the stereotype in and 
beyond literature Mary Eilmann, writing Thinking About Women 
(1969) a year earlier, attacks 'phallic criticism' where: 
the discussion of women's books by men will arrive 
punctually at the point of preoccupation, which is the 
fact of femininity. Books by women are treated as though 
they themselves were women, and criticism embarks, at its 
happiest, upon an intellectual measuring of bust and 
hips. 41 
Ellmann recognizes that a sexist ideology is not simply contained 
in books by men, but is perpetuated by male critics themselves, 
especially as it influences their 'objective' responses to 
female-authored texts. Although Ellmann takes us beyond the 
scrutiny of the stereotype in male-authored writings and gestures 
towards the effects a 'phallic' appraisal can have upon the 
reception of female authors, 'images of women' critics tend to 
concentrate upon texts which are already a part of the literary 
canon. A consequent effect of such an approach is necessarily to 
consign women as writers to the margins of the mainstream. 
Later in the seventies Elaine Showalter produced a 
'gynocritical' model, whose premise is that 'we free ourselves 
from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying 
to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, and focus 
instead on the newly visible world of' female culture. '42 Her 
dedication to revaluing 'great' women writers and drawing 
attention to previously neglected ones goes some way to creating 
a female literary history. Her appraisals of such 'lost' texts 
were, however, carried out using similar analytical tools to her 
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male forebears. This new literary history may well be a female 
one, but it shares unquestioningly the epistemological roots of 
the male-oriented original; even if it does afford some women 
writers the critical attention they richly deserve. To a degree 
Showalter exercises a phallic criticism of her own, 43 and 
unproblematically establishes an alternative female 'canon' based 
on premises similar to The Great Tradition'. 
Neither the 'feminist critique' of male writers nor 
gynocriticism were extensive enough in their break from the 
confines of' patriarchal attitudes to incorporate the wider 
political perspectives of the Women's Movement. Although such 
critics exposed deep-rooted sexism at work within literature, 
Millett, in her concentration on the sins of' the male author, and 
Showalter on the virtues of the female. left the primacy of the 
canon unchallenged. In addition they simplistically implied that 
men always produced distorted images of women, whereas women 
produced correct ones 
- 
prompting the impression that one could 
'sex' texts in a quasi-biologistic fashion. In general, 
pathfinding feminist critics - perhaps because they could not 
negotiate a complete break from a liberal humanistic critical 
tradition 
- 
never interrogated the divide between High Literature 
and popular culture. This resulted in a huge group of women 
writers being neglected and consigned to the margins of 'trash' 
fiction, where they had been already positioned by the 
male-dominated critical mainstream. 
Approaches such as 'Images of women' criticism tend to treat 
fiction as if it unproblematically 'mirrors' reality in some 
direct way; 44 yet it must be borne in mind that 'this view of' 
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texts as transmitting authentic "human" experience is... a 
traditional emphasis of Western patriarchal humanism. '45 This 
perspective on the reflective power of literature is analogous to 
a naive notion of ideology as a reflection 'in ideas' of material 
practices. Just as feminist explorations into the social 
construction of' reality need to address the ways ideological 
processes are mediated as a view of social reality, it is 
necessary to account for the features which construct the text 
and 'place' it in various conflicting ideological positions, and 
which govern its conditions of' production. Such features include 
its 'literary' status. as well as the identity of the author 
- 
if 
we wish to conduct a study of writers who have been excluded from 
the literary mainstream on grounds of race, gender or sexual 
orientation. It would be retroactive to read texts for evidence 
of a singular ideological stance of a central Subject - be it the 
author, the 'text' or whatever - but we can review (as feminists 
have constantly done) the problem of' representation and its 
disjunction with social reality-. For if' we accept that the text 
does not yield a single objective 'reality', we should concede 
that it cannot simply faithfully 'reflect' its own historical 
conditions of existence -a trap into which images critics can 
easily fall: 
In the area of cultural production... it is easy to see 
how forms of representation are governed by genres, 
conventions, the presence of established modes of 
communication and so on. Yet these are not determining 
in the absolute sense being argued for here. They do not 
in themselves account for what is represented. 46 
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There is a link between what is being represented and existing 
social relations, but despite the seductiveness of metaphors of 
mirror imagery, defining the relationship between image and 
materiality is a complex business. To subvert a prevailing 
stereotype does not rupture the status quo: modern advertising, 
for example, can quote 'feminism' in its portrayal of a new 
independent woman while still subtextually affirming the 
naturalness of patriarchal familial relations. 
Feminists. in common with other modern theorists, are 
primarily concerned with the ways meaning is constructed, rather 
than the truth or falsity of representation. This focus 
accommodates a possible plurality of' (conflicting) meanings, as 
well as exposing the way ideological processes produce, 
reproduce, challenge and even transform meaning. The assumption 
is that all texts are encoded with a preferred reading (via 
narrative voice, etc. ) which 'coerces' the reader unless they 
elect to 'read against the grain' in order to expose the 
ideological investment in this representation of reality or 
'truth'. Despite ideology's complex relations within culture and 
to reality, the political elements of feminist criticism demand 
attention to the relationship between literature. criticism and 
the social and economic conditions of our lives. Feminism is 
especially adept at making such broad links due to its 
interdisciplinarity 
- 
in changing the precepts of' traditional 
literary criticism, we are overstepping the boundaries of the 
subject, with a commitment to creating something quite other. 
The major object of study for feminist critics is writing by 
women, which necessitates a re-evaluation of' how authorial 
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identity influences textual strategies: this need not amount to 
privileging authorial intention, however. It is no novelty for 
texts to be assessed with close reference to their author's 
gender 
- 
although this practice had previously remained covert 
and depoliticized. Admittedly, feminist critiques tend to 
foreground thematic aspects of narration, paying particular 
attention to representations of' female experiences, but this does 
not necessarily demonstrate that texts are naively conceived as 
vehicles for social reality. If we accept the model of ideology 
offered above, then materiality and fictionality are both 
governed and constructed by ideological means. Indeed, Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar. in their readings of nineteenth-century 
novels explore the unsaid or underside of the female narrative 
subtext. to suggest that writing is constrained by extra-literary 
normalizing processes. 41 First-person women's narratives are 
often analysed to demonstrate means by which women have used 
patriarchal discourse to their own advantage; to rupture the 
hegemony of meaning, and insert a narrative of resistance. 
Novels such as The Bell Jar (1963), Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) and 
Fear of Flying (1974) utilize the mode of fictional autobiography 
to extend the utterances of the alienated individual and expose 
the contradictions of the patriarchal ideology of' the feminine. 
'Identity' and 'experience' are keywords for Second Wave 
politics, where women demanded liberation from predetermined 
feminine identities which themselves limited access to a whole 
wealth of social experiences. Early critics, in their endeavour 
to account for the mechanisms which maintain female 
subordination, tended to overstate the currency of universal 
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sisterhood, thus denying that women from other social groups 
might identify the 'enemy' by quite other means. This is agreed 
to be a major flaw of early analytical approaches: in 
foregrounding prevailing images of desired femininity, such 
theorists omitted to recognize that these stereotypes tended to 
target preferred/outlawed forms of white, bourgeois, heterosexual 
femininity. Black, working-class or lesbian women arguably 
respond differently to such images, which appear to affirm their 
own invisibility within Western culture, and therefore 
additionally connote racist and heterosexist social givens. Such 
blindness implicates white. middle-class, heterosexual feminists 
as culpable in constructing alternative 'realities' for women 
which ignore the material effects of other oppressive ideologies. 
Early radical perspectives in particular risked homogenizing 
female experience. and being as prescriptive in positing 
alternatives as patriarchal liberal humanism is in inscribing a 
feminine norm. Feminists have always looked to women's texts to 
express alternative 'realities' from those allowed by a 
patriarchal ideology. to move away from the tyranny of the 
central male Subject: it was left to black and lesbian feminists 
to expose the fact that the 'real' remained the preserve of white 
and heterosexual subjects. 
Interventions by black and lesbian critics have greatly 
diversified critical responses and approaches. They argue that 
the emerging female literary history is blind to racial and 
non-heterosexual forms of identity. and have inserted work by 
women previously ignored by both the critical and feminist 
mainstream. Black and lesbian writers and critics produce texts 
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with the strong conviction that their 'realities' are considered 
non-universal and have been outlawed or suppressed in literary 
history, as they have from history in general. A possible 
side-effect of this is that they eschew the 'rules' of literary 
and critical discourse more effectively than many white 
feminists, and question the assumptions which underpin Western 
notions of aesthetic worth. Recent feminist critical anthologies 
have addressed questions of' racial, class-specific and homosexual 
identity. but usually by including token essays by lesbian and 
black feminists, which arguably serves to reinforce racist and 
heterosexist notions that the 'important' work of feminist 
criticism lies elsewhere. 48 
Countering the thematic excesses of some white feminist 
criticism. black feminist criticism finds a different 'tradition' 
of representation and form in the work of' twentieth-century black 
women writers, where classic 'literary' forms of narration are 
themselves rejected as colonizing forces. They are less 
concerned with reconstructing images of women, asserting that the 
white feminist view of stereotypes fails to acknowledge that 
stereotypes of black women allow them no access to prevalent 
standards of 'femininity' at all. However undesirable a 
male-designated femininity might be, in the light of 
racial/cultural difference, it comes to represent a hierarchy of 
relative power positions among women: 
Each black woman image was created to keep a particular 
image about white women intact. Another way of putting 
it is that the aspects of woman that had negative 
connotations in the society were ascribed to black women 
so white women could be viewed, as Alice Walker would 
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later phrase it, to be 'perfect in the eyes of' the 
world'. 49 
Lesbian feminism had to confront one particularly thorny problem: 
of defining what constitutes a 'lesbian text'. The fact of 
authorial identity is unreliable because. 'one of the most 
pervasive themes in lesbian criticism is that woman-identified 
writers, silenced by a homophobic and misogynistic society, have 
been forced to adopt coded and obscure language and internal 
censorship. '50 An author-centred position would also discredit 
the validity of lesbian readings of any women's text 
- 
where the 
emphasis has been on foregrounding representations of female 
friendship and love which may or may not be sexual. Lesbian 
critiques are invaluable because they expose a tendency among 
other feminists to continue privileging intimate relationships 
with men, as well as countering the heterosexist myth that 
lesbianism is purely a sexual identity. 
Lesbian and black feniinist approaches serve to illustrate the 
means by which mainstream feminists have unwittingly retained a 
firni investment in patriarchal realities, by failing to perceive 
the extent to which many women's lives are governed by other 
oppressive mechanisms. Bell Hooks, for one, argues that 'a 
feminist ideology that mouths radical rhetoric about resistance 
and revolution while actively seeking to establish itself within 
the capitalist patriarchal system is essentially corrupt'. 51 At 
the time of writing, feminist textual criticism has reached a 
phase of relative stagnation: this is particularly true of the 
most widely read anthologies. These collections reproduce the 
same core of 'canonical' critical pieces: analyses have 
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concentrated on certain 'core' texts at the expense of others: 
and lesbian and black feminists appear to be allowed space merely 
to justify their right to a critical presence at all. 32 To 
negotiate a way out of' this impasse we must accept that cultural 
and literary criticism are forms of knowledge with a prior 
inscription in patriarchal discursive networks, which 
institutionalize preferred cultural meanings, and comfortably 
contain and defuse opposition. As Gayle Greene and Coppelia Kahn 
caution: 
If' feminist scholars are concerned with challenging and 
changing the ideology which has subjugated women, then 
they must beware of' borrowing analytical categories fron 
it 
. 
53 
Feminists can mark out a space for themselves within such bodies 
of* knowledge. but more radical actions are required in order to 
forge any significant form of ideological or discursive 
resistance. 
WAYS FORWARD: THEORIES OF DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER 
In his reassessment of the extensive power of' state ideological 
processes, Althusser maintains that 'the "obviousness" that you 
and I are subjects 
- 
and that that does not cause any problems 
- 
is an ideological effect'. 54 Ideology, then, is the central 
factor in the interpellation of the subject 
- 
its (sometimes 
contradictory) effects determine our social realities. The 
humanist notion that individuals precede their subject positions, 
and are in a position to 'choose' them is thereby discredited. 
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and the illusion of choice or freedom is itself seen as mediated 
along ideological lines. Aithusser would assert that we are 
inserted into subject positions upon entry into the Symbolic 
Order of language. Feminist accounts of gender socialization 
would seem to concur in this view, where expectations of 
preferred forms of childhood behaviour seem to gain credence from 
the fact of biological difference, to the point where a 
consciousness of the 'fixity' of gender roles appropriate to boys 
and girls appears to be communicated from an extremely early age. 
In general. feminists have argued that the success of' 
ideological processes lies in their ability to conceal their own 
unstable cultural/historical specificity under the guise of 
universal. transhistorical 'natural' forms of behaviour. This is 
particularly true of the processes which determine the private 
sphere. The most sacrosanct high Liberal principles of freedom 
of speech and choice are themselves perceived as an ideological 
effect of a fixed and stable individual and unique identity. A 
Liberal Humanist philosophy is therefore positively grounded in 
the deification of difference 
- 
not least the discrete qualities 
of* gender difference 
- 
and the idea of the free-floating 
individual is ideologically reinforced in the multifarious 
discourses that comprise Western forms of knowledge. 
Paradoxically the radical feminist rhetoric of raising 
consciousness through sharing experience, at once celebrates 
individualism while emphasizing the power of collective change; 
and a central problematic for all feminists is to what extent 
they affirm a woman's right to choose. or if there are 'choices' 
that, for political reasons, would be removed altogether. I 
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previously observed that Michele Barrett has recently located 
feminism within liberal humanist philosophy. The above paradox. 
however, suggests that feminist politics anticipates an 
anti-humanist future, where poststructuralist critiques of 
Western epistemological binarism might facilitate a movement 
beyond the impasse of what so far has been dubbed 'patriarchal 
ideology'. 
In her Introduction to the 1988 edition of Women's Oppression 
Today. Barrett foresees 'the concept of ideology being replaced 
by the terms "discourse" and "subject ivity"'. 35 And certainly 
for writers such as Michel Foucault the term ideology as used by 
Marxists is constricting, connoting as it tends to, distortions 
of' reality which are wielded as instruments of power by a 
dominant social group. Althusser's account of the relationship 
between RSA and ISA leaves us with the impression that ideology 
(like 'false consciousness' or 'bad faith') is an effect of" 
repression. Once consciousness (of' class struggle) is attained, 
might one transcend the prison-house of ideology in the pursuit 
of 'truth'? Althusser's model of ideology on the one hand 
implicates all aspects of social life 
- 
whether actions maintain 
or challenge the status quo; on the other, Althusser posits a 
space where representation of the subject's distorted relation to 
their reality might be 'corrected' unequivocally. For example, 
Althusser states that 'I do not rank art among the ideologies', 56 
affording art a privileged space beyond the welter of power 
struggles. We are prompted to question whether he considers 
Marxism itself as transcending the taint of such forces, which 
would undermine his whole hypothesis of the very immutability of 
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ideological insertion. Barrett clearly discounts the possibility 
of a space outside, arguing that contestation of existing power 
relations must occur at the point of a dominant ideology's 
contradictions. Patriarchy certainly appears immune to the 
invasion of 'alternative' cultures 
- 
leading poststructuralist 
feminists to assert that the operations of power are more complex 
than a mere flexing of political muscle by the dominant group. 
Foucault's analysis of discursive formations conceives of 
discourse as an effect of power (as distinct from domination) 
which is inscribed in all social relations. The ways discourse 
can be militated against a subordinate group are therefore more 
multifarious than Althusser's account of the effects of ISAs. It 
is argued that Foucault's model tends, at abstract extremes, 
towards an ahistoricism which occludes the necessity to explore 
discourses which elide or subordinate women in culturally/ 
historically specific terms. 57 We may well generalize about the 
existence of a long-lived and historically resilient hegemonic 
force known as 'patriarchy', but this precludes the production of 
any effective response or resistance. I would argue that 
Foucault's view of history is simply incompatible with a Marxist 
one. If Engels and Marx use an evolutionary model of history, 
Foucault conceives of it in terms of discontinuity -a site of 
fracturation and transformation, rather than an organism which, 
bar revolution, continues to derive impetus from the conditions 
of the past. Furthermore, Foucault sees relations of 
dominant to 
dominated as unstable and vulnerable; but networks of power as 
tenacious and resistant to transformation. Discourse 
is the 
containing principle of what can be known and therefore what can 
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be thought: discursive formations can disseminate and create new 
hybrid forms which often result from the incorporation of 
contradictions, and herald epistemic breaks in continuity. 
I would argue that Althusser's conceptual framework includes 
aporia that undermine the entire ideological edifice. Foucault's 
analysis of discourse and power might at first sight appear a 
more pessimistic vision of the social formation, but by locating 
power and claims to 'truth' at the level of discourse 
- 
the 
ordering principle of knowledge 
- 
he prevents an underestimation 
of the effects of' power, upon both dominant and subordinate. I 
therefore disagree with Barrett that ideology is simply 
'replaced' by discourse or subjectivity; for feminist purposes 
the discursive approach, while not projecting an 'outside' or 
neutral sphere for intervention, at least tentatively addresses 
the problems of resistance from within: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or 
rather consequently, this resistance is never in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power... These 
points of resistance are present everywhere in the power 
network. s8 
Resistance, it could be argued, lies in the gaps of discourse - 
the very contradictions that Althusser appears to identify in his 
account of ideology. 
While ideology allows us to articulate how subject positions 
are realized and institutionalized in material practices, a 
theory of discourse has been embraced by those feminists who wish 
to examine the problems of articulation itself. Foucault, among 
others, has famously asserted that 'knowledge is power', that all 
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knowledge is formalized and codified appearing to delimit the 
thinkable. However, because of' Foucault's insistence that he 
merely describes rather than explains the existence of epistemic 
shifts, it is a huge leap of faith to assert an oppositional 
point of rupture where women might 'redefine' themselves in face 
of powerful gendered social 'truths'. Is not feminist knowledge 
always at the mercy of prior discursive formations which can 
either transform it or demand 'coherence' on its own terms? 
Michel Foucault situates knowledge and the construction of 
systems of knowledge at the heart of civilization; where shifts 
and fractures occur in the epistemological formation, new 
epistemic 'spaces' are negotiated. His account of' the effect of 
the 'infinity' or pre-existence of discourse which 'inserts' the 
subject into its own symbolic order, is to further extend 
Althusser's position on ideology. To acknowledge one's place in 
an order of' things constructed, mediated and perceived through 
the fabric of knowledge systems is not equivalent to 
transcendence of' such 'knowledge' (defying the liberal humanist 
position that 'man' creates himself). At first sight this seems 
a pessimistic analogue of powerlessness. If. for example, we 
accept that women are at one level excluded by a patriarchal 
discourse which simultaneously subordinates and contains them, 
how do feminists construct a position of opposition to navigate a 
means out of such a double bind? Foucault is oblique about the 
effectiveness of opposition, but does not imply that he regards 
it as impossible to break the power nexus; he is more concerned 
to pinpoint complexities in establishing hierarchies in differing 
power relations, which in the twentieth century, filter down the 
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entire social formation 
- 
with the effect that we largely 
'police' ourselves and each other without the need for an 
omnipresent coercive force: 
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are 
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and build 
up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political 
'double bind', which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power 
structures. 59 
Discourse cannot simply be reduced to a quality of (written 
and spoken) language. despite Foucault's assertion that 
'knowledge' supercedes language 
- 
in that language inserts the 
subject firmly into the social formation affording a path to 
shared meaning and representation. Epistemic fractures are 
described as arbitrary and relational, determining which can be 
thought as well as which cannot ('unthought' lies in the 
constantly deferred and unknowable origin of orders of 
knowledge). Foucault's definition of discourse is that the 
'statement' is the elementary unit which enables a group of signs 
to coexist and the rules of discourse to become manifest. 
Statements are part of a network which constitutes a discursive 
formation, and produces and defines its 'object' of enquiry. 
Such a view is reminiscent of early feminists' sense of an 
inability to successfully commandeer language which itself seems 
constructed along patriarchal lines: 
For can I, in fact, say that I am this language I speak, 
into which my thought insinuates itself to the point of 
finding in it the system of all its own possibilities, 
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yet which exists only in the weight of sedimentations my 
thought will never be capable of actualizing 
altogether"bu 
Discourse functions through its representations of 'reality' or 
truth (eg by situating the mad or other on the underside of 
reason/discourse) which itself' determines the limits of that 
reality. An effect we witness in the operation of ideological 
processes, such as the institution of the family which in its 
abstract representation. is nuclear, heterosexually oriented. 
monogamous, non-incestuous and becomes the supposed 'reality' of' 
the desired social order at a micro level even though the range 
of' family forms is diverse (lesbian couple, working mother, etc). 
The discursive norm is set against all 'hybrid' forms as the 
natural ideal, precisely by cataloguing and defining the range of 
possible 'deviant' 'imitations'. But Foucault would not accept 
that such representations can ever refer to an originary and 
value-neutral 'real'. Representation in such a formulation can 
only signify the discourse of representation current in a given 
episteme. 
Foucault's analysis of' power and its creation in discourse 
returns us to the idea of subjectivity. By examining the 'rules' 
of discourse, the means by which human beings are made into 
subjects occupying a multitude of potentially conflicting 
subjectivities, we can theoretically reject certain subject 
positions. But we cannot block the effect of discourse in 
situating us by the actions of other subject positions: discourse 
is adept at assimilating the very anomolies it creates. 
Discourse (re)creates normal/deviant identities which seem to be 
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a matter of 'choice' 
- 
although the knowledge of 'perverse' 
choices may be used to facilitate punishment, repression or 
incarceration. The myth of sacred individualism makes us value 
what we 'are', as if that being was self-evident, unitary and 
non-contradictory: 
Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically 
unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing speaking 
subject, but on the contrary, a totality, in which the 
dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with 
himself may be determined. bl 
Chris Weedon suggests that feminists should use 
poststructuralism to produce knowledge 'which will serve feminist 
interests*; 62 one way of achieving this aim might be to occupy 
outlaw positions to secure an identity which announces the point 
at which discourses of the natural threaten to collapse. In The 
History of Sexuality: Volume One (1979), Foucault describes the 
ways in which 'norms' are established and abnormality 
accommodated by rendering 'deviant' forms of behaviour visible as 
an object of knowledge. In addition he locates a double bind 
within such discourses as psychoanalysis and sexology. If 
gathering knowledge by case-histories of sexual deviance allows 
homosexuals, for example, to be positioned 'outside' the realms 
of normal sexual behaviour, a correlative effect is to empower 
those 'deviants' themselves. By displaying their place as threat 
within the dominant discourse of heterosexuality, whose 
determining condition of possibility is in the affirmation of a 
category of homosexuality: 
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The language and law that regulates the establishment of 
heterosexuality as both an identity and an institution. 
both a practice and a system, is the language and law of 
defense and protection: heterosexuality secures its 
self-identity and shores up its ontological boundaries by 
protecting itself from what it sees as the continual 
predatory encroachments of its contaminated other, 
homosexuality. 63 
Homosexuals, therefore, can embrace the identity and subject 
position which is a residual effect of the use of documentary 
evidence, which confirms the widespread practices of 
homosexuality, by appropriating the meanings of' repressive 
knowledge systems. The homosexual can celebrate an outlawed 
status by perceiving it as shared, rather than aberrant and 
unique 
- 
'Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces 
it, but also undermines and exposes it. renders it fragile and 
makes it possible to thwart it. '64 It is precisely this 
empowering effect that Weedon exhorts feminists to exploit. If 
patriarchal ly oriented discourse can confine women within the 
thrust of biological determinism, it simultaneously allows 
feminists to explore the limits of biology. Like 
heterosexuality the notion of natural 'castrated' femininity is 
predicated upon the category of the unfeminine, or 'phallic' 
woman. As I argue earlier, the fact that feminists have 
negotiated a 'place' within influential academic discourses 
already situates them in a strong position to chart the limits of 
meaning sustaining patriarchal power. Feminists might, like 
Foucault. prescribe an 'archaeological' viewpoint which does not 
position them outside the existing order of' things, but allows 
them to review its ordering principles from within. and assert 
- 
238 
- 
that they might be otherwise. 
Foucault does not provide answers which signal the end of a 
quest for feminist knowledge: feminism as a destabilizing 
underside of patriarchal discourse must of necessity constantly 
revise and re-revise its terms of reference, in order to thwart 
engulfment by power networks which ceaselessly threaten to 
contain and defuse it. Texts such as The History of Sexuality, 
though not foregrounding women's sexual role for special 
treatment. encourage consideration of the perniciousness of the 
means by which the female body, imprisoned within its 
sexual/procreative function. becomes the site of struggle for 
meaning: 
Dominant discourses of female sexuality which define it 
as naturally passive. together with dominant social 
definitions of women's place as first and foremost in the 
home. can be found in social policy, medicine, education, 
the media and the church and elsewhere. 'bs 
A poststructuralist stance might inform the beginnings of a new 
radical resistance from 'within', and prevent contemporary 
feminists falling into Althusser's trap of gesturing towards a 
'truth' that is only an effect of knowledge. In order to pursue 
this we need to shift our gaze from ideology and discourse to a 
consideration of the way the twentieth-century obsession with 
sexuality serves to concretize women's subordination. Similarly 
it will be necessary to address the means by which the language 
of liberation and sexual revolution infected the emerging 
feminist discourse of the late 1960s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SEXUAL SELF: FEMINIST DEBATES ON SEXUALITY AND DESIRE 
What sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in terms of 
repression is doubtless this opportunity to speak out 
against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise 
bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation, and 
manifold pleasures; to pronounce a discourse that 
combines the fervour of knowledge, the determination to 
change the laws, and the longing for the garden of 
earthly delights. ' 
Foucault's statement, quoted above, cogently sums up the dilemma 
that the so-called 'Sexual Revolution' posed for feminists in the 
1970s. On the one hand, calls for liberation from sexual 
repression seemed perfectly compatible with women's liberation 
and the demand that women should have control over their own 
reproductive capacities. However, women soon discovered that 
participating in the heretofore forbidden fruits of sexual 
freedom, revealed many conceptual problems around the sphere of 
sexuality itself. Female sexual desire had been defined and 
categorized by men; the terms themselves needed redefinition from 
a feminist perspective in order to cleanse them of patriarchal 
connotations. The problem of defining one's terms in feminist 
discourse is of course a recurrent one, where one is always in 
the process of 'borrowing' and extending the conceptual 
apparatuses of our forefathers. It is common for oppressed 
social groups to appropriate negative terms, defining and 
positioning them to redefine them positively: but one is still 
left with the problem that the negative connotations exist 
in a 
wider sphere. This is true of sexuality, where definitions of 
the female sexual response are construed as the obverse of male 
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sexuality 
- 
the passive to complete the active, the lock to fit 
the key. Sexuality, then, has a history of its own in the 
Women's Movement, where the question is of a woman's relation to 
sex and (if sex is destiny) herself. In the early days of the 
Second Wave, debates about female sexuality tended to focus on 
'proper' forms of sexual practice, or more commonly on the means 
by which female sexuality has been used as a tool of repression, 
related to issues of sexual violence and pornographic images. 
Since Wollstonecraft, feminists have tended to portray women 
as the guiltless yet guilt-ridden victims of marital sexual 
relations; and before the 'Sexual Revolution' women might often 
embark upon married life in a severe state of ignorance about 
even the basic elements of female/male anatomy. The onset of the 
'Permissive Society' of the sixties was supposed to change all 
that: women were emerging with a new freedom 
- 
the right to 
choose sex before marriage with more than one partner (although 
this did not extend to being able to refuse sexual contact within 
marriage) and the 'right' to enjoy sex -a volte face had 
occurred in medical/social thinking in terms of female sexual 
response. No longer were women who enjoyed or actively wanted 
sexual intercourse to be pathologized; sex was to be perceived as 
an important aspect of physical and mental health. Facing a 
dearth of writings available on female sexuality, feminists had 
to accept the insights offered by sexological thinking, and 
welcome the recommendations of writers such as Kinsey and Masters 
& Johnson that mutual satisfaction was the desired aim in sexual 
relations. As Lynne Segal argues, 'by the mid seventies 
heterosexual sex was taken out of the context of personal 
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relationships and put in terms of individual needs which were 
being met, or not met. '2 This created an atmosphere where 
pleasure and satisfaction within relationships was calculated 
purely on the basis of a single 'end product' 
- 
the orgasm. 
Many feminists remained sceptical that a vision of female 
sexual autonomy would actually change the way female sexuality is 
conceived of as being in the service of male pleasure, since they 
argued that women's bodies have been sexualized as objects for 
male desire from time immemorial. They also doubted whether 
identifying the 'authentic' anatomical site of female pleasure 
would provide clues to the dynamics of female desire, which had 
been distorted and suppressed for centuries; sexual women 
occupied the shady margins of Western culture, and 'decent' women 
were contained by images of gentility and fragility. The female 
body in Western medical discourse was a volatile mechanism, whose 
balance could easily be upset. Contemporary theorists perceive 
tensions in the way desired forms of sexual behaviour are 
enforced by means of identifying and cataloguing forms of 
deviance; and although heterosexuality is situated as correlative 
with the most natural form of sexual expression, the body of 
sexological and psychoanalytical casework deals with the sexual 
'failures' of this world 
- 
people whose responses turn out 
'abnormal'. This points to what Jeffrey Weeks terms an 'enduring 
paradox' 
- 
'heterosexuality is natural yet has to be attained, 
inevitable but constantly threatened, spontaneous yet in effect 
to be learnt-93 
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DEFINING SEXUALITY 
One formidable difficulty lies in attempting to limit and 
determine what 'sexuality' means. The breadth and scope of the 
term makes it unwieldy to the point of meaninglessness. It is 
summoned by sexologists, feminists, and libertarian theorists 
alike, and has passed into common usage to encompass so many 
aspects of human sexual life. Strictly speaking, the term 
sexuality refers to the quality of being 'sexual' and pertains to 
relations between the sexes; but this definition itself throws up 
tensions between what might be deemed biological fact and what is 
overlaid by cultural convention. Analyses of human sexuality 
tend to assume fundamental distinctions between the sexes on the 
basis of anatomy, and when we talk about sex it is assumed that 
we are talking about coitus between a man and a woman. As 
Jeffrey Weeks avers, the centrality of definitions of sex as a 
procreative force has'hierarchized sexual practices, with 
heterosexuality at the centre, the diffuse but defining principle 
against which deviations from the 'norm' have been identified. 4 
The procreative capacity may well be a biological given, but 
sexual pleasure and desire exist outside such constraints, and 
are affected by historico-cultural and ideological forces, as 
well as being subject to social control. The categorization of 
heterosexuality as a discrete set of sexual practices which 
announces a complete identity in itself is a relatively new 
phenomenon, corresponding with the creation of the 'homosexual' 
as a medical model, which described an individual rather than an 
act which could be potentially practiced by all humans. The 
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nineteenth century fervour to categorize certain forms of sexual 
practice resulted in a conflation of the act and the individual: 
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a 
past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to 
being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with 
an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition 
was unaffected by his sexuality... The sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species. 5 
In face of the multiplication of discourses around sexuality, 
there grew a quest for the origins of the sexual response in 
biologistic explanations, linked to the organs requisite for 
procreation 
- 
and in the cases of 'deviance', their malformation. 
Although all sexual sensations find their focus in bodily 
response, whether provoked by physical or mental stimuli, some 
come to be deemed natural or normal, by virtue of their necessity 
to facilitate conception. In this way, male orgasm, synonymous 
with ejaculation, is fundamental to the 'natural' expression of 
sexuality (coitus); whereas female orgasm is not essential and 
has, conversely, had a more chequered history. 
In Freudian psychoanalytical theory sexual 'health' became one 
of the indicators of mental health; but as it is a commonplace to 
observe that the penis achieved a huge symbolic significance - as 
phallus 
- 
in Freudian theory, it is clear that female sexuality 
is merely considered as an adjunct to male sexuality. The 
Penguin collection of Freud's essays on sexuality contains a 
final piece devoted to the problem of female sexuality, implying 
simultaneously that the construction of female sexuality is 
different and problematic, whilst being subordinate and marginal 
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to a broader theory of sexuality based on the male model. For 
Freud the active sexual urge is itself 'masculine', something 
which both pre-pubescent girls and boys experience 
auto-erotically, but something which is repressed in the 'normal' 
pubescent girl, to facilitate her entry into a passive feminine 
sexual order. 6 Children, in Freud's terms, possess masculine 
terms of sexual reference, which girls acquire by means of a 
seemingly universally acquired penis envy, leading them to regard 
themselves as castrated, and necessarily inferior beings. This 
conceptual framework leads to a very complex view of the 
development of female sexuality; while the possession of a penis 
allows boys a relatively trouble-free transition from immature 
auto-eroticism, to the adult quest for an appropriate sexual 
object, the female's path from immature (clitoral) to mature 
(vaginal) sexual identification is a treacherous one: 
When erotogenic susceptibility to stimulation has been 
successfully transferred by a woman from the clitoris to 
the vaginal orifice, it implies that she has adopted a 
new leading zone for the purposes of her later sexual 
activity. A man, on the other hand, retains his leading 
zone unchanged from childhood.? 
The implication in Freudian theory that female sexuality 
constituted the underside of male sexuality conceptualized as a 
lack, or absence of the penis, sedimented notions of female 
inferiority into psychoanalytical and sexological thinking. 
Coupled with this is his suggestion that in order for the 
transition from clitoral to vaginal identification the girl 
begins to sense shame and disgust at her previous masturbatory 
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pleasures, which itself appears to inform sexological approaches 
to frigidity. 8 
Juliet Mitchell in Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974) offers 
an apology for Freud, arguing that he uses the terms masculine 
and feminine to suggest the cultural differentiations they imply 
(eg. between passivity and activity), and that the phallocentric 
organization of his theories is 'not a recommendation for a 
patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. '9 In this sense 
Freud's language can be appropriated in the way that Lacan and 
Mitchell later did; the phallus becomes correlative with the 
Symbolic Order 
- 
the entry into language, and thus socialization 
which has both historical and cultural determinants. In this way 
the phallus is symbolic of power, the possession of a penis being 
the boy's passport to his entry into the patriarchal order, and 
the promise that one day he too could assume the dominant 
position (in sexual and social terms) of his father. The absence 
of the penis informs, at a symbolic level, the woman's lack of 
power, her social position illustrating the power of that lack. 
It is certainly the case that Freudian theory is ineluctably 
entrenched in the discursive formation that enabled its 
appearance, and the uses that Freudian theory have since been put 
to seek to provide a model of sexuality which hinges on the 
biological and natural rather than the social and cultural. 
In common with Freud, sexologists such as Havelock Ellis 
considered a person's sexual history as of vital importance to 
understanding the development of psycho-sexual problems in adult 
life. Sexology, the 'scientific' examination of sex, involves a 
cataloguing and interpretation of all forms of sexual practice 
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which are then hierarchicized as more or less 'deviant': again, 
the assumption is that at the origins of the human sexual impulse 
there is a natural form of response, which can be corrupted by 
biological or cultural means. In a positive light, the 
sexological tradition is seen to have offered individuals a space 
to explore their inhibitions, their fetishes, or their 
'perversions' in a more tolerant atmosphere of objective 
scientific exploration: often a person might find that they 
belong to a category, and that their 'problem' is not unique. 
More negatively, it can be argued that sexology inscribes in our 
culture notions of proper and acceptable forms of sexual 
behaviour, and comprises 'a more or less coherent body of 
assumptions, beliefs, prejudices, rules, methods of investigation 
and forms of moral regulation, which still shape the way we live 
our sexualities. '10 Sexology might well be perceived as a body 
of research which in its claim to a privileged knowledge of the 
sexual impulses, has 'the power to adjudicate on normality and 
abnormality'. 11 In addition, it arguably possesses a hidden 
agenda that is rooted in a biologistic model of sexuality, which 
necessarily includes a view of female and male sexuality as 
different and complementary. The passive female responds to the 
active male, whose sexual urges are only barely held in check by 
cultural behavioural norms; and women are themselves implicated 
in containing this explosive male force. 
'Sexuality', however, might be more provocatively regarded as 
a social presence which bears little relation to 'nature' or 
'biology', and whose realm incorporates all humans, bringing 
together the capacity to reproduce, desire and need, fantasy, 
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gender identity and bodily differences. Unlike sexologists, 
theorists such as Jeffrey Weeks and Michel Foucault do not accept 
the veracity of 'scientific' essentialist claims, and assert to 
the contrary that there is no inner truth or sexual essence at 
the heart of every human being. They argue instead that in the 
wake of religion's demise over the past two centuries, sex became 
destiny 
- 
that is to say, we are what we desire. 12 Accordingly 
homosexuals were not just men and women with a non-heterosexual 
orientation, they were defined as a different breed, a third sex. 
Ellis coined the term 'invert', implying the status of a 
congenital anomaly, and lesbians such as Radclyffe Hall regarded 
themselves as naturally aberrant, the fact of their biological 
femaleness being merely a physiological carapace which contained 
a male 'soul'. 
Until recently feminists have seemed reluctant to interrogate 
the field of sexuality and the theories that inform it, although 
the problem of the sexualization of women is a central issue in 
feminist thought. The dominant feminist line has tended to be 
one of defence 
- 
to argue that women's sexual authenticity lies 
elsewhere 
- 
rather than taking the form of an attack upon 
entrenched beliefs around sexual selfhood. Later feminist 
theorists have followed the lead of thinkers such as Michel 
Foucault, arguing that sexuality is an historical construct, and 
is meaningless without its relevant socio-historical context. 
This facilitates a further and more concerted attack upon the 
status of the natural in Western epistemology; a move readily 
compatible with earlier feminist endeavours to deconstruct the 
naturalization of the social self. For feminists, it is 
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important to recognize that the production of sexualities is 
sustained and endowed with meaning by a complex and contradictory 
signifying system, in order to analyse the social construction of 
sexuality. Following Foucault and Weeks, the nature of the 
relationship between sex and power can then be further 
investigated. 
Instead of taking nature 
- 
'biology' 
- 
as the raw material for 
analysing the social, contemporary theorists on sexuality 
investigate how social relations of sexual difference/differing 
sexualities are 'naturalized' and made an intrinsic part of a 
person's identity. Despite the fact that biology might provide 
the preconditions for human sexuality, Jeffrey Weeks prefers 'to 
see in biology a set of potentialities which are transformed and 
given meaning only in social relationships'. 13 Feminism, 
meanwhile, still tends to conflate the biological and cultural 
when it comes to studies of female sexuality, and this seems to 
be an inevitable effect of drawing upon theories of sexuality 
constructed with male sexual response as the motivating force. 
This is true of Freudian theory which 'uses visible anatomical 
difference as its guarantee of psychic difference and women's 
inferiority', 14 and focuses discussion around anatomy, whilst 
decentring questions of cultural and ideological influences upon 
a person's sexual motivation. In the case of Freudian theory and 
its legacy, 'anatomical division is seen as equivalent to sexual 
identity and has been privileged as the fundamental symbolic 
category in sexuality', 15 with the effect that at an ideological 
level anatomy is regarded as the irrevocable defining principle 
of sexual response. The meanings that have been applied to 
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female sexuality within feminism are conflicting 
- 
particularly 
where the findings of sexologists such as Kinsey and Masters and 
Johnson have been variously regarded as the key to liberating 
female sexual awareness, or as evidence of the imposition of a 
further series of oppressive and coercive structures upon female 
sexual life. 
FE24ALE SEXUALITY 
- 
THE LDGACY OF SEXOLOGY 
Foucault has asserted that 'it is possible that where sex is 
concerned, the most long-winded, the most impatient of societies 
is our own. '16 Nowhere is this impatience, this eager search for 
the truth about sex, more evident than in sexological thought. 
During the early years of the twentieth century, Havelock Ellis 
was credited with heralding a new era of sexual enlightenment, by 
establishing sexology as an exact science. He identified the 
existence of a female sexuality which was not pathological; and 
in creating 'scientific' explanations for homosexual desire he 
promoted some degree of tolerance to illicit forms of behaviour. 
Nonetheless, his relatively radical views on human sexuality did 
not lead him to interrogate the qualities assumed to govern 
discrete forms of masculine or feminine behaviour. Female 
sexuality was still viewed as determined by the reproductive 
urge, and the power dynamics invested in heterosexual sex was 
endorsed as an expression of the natural biological order of 
things. His most influential volumes - Studies in the Psychology 
of Sex (1913) 
- 
whilst libertarian in some respects, continue to 
view women as the receiver of' the male, arguing that some 
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conventional feminine attributes, such as modesty, are essential 
to trigger the chemistry of sexual attraction: 'the women who is 
lacking in this kind of fear is lacking, also, in sexual 
attractiveness to the normal and average man'. 17 Women, Ellis 
maintains, desire to be conquered: this, of course, seems to be a 
small step towards legitimizing rape as something women 
'unconsciously' desire. '8 
Sexology bases its hypotheses of sexual behaviour primarily 
upon perceptions of the male, and: 
takes as given the particular form of male sexuality 
that exists under male supremacy and attempts to 
universalize it, so that it becomes the model of 
sexuality in general. 
. . 
The model thus reflects and 
reinforces the male supremacist notion that the (male) 
sexual urge is either uncontrollable or, if repressed, 
causes neurosis or finds an outlet in sex crimes. 19 
In common with Freudian theories, sexology appeared to accept 
that the male should provide the paradigm for natural, healthy 
sexual response defined in terms of a goal-oriented role, 
beginning with penetration and ending with ejaculation. Healthy 
masculine sexual behaviour was still cast in acquisitive terms, 
whereas the female sexual response should be passive and 
receptive. Nonetheless later sexologists such as Kinsey and 
Masters and Johnson refuted Freud's distinction between the 
clitoral and vaginal orgasm - and therefore the notion of a 
female transition from immature to mature sexual behaviour - by 
asserting that all orgasmic sensations emanated from the 
clitoris. Such findings suggested that sexual intercourse was 
not necessarily the most effective means by which women could 
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receive sexual pleasure, prompting a degree of moral confusion 
about the legitimacy and normality of other types of stimulation. 
It announced the legitmation of sexual pleasure in women as 
natural for any healthy woman, and constructed a model of 
fulfilling 'married love' via the simultaneous orgasm, after the 
woman has been dutifully 'prepared' for intercourse: 
It is not so much denial of the clitoris that is 
striking as its appearance and disappearance in favour of 
the mythologized vagina, in defence of the penis as the 
organizing principle of the sexual act. This 
displacement allows the idealization of the simultaneous 
orgasm and a plethora of neurotic symptoms, notably 
premature ejaculation and frigidity. 20 
For women the legacy of sexology has been that while female 
sexual pleasure is acknowledged as biologically natural, sexual 
response during coitus is not: it is a 'learned' response 
- 
not 
least because women have to unlearn repressive childhood taboos 
in order to experience pleasure during 'legitimate' sex. 
Masturbation came to be viewed by sexologists such as Masters and 
Johnson as 'healthy' perhaps, but very much second best 
- 
women 
are assumed to resort to it between sexual partners, or to 
practice it in order to increase their orgasmic potential during 
coitus. From this one can observe that sexuality is still 
associated with coitus, and though other practices of stimulation 
are acceptable, they remain subordinate to this as the organizing 
principle: 'In fact the very term "sexual intercourse", which 
would in theory mean any form of sexual interaction, is in 
practice synonymous with coitus in everyday speech as well as in 
the scientific literature. '21 
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Sexuality has been implicitly accepted by psychoanalysts and 
sexologists to represent a fusion of culture and nature: the 
instinct is there from birth, but our transition to healthy adult 
(hetero)sexuality is a tortuous journey affected by our 
successful or unsuccessful entry into cultural/social/gendered 
norms. Foucault, Weeks and many feminist theorists have opposed 
the biologistic dimensions of sexology, arguing that sexuality is 
only definable through specific social meanings 
- 
that correct 
practices, choice of partner/object and periods of abstinence and 
forms of desire have always changed according to the vicissitudes 
of history and changing social relations. Sexuality, then, is 
viewed as susceptible to dominant ideological positions, and as 
focused upon our consciousness of social reality, rather than 
animal instincts. We are all profoundly influenced by social 
notions of' incorrect and correct forms of sexual expression, and 
there are various types of 'punishment' meted out to those who 
deviate from the current norm. 
In the previous chapter I have already outlined the view that 
ideological apparatuses and their effects become embedded in the 
subject's consciousness through means of 'education' and 
interpellation. The way we learn appropriate forms of sexual 
expression seems to be through punitive responses to undesirable 
forms of childhood sexual behaviour; the 'secret' of sex is one 
which many moral reformers would like to retain, even though the 
will to hide sexual realities is embraced by a 'veritable 
discursive explosion', 22 to use Foucault's words. The 
association of sex with secrecy and privacy still pervades 
discourse around sexuality today, and perhaps goes some way to 
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explaining feminists' reticence to explore the subject in detail. 
In addition, this explosive obsession with sex is primarily 
exhibited as a concern to catalogue unnatural and 'deviant' forms 
of sexual expression, whereas the 'natural' that presumably 
underpinned all this chaos was left largely undocumented: 'the 
legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right to 
more discretion. '23 Foucault's critique of psychoanalytical and 
sexological discourses has proved an important source for 
feminists, because he identifies clear links between social 
control of licit and illicit sexual practices and the operation 
of power between individuals and institutions. The notion of 
sexuality as natural instinct is one utilized within society to 
reaffirm preferred social/gendered hierarchies, and which has no 
currency or meaning outside these modalities of power: 
Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by 
nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power 
which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails 
to control it entirely. It appears rather as an 
especially dense transfer point for relations of power: 
between men and women, young people and old people, 
parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and 
laity, an administration and a population. 24 
Networks of power and their relation to individual drives and 
practices is complex, and yet in Foucault's analysis 'power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere'. 23 One cannot identify a singular 
oppressive force from whence all definitions of sexuality derive; 
and the more sex is cast as the root of the self, the harder it 
is to combat the tenacious association of certain practices with 
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the natural, yet such practices remain the most ill-defined. For 
feminists approaching the problem of sexuality in relation to 
women's material and ideological conditions of existence, it is 
necessary to reinforce the point that, 'sexuality is as much 
about words, images, ritual and fantasy as it is about the body: 
the way we think about sex fashions the way we live it. '26 Many 
of the images, words, rituals and fantasies utilized in modern 
representations of sex and sexuality involve the use of women's 
bodies 
- 
often fragmented and idealized 
- 
to stimulate male 
desire. It is these sexualized images of women which early Second 
Wave feminists took as their primary object of study maintaining, 
to varying degrees, that 'what is specific to the oppression of 
women of all races and classes is that it takes a sexual form. '27 
EARLY SECOND WAVE FEMINISM AND THE 'SEXUAL REVOLUTION' 
Second Wave pioneers variously attempted to insert the problem of 
female sexuality 
- 
its current patriarchal construction, and 
quests for a more authentic model - into their wider political 
agenda. Part of their struggle has been to find means to 
liberate women from the sexualized female images that they 
encounter daily, and which perpetuate the mythification of woman 
as passive vessel/victim to the dominant male sexual urge. A 
crucial aim was to correct the patriarchal perspective which 
objectifies the female body; but an equally important project 
involved offering a positive view of the future, where women 
might be able to negotiate their own desires and needs outside 
the patriarchal imperative. Such a quest led feminists to seek a 
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model of female sexuality which cou 
than the patriarchally defined one; 
sexual response that swept away all 
female sexual autonomy. In a sense 
converge with those of sexologists, 
of' lifting the veil on human sexual 
degree to which they afforded women 
latterly extensively questioned. 
Id be deemed more authentic 
a description of female 
the old myths and affirmed 
these objectives appeared to 
who were also in the business 
behaviour; even though the 
any liberation has been 
The so-called 'Sexual Revolution' was believed to have been 
engendered by the endeavours of feminists and sexual radicals 
alike. Both used the language of liberation from repression, and 
attempted to create an arena of' honest open discussion around 
human sexuality, in order to destroy some of the more pernicious 
myths that encumber it. The problem peculiar to feminist 
explorations into this field was that sexuality never yielded 
itself up as an area with clearly demarcated boundaries; the 
conventional view of the preferred manifestations of female 
sexuality as passive, receptive and even masochistic, seemed to 
be reaffirmed in diverse ideological perspectives on women's 
'proper' social and domestic duties. Despite the problems of 
establishing a viable political stance on a subject which many 
would see as beyond the purview of politics, feminists, having 
broken down the conceptual boundary between private and public 
spheres of' social life, demonstrated that medical, legal and 
philosophical perspectives on female sexuality directly affected 
issues related to reproductive rights, rape, domestic violence, 
pornography and the sexual division of labour. Wherever 
feminists fought for equality, they confronted the problems of 
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sex. How, for example, could one make marriage a more 
egalitarian institution, when until very recently the male still 
had a legal right to sexual intercourse on demand? 
Radical feminists in the United States looked for inspiration 
to the research of contemporary sexologists, such as Alfred 
Kinsey and Masters and Johnson. They had finally quashed the 
Freudian notion of female transference from one type of orgasm to 
another. They made it official: women achieve orgasm solely by 
direct or indirect stimulation of the clitoris, and in this 
'discovery' feminists hoped to decentralize coitus, armed with 
sexological proof that it was the least effective way for women 
to gain sexual satisfaction. Anne Koedt's essay, 'The Myth of 
the Vaginal Orgasm' (1970), pursues this point, asserting that 
now the 'myth' has been exposed, women should use this 
information to transform and redefine heterosexuality: 
What we must do is redefine our sexuality. We must 
discard the 'normal' concepts of sex and create new 
guidelines which take into account mutual sexual 
enjoyment... We must begin to demand that if certain 
sexual positions now defined as 'standard' are not 
mutually conducive to orgasm, they no longer be defined 
as standard. 28 
She concludes by implying that once women are made conscious of 
the fact of clitoral orgasm, the stability of the heterosexual 
institution is threatened; one consequence of which will be to 
'open up the whole question of human sexual relationships beyond 
the confines of the present male-female role system'. 29 Koedt, 
however, does not subscribe to the logic of other radical 
feminists' conclusions - which was to suggest that lesbianism is 
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the only viable political and sexual choice for women to make in 
order to forge a revolution. The main thrust of her argument is 
to expose the means by which current definitions of appropriate 
sexuality are correlative with patriarchal power and effective 
social control. of women. In her acknowledgement of the impact of 
social processes external to sex she appears to concur with Kate 
Millett: 
Coitus can scarcely be said to take place in a vacuum; 
although of itself it appears a biological and physical 
activity, it is set so deeply within the larger context 
of human affairs that it serves as a charged microcosm of 
the variety of' attitudes and values to which culture 
subscribes. 30 
Germaine Greer rejects Koedt's position, on the grounds that it 
prioritizes the clitoris as the sole focus of female sexuality 
and facilitates 'the substitution of genitality for sexuality'. 31 
It is true that to some extent Koedt's analysis retained an 
anatomical and potentially biologistic focus; but Greer herself 
is unhelpfully oblique with regard to what sexuality can mean. A 
tendency among feminists writing in the seventies was to 
celebrate women's new-found 'right' to enjoy sex, without fully 
addressing the current obstacles to the exercise of such a right. 
The prevailing assumption appeared to be that some simple sexual 
energy lay buried under patriarchal definitions, waiting to be 
released. 
Sheila Jeffreys, a British Revolutionary Feminist writing some 
twenty years after Koedt, argues that earlier feminists reacted 
too enthusiastically to sexological perspectives on sexual 
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liberation, carried away by the novelty of being able to talk 
honestly about sex as a potentially active experience for women. 
She is critical of Koedt for taking the 'scientific' findings of 
Masters and Johnson at face value, resulting in a dismissal of 
the erotic potential of vaginal stimulation in lesbian 
sexuality. 32 Jeffreys accuses earlier feminists in general of 
colluding with male sexual liberationists with the result that 
'the enthusiasm for the fulfilment of women's sexual potential 
went so far that some feminists confused sexual liberation with 
the political liberation of women. '33 Margaret Jackson agrees 
with Jeffreys, and argues that radical feminists misunderstood 
the purpose of' the 'findings' of Masters and Johnson 
- 
'which is 
to cement heterosexuality and marriage through the "pleasure 
bond" of coitus. '34 It is clear that, despite her tentative 
closing gesture towards a departure from the dominant male-female 
model of sexuality, Koedt's critical perspective remains 
exclusively heterosexual. Generally speaking, other feminists' 
uncritical adoption of sexological premises meant that their 
pathfinding analysis remained woefully heterosexist. 
Contemporaries of Koedt were concerned that placing sexual 
discovery at the heart of' the movement's agenda would encourage 
introspection, and thus divert attention from collective feminist 
revolution. In common with later writers such as Jeffreys, Dana 
Densmore views the emphasis upon sexual revolution as another 
means to deny women's freedom in other areas: 
Sex becomes a religion, existing independently of the 
individuals who share its particular physical 
consummation. The media totally bombard us with it. Sex 
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is everywhere. It's forced down our throats. It's the 
great sop that keeps us in our place. The big lift that 
makes our dreary worlds interesting. Everywhere we are 
sexual objects, and our own enjoyment just enhances our 
attractiveness. We are wanton. We wear miniskirts and 
see-through tops. We're sexy. We're free. We run around 
and hop into bed whenever we please. This is the 
self-image we have built up in us by advertising and the 
media. It's self-fulfilling. And very profitable. It 
keeps us in our place and feeling lucky about it... It 
makes us look as if we're free and active (actively, 
freely, we solicit sex from men). 35 
Whereas Densmore eyes the Sexual Revolution sceptically, there is 
a tendency among her contemporaries to suggest that there is an 
incontrovertible, transhistorical, cross-cultural 'true' 
sexuality lying innate, corrupted and distorted within the female 
body. Densmore questions the advisability of situating the 
female quest for ultimate sexual pleasure at the heart of the 
feminist agenda at all, since this can and should not be the only 
revolutionary goal of the Women's Movement, when sexual 
relationships as they are currently defined all too often 
alienate us from other social bonds, such as female friendship 
which have always been conceived as of secondary importance to 
the institution of heterosexuality. The area of sexuality was a 
dangerous one for feminists, a realm of experience which seemed 
to invite recourse to biological givens, which often served to 
undermine the central precepts of feminism - in that difference 
was the determining feature. Radicals involved in consciousness 
raising groups in the USA and later in Britain, risked 
reinforcing the assumption that a liberated woman was first and 
foremost a sexually liberated one. Moreover, she had a 'duty' to 
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explore her own sexual potential, using most recent sexological 
findings as a yardstick 
- 
although the fact of women's 
multi-orgasmic potential was a daunting target for many. 
There seemed to be a confusion about what these 'new' 
discoveries on female sexuality were for. On the one hand 
scientific endorsement of the clitoris as site of female sexual 
pleasure might notionally free women from the guilt of being 
regarded frigid if they failed to become orgasmic during coitus, 
and this could be used as a means to redefine prevalent meanings 
of heterosexuality itself. On the other, this information was 
implicitly used as a means to 'prove' that after all, women were 
avowedly dominant in one sphere 
- 
that of sexual performance. 
Books and groups encouraged women to view their own dark 
continents via specula, slides of assorted women's genitalia and 
through learning masturbatory techniques, supposedly freeing them 
from their unconscious dependence upon penetrative sex. Betty 
Dodson is an example of such a sex practitioner, who developed 
body sex workshops, involving group masturbation sessions. 36 At 
one and the same time women were encouraged to discover their 
'natural' potential; but if such potential could only be 
discovered by the learning of techniques, who were women 
'improving' themselves for? The implication behind such 
approaches to female sexuality is that to foreground 'foreplay' 
and marginalize penetration solves the problem of' unequal power 
relations between men and women, without having to confront the 
wider ramifications of heterosexuality as an institution. Yet 
feminists were also acutely aware that the politics of the 
bedroom reflected broader social, economic and juridico-political 
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forces which had already institutionalized inequities of gender, 
race and class. The problem still was men; and whilst women 
might rally to the demand to 'get off our backs', changing 
patterns of (hetero)sexual behaviour was only an ephemeral 
'solution' to female oppression, where changing female 
consciousness of self would not necessarily change males. 
Recent feminists who have reviewed radical feminist approaches 
to sexuality tend to see its agenda for change as prescriptive, 
moralistic or hopelessly dependent upon the patriarchal 
heterosexist model of what sexologists deem to be normal or 
acceptable behaviour. The critique and wholesale redefinition of 
notions of female sexuality from a feminist perspective did, 
however, gradually gain purchase within the movement. For 
feminists engaged in anti-pornography campaigns, or work against 
sexual violence, approaches to the construction of female 
sexuality should always involve an attack on the continued male 
control of women's bodies. The fact that the Women's Liberation 
Movement was at is peak during a so-called 'Sexual Revolution' in 
Western society, has resulted in the two terms being conflated at 
times, so that the Sexual Revolution is seen to primarily serve 
the interests of women, and sexologists are therefore perceived 
as the champions of women and feminism. However, many feminists 
remained sceptical of the pro-feminist guise of sixties 
sexologists, or of the revolutionary potential of such 
bestsellers as Alex Comfort's The Joy of Sex (1972). Margaret 
Jackson argues that despite the gender-neutral rhetoric of some 
sexual reformers, they are concerned at heart with maintaining a 
patriarchal status quo: 
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While they do attack certain patriarchal sexual values, 
such as the double standard and goal-oriented sex, their 
primary concern with male sexual inadequacy (defined as 
failure to achieve or maintain erection), and with the 
maintenance of heterosexuality and marriage by means of 
continuous coital connection, could hardly be called 
feminist. 37 
Taken at face value, access for women to more information about 
sexuality might seem positive, but the discourse of sexology 
still defined sex around the male model, so that penetration 
remained at the centre, and sexual problems were performative 
ones, rather than an indication of' the inadequacies of the 
sexological model. If females were to be more active in their 
desires, this was still supposed to be focused towards male 
pleasure; setting aside for a moment the question of whether 
coitus is the most satisfactory practice from a female 
perspective, this indicates that the dynamics of heterosexual 
norms were left largely uninterrogated. 
However widespread permissiveness is believed to have been 
throughout the sixties and seventies, there can be no doubt the 
sexual reformers changed prevailing social attitudes to sexual 
freedom 
- 
at least in a heterosexual environment. This new wave 
of sexual 'revolution' spawned an increase in the production and 
sales of mainstream 'soft' pornography, and also heralded the 
inception of journals such as Forum, whose emergence coincided 
with the boom in the pornography industry and the production of 
magazines such as P1aYboY and Penthouse. Forum's subtitle - 
'The International Journal of Human Relations' - effectively 
announces its major intention of being a serious publication for 
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the dissemination of information around sexual matters, devoting 
much space to articles, readers' letters and a problem page. In 
particular k'orum became associated with the Sexual Revolution and 
the era of 'swinging' (group sex, and partner swapping) 
- 
ostensibly addressing the needs of both men and women, via 
features designed to increase enlightenment and combat sexual 
'hang-ups'. In actuality, most of its regular features, 
including the problem page, arguably reinforced gender 
differences in the field of sexuality, where problems were what 
women suffered from and needed advice about in order to better 
satisfy their husbands. 38 Although visual pornographic images 
were secondary to erotic fiction and articles, and despite the 
fact that 
- 
in theory, at least 
- 
it demonstrated a liberal 
attitude to homosexual relations, Forum served to reinforce a 
hetero-reality, where 'lesbianism' was acceptable purely as a 
prelude to heterosexual 'consummation'. In The Sexuality Papers 
(1984), Coveney et al. have surveyed numerous editions of Forum 
issued during the seventies, and argue that they ironically 
demonstrate that-women were actively coerced into 'swinging' and 
'free' sexual expression for the greater titillation of their 
male partners 
- 
as well as concretizing the male 'right' to 
promiscuity within marriage. Their overall conclusion is one 
shared by earlier commentators such as Dana Densmore: that the 
belief that the Sexual Revolution liberated women is a myth; and 
that the 'discovery' of women's multi-orgasmic potential was 
co-opted into the service of male-oriented eroticism. In fact 
they identify women as moving from a period of guilt about 
demonstrating active sexual feelings (only 'bad' women did) to a 
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New Guilt if they were reluctant to participate in an environment 
of free sexual expression: 
This is how the New Guilt works. Instead of women 
feeling guilty because they don't want sex at all, or 
because they experienced sexual pleasure in the days when 
women weren't supposed to have any sexuality, they now 
have to feel guilty because they have these 'unliberated' 
antisocial attitudes towards their husbands' 'liberated' 
practices. 39 
What is interesting is the coincidence of the 'soft' 
pornography explosion and media representations of the late 
sixties and early seventies as the golden age of sex, with the 
feminist concentration on the need to define personal 
relationships and redefine female sexuality and desire. The 
notion of there being any common ground between the two is 
particularly problematic, since the anti-pornography lobby became 
a powerful arm of the Women's Movement. Radical feminists, such 
as Andrea Dworkin, interpreted the images purveyed by pornography 
as a kind of patriarchal propaganda which reinforced male notions 
of women as sexual objects who can be 'taken' if necessary by 
violent force or rape. 
Pornography is an essential issue because pornography 
says that women want to be hurt, forced, and abused: 
pornography says that women want to be raped battered, 
kidnapped, maimed; pornography says that women want to be 
humiliated, shamed, defamed; pornography says that women 
say No but mean Yes - Yes to violence, Yes to pain. 40 
For radical feminists of the 1970s, pornography quite simply 
objectified and dehumanized women, and legitimized the 
-265- 
perpetuation of male violence against individual women in their 
everyday lives. Their definitions of pornography vary, but in 
the main such representational forms were regarded as fluid 
enough to encompass all aspects of culture, including 
advertisements. Radicals such as Adrienne Rich had no doubt that 
sexualized images of women affected their social experiences and 
the way men are encouraged to view women: 'The most pernicious 
message relayed by pornography is that women are natural sexual 
prey to men and love it'. 41 Early socialist feminists, 
especially in Britain, were more lukewarm and tended to consider 
pornography in the light of the boundaries of censorship; that 
the definitions of 'obscenity' were governed by the moral purity 
lobby and censorship might equal denial of free speech for women 
too. Nonetheless the feminist pornography debate became 
inextricable from the sexuality debate, and tended to further 
problematize the issue of female desire, since the female body 
through pornography had seemingly been subjected to wholesale 
colonization by the male. Dworkin exemplifies this conflation of 
perspectives: 
The sexuality of women has been stolen outright, 
appropriated by men - conquered, possessed, taken, 
violated; women have been systematically and absolutely 
denied the right to sexual self-determination and to 
sexual integrity; and because the sexuality of women has 
been stolen, this sexuality itself, it - as distinguished 
from an individual woman as a sentient being - it can be 
sold. 42 
In the early days of Women's Liberation, therefore, most 
discussions of what could constitute an authentic female 
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sexuality, were necessarily tainted by the notion that sexuality 
had been commodified, and that female sexuality could only be 
critically cast in negative terms 
- 
as something women 
historically lacked. In this context Shere Hite began her 
research into how individual women regarded their sexuality, and 
their own personal relationships. 
The Hite Report (1976) surely emerged as a result of the 
collision between an atmosphere of increased explicitness 
prompted by the Sexual'Revolution and the Women's Movement 
itself. The Report collated the responses of 3,000 American 
women to a questionnaire addressing issues surrounding sexuality 
and sexual practices. It consists largely of quotes by these 
anonymous contributors, categorized under headings such as 
'Masturbation', 'Orgasm', 'Intercourse', 'Lesbianism', etc. The 
findings and ramifications of these replies have been seen as of 
importance for the early Women's Movement as a means for sharing 
experiences and providing statistics about women's attitude to 
sex across the ranges of age and sexual orientation (although the 
sample is still relatively small and ethnic origins of 
respondents were not recorded). For the purpose of this 
discussion, the most interesting part of the book is the section 
dealing with the Sexual Revolution, where most of the women's 
responses are profoundly negative, and appear largely pessimistic 
about the possibility of there being a sexual revolution that 
would benefit women equally. One woman directly relates sexual 
revolution to the images of pornography: 
It's got a long way to go. If the crap in Playboy or 
Penthouse is anybody's idea of a sexual revolution then 
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it's revolting all right. As long as women are exploited 
sexually, viewed as sex objects and raised from the 
cradle to accommodate men, the sexual revolution is 
meaningless. It seems to me that the sexual revolution 
has just given the con men the chance to sell douches and 
razors, but that you don't see much in the way of real 
free expression and happiness, or joy in the body and in 
sex. 43 
Another woman comments: 
What 'sexual revolution'? I am struggling in a feminist 
revolution! The so-called sexual revolution, from my 
point of view, did nothing to liberate women or men. Men 
got a screw for free and it was done out in the open and 
under the liberal-radical guise of a revolution against 
antiquated sex attitudes. Women still wanted those men 
for lifetime companions because they gave away their 
bodies and minds and found identity in the man instead of 
in themselves. Men still maintain the top position in 
the job market, in women's magazine stories, in bed and 
in the mind of the female psyche. So really the sexual 
revolution advertised something I already knew. Women 
are treated as objects. Only in this 'revolution' the 
oppressed didn't gain a thing. The oppressor began the 
'sexual revolution' through rock music, the cosmetic 
market, Hugh Hefner, etc., but we weren't liberated from 
our roles, only more objectified. 44 
From these two examples it is clear that women were beginning to 
see more liberal acceptance of expressions of female sexuality as 
further means for male exploitation. Both respondents make 
connections between sex and its cultural commodification, and 
this awareness in itself seems to be a tribute to the power of 
the radical feminist message. However, replies in other chapters 
demonstrated a depressing inability among women to translate this 
consciousness into their daily lives. 
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Although Hite amongst others calls for a redefinition of what 
we see as sex 
- 
where reproduction is no longer perceived as the 
sole reason for sexual contact and intercourse need not be 
central to heterosexual experience4S 
- 
heterosexuality remains 
the assumed norm for women. The respondents of the survey saw 
penetrative sex as a 'goal' in their relationships (even if it is 
a goal that left them feeling largely unsatisfied), and the 
questionnaire itself is inevitably weighted towards heterosexual 
experience. Although Hite is careful to use the non-gendered 
term 'partner', she specifically addresses a question to lesbians 
which reveals their effective exclusion from other questions. In 
addition she persists in using the term 'intercourse', which is 
popularly considered to connote penile penetration. Later, women 
are asked whether they prefer clitoral stimulation to penetration 
-a distinction which only makes clear sense in heterosexual 
terms, where foreplay is seen as part of a progression to 'real' 
sexual congress. 
Nevertheless books such as The Hite Report clearly aided the 
consciousness raising aspects of the movement, including as it 
does frank descriptions of individual women's experiences of 
various sexual activities. Perhaps its major success lay in its 
exposure of the fact that many women felt pressurized to perform 
in this 'new era' of sexual freedom, just as they had accepted 
the 'fact' of female sexual repulsion in the 'dark ages' of 
sexual ignorance: 
Yes, I feel the need to perform orgasmically, 
competitively with other women at large in the community. 
I wish I didn't. It really got started when I used to 
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feel pressure frone my former partner, because if I didn't 
come, it proved he wasn't a 'real man'. But I'm not a 
star of a two-ring circus. 46 
The Hite Report reads like a catalogue of restraint, disgust and 
capitulation. 'Freedom' of sexual expression did not guarantee 
any increased freedom or change in status for women in other 
areas of their lives. And many feminists, in common with the 
above women, associated this failure with the way female 
sexuality is used and objectified by the media, where 
'permissiveness' appears to sanction permission for men to use 
women as sex objects. 
The Permissive Society meant many things retrospectively 
- 
not 
least the opportunity for people to bemoan the increasing 
promiscuity of youth and the subsequent threat to 'family values' 
of monogamy and female chastity. If something 'offended' against 
public decency, then it all too often became linked with 
counter-cultures from hippies to feminists, despite feminists' 
obvious unease with their supposed leading role in the Sexual 
Revolution. The Permissive Society is also famously the era when 
the Pill became widely available, coinciding with feminists' 
struggle for women's right to greater control over their bodies, 
especially in the sphere of reproduction. The commonplace that 
the Pill liberated women more than anything else cements the 
assumed link between reproduction and female sexuality. It is a 
link which many feminists left unquestioned, with the result that 
coitus still determined sex, and the association between 
contraception and 'family planning' implied that the only freedom 
women should have in this field is the freedom to space their 
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pregnancies once a long-term (marital) partnership is achieved. 
Female sexual expression was still associated with risks, because 
it remained centred upon penetrative intercourse: you either 
risked an unwanted pregnancy or accepted the long term risks of 
the Pill. Contraception and abortion, not a revolution in sexual 
practices, remained central to feminist debate and in this sense 
heterosexual feminists contributed to the commonsense view that 
penetrative intercourse was the pinnacle of sexual experience 
- 
although The Hite Report stands as testimony to the inaccuracy of 
this view 
- 
and the purest expression of love is in 'giving 
oneself completely' to a man. 
Feminism was and still is dominated by heterosexual women, and 
the area of sexual identity itself was often neglected as a 
potentially divisive subject, which meant that lesbians felt 
alienated and unrepresented by mainstream feminist discourse. 
Heterosexual women themselves appeared to be threatened by 
lesbian dissenting voices in the movement, especially in face of 
calls for the interrogation of heterosexuality as an institution 
as well as a sexual choice. Lesbians with a history in gay 
activism were accustomed to being outspoken about their own right 
to sexual self-determination, but even today heterosexual 
feminists remain reluctant to scrutinize the social construction 
of heterosexuality, and the means by which 
- 
as institution 
- 
it 
exerts a powerful influence over women's social/sexual lives. 
Discourses which inform knowledges of human sexual behaviour 
contain and categorize homosexuals as subjects bounded and 
determined by the perceived nature of their desires; 
heterosexuality evades such simplistic definition 
- 
not least 
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because it is synonymous with a 'normal' way of life, and 
therefore its practices and characteristics are deemed to be 
self-evident. This abstract slippage between definitions is 
perhaps a contributory factor to heterosexual feminists' 
reluctance to analyse their own sexual choice. It has been left 
largely to lesbian and gay male critics to examine the differing 
social/sexual meanings of heterosexuality, and to investigate its 
ideological power as an institution which affects everyone's 
lives regardless of one's orientation, and is, accordingly, much 
more than a mere 'preference'. As a result, the most cogent and 
contentious analyses of heterosexuality have been produced by gay 
men (Jeffrey Weeks, Michel Foucault) and lesbian feminists 
(Adrienne Rich and Sheila Jeffreys), who hold up supposedly 
natural expressions of desire and pleasure for scrutiny, arguing 
that all constellations of pleasure and desire are socially and 
ideologically constructed, rather than part of a natural 
universal life force. 
RADICAL/LESBIAN FEMINISM 
- 
REVOLUTIONARY OR PRESCRIPTIVE? 
Utopias involving total sexual freedom (or degrees of 
concubinage) have endured since the nineteenth century. Radical 
feminist sexual utopias of the seventies increasingly took on a 
specifically lesbian identity. Such separatist havens were to be 
for women whose chosen sexual orientation was lesbianism, and 
also for women who ended sexual relations with men for 
'political' reasons, and who may or may not have sex with other 
women. This reflected a conviction that heterosexual sex 
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reflected in microcosm gendered power politics played out in the 
wider social sphere, and for the interim one could only truly 
liberate women by liberating oneself from sexual relations with 
men altogether. Such a view is problematical for feminists who 
felt that heterosexuality 
- 
ill-defined as it is 
- 
could be 
reformed from within. As it is, a call for the rejection of male 
lovers on political grounds, in favour of female lovers or 
celibacy, implies that the women's right to choose her sexual 
orientation might metamorphose into no real choice at all within 
a radical feminist world view. Feminists who retained their 
sexual ties to men were afraid of being accused of acting in bad 
faith and shielding the enemy, rather than exposing him to the 
consequences of men's past atrocities against women. Although 
very few feminists explicitly called for all women to reject men, 
the elision of discussions around politically appropriate forms 
of sexual desire fostered the common conception that there was a 
correct form of sexual response - even though feminists had only 
really got as far as identifying the negative effects of the 
prevailing patriarchal ideology of heterosexuality. It seems 
that in the sphere of sexual relations at least, women found it 
difficult to collapse the public and private spheres, and were 
enraged by what they regarded as the coerciveness of manifestos 
such as 'The Woman Identified Woman'. 47 Such a conflict is 
expressed by a respondent in an interview conducted by Anne Koedt 
in 1971: 
Many feminists are now beginning to at least 
theoretically consider the fact that there's no reason 
why one shouldn't love a woman. But I think that a 
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certain kind of experimentation going on now with 
lesbianism can be really bad. Because even if you do 
ideologically think that it is perfectly fine 
- 
well, 
that's a political position; but being able to love 
somebody is a very personal and private thing as 
well 
... 
48 
Despite a commitment towards politicizing the personal, many 
women wanted to draw the line at a policing of sexual practices, 
which was often perceived as an invasion of a sphere of privacy. 
that should be demarcated as beyond even sexual politics. 
Heterosexual women were often antagonistic to lesbian feminist 
writings on sexuality, although happier with Adrienne Rich's 
potentially more moderate conception of the 
woman-identified-woman, which could suggest a lesbian bonding, 
but was mainly interpreted as an exhortation for women to give 
support to each other rather than drain all their energies in 
total emotional investments in men. In other words, few took up 
Rich and others' call to interrogate heterosexuality in the light 
of constructions of sexual desire and pleasure, preferring rather 
to analyse its effects outside of this domain - via the 
institution of marriage, the availability of contraception and so 
forth. 
One slogan 
- 
'Feminism is the theory; lesbianism is the 
practice' 
- 
reputedly first coined by Ti-Grace Atkinson49 - 
exemplifies a deepening rift between some radicals and the main 
body of heterosexual feminists, in its uncompromising link 
between a feminist political identity and a lesbian sexual one. 
And such a position - undoubtedly a minority one - was used to 
suggest that feminism was necessarily prescriptive in its 
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delineation of appropriate forms of sexual response. The notion 
of a correct political identity which encompasses women's most 
private lives caused heated controversy in the movement, and 
still does. Many feminists might accept that as an institution, 
heterosexuality warrants deeper scrutiny, but that this should 
not affect women's 'right' to retain the sexual 'preference' of 
heterosexuality. The breadth of disagreement surrounding the 
issue of sexuality highlighted it as a real theoretical and 
political problem for feminism. If you could identify 'bad sex' 
in the form of power plays of dominance and submission and 
reliance on penetration in heterosexual behaviour, then it is 
implied that one must set the terms for 'good' non-exploitative 
sex. Some straight feminists reacted to criticism of their own 
bad faith by arguing that many lesbians mimicked traditional sex 
role definitions, particularly in butch/femme roleplay, and were 
therefore equally inauthentic in their open parody of male/female 
power axes, and lesbian sexuality itself was gradually rendered 
vulnerable to extensive criticism. 30 
Sheila Jeffreys, a revolutionary feminist who has had a 
significant impact upon feminist thinking during the 1980s and 
1990s, perhaps exemplifies the most uncompromising position on 
what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate forms of sexual 
behaviour, including lesbianism. Jeffreys paints a harshly 
essentialist view of male sexual impulses, where the male is 
predator, whose penetration of the female necessarily and always 
connotes colonization and aggression. 51 The more common position 
adopted by lesbian feminists from the seventies to the present, 
is characterized by their struggle to make heterosexual feminists 
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confront their own homophobia; particularly in some feminists' 
paranoic fear of a lesbian takeover within the ranks. Straight 
feminists often rather wilfully ignored the fact of their 
tendency to 'masculinize' sex; to conduct discussions solely 
around the arena of sexual violence, pornography and 
contraception, and to block debates around female desire and 
sexual pleasure. Meanwhile lesbian feminists pursued a 
commitment to explore lesbian sexuality and its expression 
- 
the 
resulting debates often causing rifts and conflict, revealing a 
painful tension between concepts of sex as an expression of one's 
own personal desires, and sexuality as a political battleground 
for both feminists and the gay movement. 
In retrospect, it seems that heterosexual feminists 
exaggerated the takeover threat of the 'separatist' tendency, 
perhaps because debates about sex created real, but futile, fears 
that each feminist in her private life did not act ethically; 
futile in that such demands contributed to the popular 
consciousness that feminism was an ultimately tyrannical form of 
orthodoxy. Anne Koedt, in her essay 'Lesbianism and Feminism' 
(1971) attacks what she sees as prescriptive tendencies among 
radical lesbian feminists as a perversion of 'the personal is 
political': 'While it is true that there are political 
implications in everything a woman qua woman experiences, it is 
not therefore true that a woman's life is the political property 
of the woman's movement. '52 
Adrienne Rich's famous essay 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and 
Lesbian Existence' (1980) was one of the earliest attempts to 
analyse the effects of heterosexuality as an institution, which 
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taints women's lives, whatever their sexual orientation, and 
which constitutes a major aspect of women's experience of social 
and sexual reality. Moreover, she accurately pinpoints an area 
of neglect by feminists: that of heterosexual sex itself, and the 
normalizing processes that strengthen its centrality and allow it 
to seem too 'natural' and obvious to demand definition and 
categorization in the way that 'deviant' sexual practices do. 
Since much of the rhetoric of the modern feminist movement is 
arranged around notions of 'choice' or 'freedom', Rich's analysis 
of heterosexuality as a compulsory practice is challenging: 
Feminist theory can no longer afford merely to voice a 
toleration of 'lesbianism' as an 'alternative life style' 
or make token allusion to lesbians. A feminist critique 
of compulsory heterosexual orientation for women is long 
overdue 
.3 
Seeming to concur with the findings of Michel Foucault and 
Jeffrey Weeks, Rich identifies the problem of male sexuality as 
not limited to their predilection for penetration, but something 
that as an expression of male power amounts to 'a pervasive 
cluster of forces, ranging from physical brutality to control of 
consciousness'. 54 Rich gestures towards a consideration of the 
ideological impact of dominant definitions of sexuality and their 
entrenchment within the master discourses of Western patriarchal 
social reality; but it is a theme which has only latterly been 
developed. 
Feminists of the 1970s, because of their forthright views on 
sex, tended to be perceived by outsiders as either sexually 
available women ('liberated' from chastity) or prudes (liberated 
I- 
- 
277 
- 
from sex altogether); but the problem of female sexuality and the 
means by which to redefine it positively became an increasingly 
thorny one in the eighties and nineties, and the prudish image of 
feminism has held sway. Few feminists dared to suggest a 
possibility of a future where everyone was 'bisexual', in face of 
internal debates about sexual identity, even though most believed 
in theory that current sexual identities were socially 
constructed and therefore up for redefinition. Shulamith 
Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex (1970) does display her deep 
conviction that humankind is innately bisexual, and her 
bio-technologized utopia predicts a period of total sexual 
freedom (including the abolition of incest taboos and childhood 
sexual repression), particularly in her proposed removal of the 
link between procreation and sexual intercourse in the era of the 
text tube baby. In common with many early feminists, she 
believes that sex roles can be transformed by a transformation of 
sexual behaviour, although her assurance that 'a revolutionary in 
every bedroom 
- 
cannot f ail to shake up the status quo' 
, 
S4 had not 
caused any tremors in the world order by the time the New Right 
moral reaction began to be felt in the 1980s. 
DEBATES AROUND SEXUAL IDENTITY 
- 
THE 1980s-90s 
Recently, feminists have viewed the early years of Women's 
Liberation and the Sexual Revolution with a colder eye, and 
sexuality, a subject which always underpinned the central 
precepts of feminism, has become subject to more intense 
theoretical scrutiny. Questions of pleasure, desire and 
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difference were foregrounded, and many theorists became 
dissatisfied with what they regarded as the simplistic analytical 
premises of the early Second Wave where it was often assumed that 
there was a one-to-one relationship between images of women and 
female oppression. Most notably this has led to intense rifts 
around the area of pornography, where some women would argue that 
sexualized images of women can be renegotiated in a way that is 
empowering and self-determining. In the past, talking about sex 
in feminist terms meant talking about anything but the dread act 
itself; to simply address the 'problem' of sex might risk 
reaffirming the status of women in Western society as primarily 
'sex objects', defined by lack (of a penis/power). Feminists, 
after all, had campaigned for a women's right to complete access 
to human relations in personal and social terms; and this had to 
involve, to some degree, a decentring of' the image of woman as 
sex object. 
In fact, by the 1980s, feminists were becoming rapidly more 
conscious that earlier arguments about 'true' female identity 
might equate all. too closely with the old patriarchal analysis of 
feminine 'weakness'. It was on the whole easier to emphasize the 
non-violent, emotional aspects of femininity as positive than it 
was to address the image of a liberated woman with an even 
sprinkling of 'masculinity' - including sexual acquisitiveness. 
To address the problems at the core of definitions of female 
sexuality, begged an openness about how women really perceived 
and conducted their sexual relationships, as opposed to the 
mythologies that surrounded this area, and which feminists seem 
to have internalized along the way. Changing definitions of 
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female sexuality were sorely required, and were directly related 
to projections of what a feminist future might hold. 
Often to talk about sexuality was to talk not about sex 
at all, but about relationships, about life styles, about 
emotions. The word 'sexuality' went wider, in any case, 
than sex: 'sex' referred to acts and the engagement in 
practices; 'sexuality' was about identity and gender, 
about masculine and feminine, about desire, fantasy, and 
the whole construction of the self. 56 
Certainly there have recently been more articles about desire and 
pleasure, especially through the channels of French feminisms and 
psychoanalytic theory. Nonetheless Anglo-American feminists 
found supreme difficulties in reconciling a political position 
which aimed to reinvent a social reality, with a stance that 
engaged with sexuality at more than a high theoretical level, and 
which often simply alienated women who might be seeking guidance 
about the politics of their own desires. 
The central theoretical position of' Jeffrey Weeks and Michel 
Foucault 
- 
that sexuality was bounded and defined by social and 
cultural meanings - was embraced by many feminist theorists. 
Such a view appeared to provide a shifting perspective where 
change might be negotiated, and the fusion of female sexuality 
within the parameters of reproduction and domestic servicing 
could be fruitfully exposed as a construction deeply entrenched 
in Western medico-juridico-political discourse. only once the 
interdependencies between these forms of discourse and their 
utilization can be made, can the seeming fixity and naturalness 
of the view of female sexuality as simply complementary - 
the 
passive obverse to a male sexuality which becomes the central 
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determinant of definitions of human sexual response 
- 
be exposed. 
Such theorists challenge essentialist views of sex, seeing the 
notion of sexuality as a fluid concept, an historical construct, 
which to be analysed effectively needs to be broken down into 
social categories of class/race/gender differentiation, the role 
of the state, and analysis of discourses (e. g. medical, legal, 
religious) which have sought to control and therefore determine 
sexuality. They assert that sexuality, therefore, is not simply 
descriptive, referring to the quality of being 'sexual' in human 
beings, it is more ominously prescriptive. At one level 
sexuality is seen as a force which demands gratification as an 
individual's desires and needs, yet these longings become 
incorporated into the social fabric and transformed in 
'appropriate' forms of sexual behaviour (usually genital 
intercourse between men and women). The myth of sexuality in its 
current usage is that it affords the individual liberation 
through free expression of her/his desires: it is a myth because 
these desires are mediated through a powerful ideological image 
of 'good' and 'bad' (usually non-productive) forms of sexual 
relations, sanctioned or prohibited in social relations. Viewed 
as a site of symbolic enactment of unequal power relations, 
female sexuality can be defined as having nothing to 'add' to 
that of the male; and the masculinized hegemony of definitions of 
sexuality is maintained. 
Sheila Jeffreys, in Anticlimax, is resistant to the position 
held by Weeks et al., and suggests that current feminist 
adoptions of analogous positions is part of a 
'libertarian 
backlash' against the critiques of pornography and sexual 
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violence initiated by the Women's Movement. She goes so far as 
to suggest that 'in the 1980s women's liberation has been 
hijacked by the sexual libertarians who are devoted to persuading 
women that the enthusiastic celebration of our oppression in 
sadomasochism is the same thing as liberation. 'S7 For Jeffreys, 
heterosexuality embodies and gives meaning to the sadomasochistic 
role-play of dominance and submission, in whatever context it is 
conducted 
- 
hence it necessarily interfaces with broader social 
relations of power at more than a symbolic level. She denies 
that there may currently be any distinction between 
heterosexuality as an institution which shapes sexological, 
medical and political discourse, and heterosexuality as a 
definition of desire between members of' the opposite sex 
- 
no 
matter whether in the future this might be determined along more 
egalitarian lines. Many feminists would agree with her assertion 
that 'sex as we know it under male supremacy is the eroticized 
power difference of heterosexuality', 38 but few would be 
currently willing to accept that only an outright rejection of 
heterosexuality as a form of object choice would pave the way for 
a feminist revolution. Her analysis of the effects of 
sexological research and sex therapy can, however, be acute and 
enlightening; as she points out, if it is accepted that sexuality 
is socially constructed, then the chief function of sex therapy 
as a curative process is that of social control. It would not be 
fair to suggest that sex therapy onl performs the function of 
social control; but it clearly has the capacity to project a 
model of appropriate sexual appetite and performance against 
which individual performances and choices can be gauged. 
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Jeffreys, in short, views all forms of discourse around sexual 
liberation 
- 
whether it be sexology, sexual therapy, pornography, 
or a new wave of sexually explicit literature engendered in the 
1960s, as perpetuating a male model of sexual normality and an 
apologetic for male dominance in all areas of private and public 
life. In this context she makes the reasonable point that sexual 
libertarianism can seem to reaffirm the public/private 
distinction 
- 
that anything goes for consenting adults 
- 
whereas 
feminism needs to interrogate such a divide because it fosters 
other forms of inequality. 59 The gay liberation movement is 
itself viewed as being hijacked by gay men who, Jeffreys 
maintains, subsumed and negated lesbian sexuality (and with it 
feminist egalitarian values) in an eroticization of difference 
within same-sex relationships 
- 
'As men gays receive the same 
socialization as do heterosexual men. Dominance and submission 
are eroticized for them too. '60 This leads me to identify one 
singular flaw in Jeffreys' argument. Having implied that 
heterosexual socialization taints all male sexual response, and 
therefore indicating that all individuals, regardless of sexual 
orientation collude or resist, but necessarily act within a 
'hetero-reality', she appears to deny that lesbians might also be 
susceptible to the erotic symbolization of power play in their 
sexual lives. 
This is where Jeffreys' work is at its most unsatisfactory; 
having concurred with other sexual theorists that sexuality is a 
social construct which enforces a set of norms that have a 
dubious bearing on biological imperatives, she isolates 
lesbianism as in its 'pure' form untainted by such networks of 
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dominance and power. She highlights what are assumed to be 
predominant forms of gay male sexual behaviour such as 
'cruising', 'cottaging' and habitual promiscuity, setting this 
against statistics provided by the Kinsey Institute to show that 
lesbians do not tend to cruise, and prefer instead long-term 
commitments. 61 The central problem here is that she uses such 
information to appear to claim that there are essential 
differences between the behaviour of gay men and women, although 
one of course could equally argue that each group is responding 
to the socializing tendencies of a heterosexual institution which 
endorses different attitudes to sex and emotional commitment 
along gendered lines, and which must also inform the way 
homosexuals develop their own specific social environments 
- 
where, for example, bar culture is more commonly an entrenched 
and acceptable outlet for male recreation. 
Not only does Jeffreys attack gay men and heterosexuals, but 
also particular forms of lesbian sexual expression, such as 
butch/femme role-play, and especially sadomasochism. For her, 
sadomasochism is a practice embedded in gay male sexuality, 
something which some lesbians have adopted, despite Jeffreys' 
personal conviction that 's/m ideology is in contradiction to the 
most cherished precepts of feminism'. 62 Unfortunately she is at 
all times loath to outline what her view of central feminist 
precepts are 
- 
all we know is that she abhors any reproduction of 
socially defined inequalities of power within sexual 
relationships. What Jeffreys' own precepts are and how she 
envisages a future feminist political stance on appropriate forms 
of sexuality is difficult to determine, except to say that she 
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perceives all forms of sexual relationships 
- 
apart from 
so-called 'vanilla' lesbian sex 
- 
as tainted by powerplay 
politics. She implies that male heterosexual urges are informed 
by violent and aggressive feelings towards women, ineluctably 
informed by their perception of their own ruling class status 
(here all men regardless of race and class are seen as possessing 
equal measures of this). 
Of course most feminists would agree that women's social 
experiences of violence and harassment colour their perceptions 
of sex, but this view can be shaped to quite different ends 
- 
other than condemning all heterosexual practices as essentially 
determined by violence and exploitation. Undoubtedly pornography 
in its current form is perceived by many as exclusively 
structured by preconceptions of the nature of the male sex drive, 
and it informs many men's attitudes to women in a sexual context. 
Research on the relationship between pornography and acts of 
sexual violence has never been conclusive, and many have decided 
that although pornography can 'educate' men in ways to abuse 
women, to argue that this directly incites acts of violence is 
probably not the most effective way to redefine pornography. 
Many contemporary feminists prefer instead to contrast the images 
of women portrayed in mainstream pornography with other dominant 
images of women, which also speak volumes about the presumed 
social/sexual status of women. 63 
The main problem with Anticlimax is that Jeffreys' arguments 
are inconsistent and draw upon both biological and cultural 
considerations. On many issues she is incisive - for example 
that libertarian approaches to sexuality effectively block the 
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development of a political interrogation of sexuality: if the 
premise is that one's private pleasures are sacrosanct, then 
there is no space to proscribe certain practices, which may well 
not involve the full consent of both parties 
- 
for example 
paedophilia. Nonetheless her consequent dismissal of writers 
such as Foucault and Weeks as libertarians themselves is 
debatable, since neither of them appear to have a clear 
investment in retaining the public/private divide as it now 
operates, or to perceive this as individually liberating. In her 
concluding chapter, Jeffreys' own position becomes clearer; as a 
revolutionary feminist she believes that lesbianism is an 
important political strategy for women to end their 
subordination, and any view of an egalitarian future for 
heterosexuals and gay men is deferred, on the grounds that we 
cannot predict what choices people would make in such a 
situation. 
Jeffrey weeks sees the discourses around sexuality as much 
more complex and contradictory, and in Sexuality and its 
Discontents (1985), whilst acknowledging that sexological 
thinking has contributed to modern meanings of sexuality, argues 
that their theoretical work is far too heterogeneous to be simply 
dismissed as a vehicle for greater social control. It remains a 
vital component of our existing definitions of the boundaries of 
desire, and although it may need to be rejected, its contribution 
and its terms of reference need firstly to be re-examined. 64 In 
fact, in the radical feminist reaction against the male-oriented 
rhetoric of the Sexual Revolution, he perceives the risk of a 
peculiar coalition of interests with its 'ideological enemies in 
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feeding the new puritanism of our time'. 65 This is the kind of 
accusation that Jeffreys objects to, but does little to reject by 
outlining a future agenda for increased freedom to negotiate 
one's own sexual choices. Weeks denies Jeffreys' inference that 
sexual libertarianism has depoliticized the feminist agenda, 
arguing instead that 'the contemporary political agenda on sexual 
issues is being written not by the libertarian left but by the 
moral right. '66 Jeffreys cites the former as the enemy and Weeks 
the latter; and for feminists in general there may well be a 
pressing need to seek a new discursive ground divorced from both. 
The Right is associated with moral crusading, the Left with 
libertarianism, and yet both associations are with conventional 
mainstream political demarcations, which make little sense for 
feminist theorists in the wake of their destabilizing of the 
agendas of the mainstream parliamentary system. Libertarianism 
and moralism are both features of an old patriarchal order; 
arguably what most feminists seek is an ethics of sexuality -a 
consensus of definitions around this area that neither leads to 
prescriptiveness nor to the myths that sex has got nothing to do 
with other aspects of our social lives. For women this has never 
been the case; and as long as sexuality has bearing on the 
processes of reproduction it never will. 
Weeks himself suggests by the logic of his own argument that 
there has to be some form of social ethics in our consideration 
of the construction of human sexuality, if we are to avoid a 
libertarianism that implicitly argues that we should be freed as 
individuals to pursue our own sexual choices on the grounds of 
natural self expression - 'We need, therefore, to tear open the 
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assumptions which lock us into conflicting views about what is 
natural or unnatural, true or false, right or wrong. '67 Later he 
states that: 
It clearly cannot be the case that all manifestations of 
non-orthodox sexuality are equally valid; that no real 
distinctions can be made. To argue that 'anything goes' 
is to fall back into an easy libertarianism which ignores 
questions of power and the quality of relationships. 68 
Surely this indicates a need for a more general overview of how a 
theory of sexuality 
- 
of appropriate and inappropriate forms of' 
sexual behaviour 
- 
dominates Western consciousness of sexual 
difference in men and women, and extends far beyond the 
biological, and even beyond observations of' what we do in bed. 
Theories of sexual response embrace much more than an 
individual's expression of desire, or need for gratification; a 
person's sexuality, whether they are heterosexual, homosexual, 
transsexual, auto-erotic, etc., comes to define their very 
essence. 
CONCLUSION 
Feminist theorists have begun to recognize the pitt'alls of' a 
position which tends to cast female sexual responses in purely 
negative terms, as shaped and defined by the dominant male 
imperative. However, the connections that have been made between 
sexological and psychoanalytical descriptions of human sexuality, 
and the enactment of such notions of' difference at the level of 
social relations have been crucial to the development of" feminist 
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thought, and the value of this enterprise should not be 
underestimated. Nonetheless, at present Anglo-American feminist 
explorations into the realms of female desire are still too 
dependent on patriarchal representations of' sexuality. Even if 
this dependency only perversely manifests itself' as a rejection 
of such representations, it blocks attempts to signal a way 
forward for feminism, and sometimes 
- 
as in the case of Sheila 
Jeffreys 
- 
marks a retreat into dubious truth claims around an 
authentic female nature. Jeffrey Weeks pinpoints such a retreat 
as a significant danger within contemporary theories of 
sexuality: 'Sex exists today in a moral vacuum. In the 
resulting confusion and uncertainty there is a temptation to 
retreat into the old verities of "Nature" or to search for new 
truths and certainties, a new absolutism. '69 Weeks suggests that 
those who do not accept the challenge of a new (politicized) 
libertarianism which decentres the family form as the purveyor of' 
social norms, are frightened of the possible moral chaos outside 
its parameters. I would argue that sexuality is such a minefield 
for feminists that perhaps they recognize a need to construct 
quite well-defined models of" appropriate forms of sexual 
expression to prevent a perpetuation of* male definitions of 
sexuality outside the existing familial organization. 
Once sex is scrutinized in relation to its social meanings we 
can identify a proliferation of' sexualities contained within the 
consensual reality of heterosexuality, most of' which are negated 
by prevailing structures of power. Michel Foucault argues that 
'sex is placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, 
permitted and forbidden'; '° for feminists it seems abundantly 
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clear that in relation to sex, power is additionally organized 
around the binarist meanings ascribed to gender difference in 
psychoanalytical and sexological thought. This crucial binary is 
largely ignored by writers like Foucault and Weeks, and yet just 
as we act upon our knowledge of' the licit and illicit, any sexual 
utopia is hampered by the concretizing in discourses of power, of 
the notion that two sexes act upon completely separate sexual and 
emotional economies in their responses. Foucault's observation 
that 'in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut 
off the head of' the king', 7' has a particular resonance for 
feminists in their analysis of' the perpetuation of gendered power 
relationships. To extend the analogy, to cut off the king's head 
finally. there is nothing to be gained by simply replacing the 
head of the queen: we still need to heed his laws and understand 
the maintenance of his sovereignty in order to subvert them, 
which engages us in a seemingly incontrovertible double-bind. 
For example Freudian discourse. as reassessed by feminists, 
reveals its own points of' fragility, its own radical 
inconsistencies which has facilitated feminist enquiry in 
thwarting some of the more tenacious truth-claims around sexual 
response. 
For most mainstream feminists, heterosexuality as a sexual 
'choice', as an institution, as an instrument of coercion - in 
whatever guise it appears in the field of human sexual response - 
is resolutely avoided as a topic of debate. The attempts by 
early radical feminists to encourage women to understand their 
own bodies and to explore their own sensual feelings are not 
pursued today in any refined form; generally such activities are 
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simply treated to an embarrassed silence, and the issue of' sex is 
elided 
- 
not surprisingly, confirming the fears of' sexual 
radicals that feminism has the potential for a strong puritan 
streak. As I suggested earlier, lesbian feminists have had a 
much more extensive engagement with these areas; and as much as 
they have addressed the demonization of' lesbianism and 
homosexuality in general, they have in addition attempted a 
critique of heterosexuality and its part (as institution) in 
women's oppression. Sheila Jeffreys has gone as far as to 
suggest a one-to-one correlation between lesbianism and feminism. 
stressing that lesbianism is the only political choice for women, 
thereby conflating the issues of desire and sexual choice with 
that. of an appropriate political/personal stance. Such a 
position effectively blocks further discussion by heterosexual 
feminists, who might be forgiven for feeling automatically 
accused of' 'inauthenticity', and declining to enter into such 
debates. Such a deadlock risks a perpetuation of the popular 
belief* that feminists are prescriptive and tyrannical, and 
perhaps a little too moralistic about sexuality. Conversely, 
Beatrix Campbell argues that: 
Heterosexuality has to feature in our politics as more 
than a guilty secret; indeed, in order that women 
mobilize any political combativity around it, it must be 
restored as a legitimate part of' feminism's concern. It 
is, after all, the primary sexual practice of' most women. 
It also needs to be present to help clarify lesbianism's 
place within feminism. 72 
As Campbell hints above, lesbian explorations into female 
sexuality remain the most far-reaching available within feminist 
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discourse 
- 
to the point where lesbian feminists are assumed to 
have forcibly occupied a position of moral superiority in 
relation to their 'guilty' heterosexual sisters. However, it is 
evident that essays such as Rich's 'Compulsory Heterosexuality 
and Lesbian Existence' were sustained attempts to enable 
heterosexual feminists to take the opportunity to relinquish 
their status as guilty 'bad girls', and seriously engage with the 
ramifications of their own sexual choice. in other areas of 
feminist investigation it is clear that a lesbian or black 
perspective is still lamentably regarded as the minority one, 
suggesting that white heterosexual women have tended to leave the 
'problem' of sexual orientation to lesbians, just as there is a 
tendency to place the 'problem' of race firmly in the laps of 
black feminists. This indicates a marked reluctance on the part 
of 'mainstream' feminists to focus on issues which demand further 
scrutiny of' many women's most deeply-held prejudices. 
To continue to ignore the problem of female sexuality implies 
that heterosexual women retain an investment in heterosexuality 
as the norm, as well as indicating a wish to avoid areas of' 
debate where differences between groups of' women are at their 
most obvious. As Jana Sawicki argues, for white radical 
feminists, 'sexual freedom is construed negatively as freedom 
from male dominated institutions whose elements are crystallized 
in pornography, particularly in its sadomasochistic varieties': '13 
and the problem with this model of- female sexuality is that it is 
resistant but not transgressive. Lesbian sexuality is held, at 
best, as the 'moral conscience' of feminism and at worst its 
scourge - either way such ascriptions are only intelligible when 
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it is assumed that both lesbianism and heterosexuality comprise 
two distinct but singular forms of' sexual expression. The recent 
theoretical splintelings of lesbian feminism into a multitude of* 
sexual identities 
- 
not. all of which are held to be conducive to 
the mythology of a homogeneous 'feminist community' 
- 
has further 
divided feminist accounts of female sexual response. Lesbian 
advocates of butch/femme and sadomasochistic eroticism have 
questioned the relevance of' the old binary of vaginal versus 
clitoral pleasure, arguing that the notion of' pleasure as lying 
within anatomical or sexological definitions is a specious one. 
It is contended that sexual 'identities' can themselves be 
parodied and freely interchanged in a new assertion of 
transgressive oppositional sexual behaviour. Although debates 
about the veracity of the adoption of' such subject positions has 
resulted in much acrimony, the resulting critiques signal a new 
departure for feminist approaches to sexuality and subjectivity, 
which perhaps owes much of its dynamism to feminism's relatively 
recent engagement with discourses of postmodernism. 74 
Feminist theorists are beginning to review dearly-held beliefs 
about the path of' female sexual revolution, and are no longer 
confident in the binaries they themselves produced - for example 
that either sex equalled sexism, or lesbian sex per se equalled a 
radical or revolutionary political stance. Now that heterosexual 
feminists are also beginning to investigate the areas of' desire 
and pleasure within and outside a psychoanalytical model, it is 
probable that a whole constellation of warring (hetero)sexual 
identities will be born. Perhaps it will not be long before the 
butch or sadomasochistic heterosexual women will emerge from her 
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guilty closet. This is not. to suggest that, existing critiques of 
sexual violence, sexual objectification and patriarchal 
hetero-reality should be subordinated to the utopian search for a 
language and representation of' desire. Rather that such 
critiques be interpreted as an effort to locate another missing 
piece of the jigsaw in feminism's current political agenda. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IDD TITY CRISIS?: MEN IN FEMINISM, POSTMODERNISM/'POST-FEMINISM' 
Our language, intellectual history, and social forms are 
'gendered'; there is no escape from this fact and from 
its consequences on our lives. Some of those 
consequences may be unintended, may even be fiercely 
resisted; our deepest desire may be to 'transcend gender 
dualities'; to not have our behaviour categorized as 
'male' or 'female'. But, like it or not, in our present 
culture, our activities are coded as 'male' or 'female' 
and will function as such within the prevailing system of 
gender-power relations. The adoption of the 
'professional' standards of academia is no more an 
activity devoid of gender politics than the current 
fashion in women's tailored suits and largely shouldered 
jackets is devoid of gender meaning. One cannot be 
'gender neutral' in this culture. ' 
Around the mid-eighties in academic circles a 'crisis' in 
feminism seemed to have been consensually acknowledged: the 
subject of feminism's differences of opinion was beginning to 
seem the most crucial in an era of critical retrospectives and 
summaries. Those dominant 'strands' in feminist thought, which I 
have referred to extensively in Chapters One to Three, were 
marking their territory and consolidating their own 
methodological boundaries, and the impact of French 
psychoanalytic theory was changing the terms of feminist 
theoretical debate in the Anglo-American sphere. Radical 
feminism was increasingly vilified in British socialist feminist 
circles, and in America feminist radicalism had become associated 
with a narrower 'cultural feminist' position, which signalled a 
return to the celebration of the 'feminine', albeit from a 
woman-centred perspective. Socialist feminists were themselves 
more regularly defining their own political stance in terms of a 
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departure from Marxist orthodoxy. Black and lesbian feminists 
were identifying themselves as organized groupings on the basis 
of race or sexual orientation, using much of their energies to 
signal the most grievous sins of white, bourgeois heterosexual 
feminists. Perhaps their combined critiques 
- 
more than any 
others 
- 
exposed the partial and exclusionary nature of the 
category of 'gender' as it had been used in other elements of 
feminist thought. Each grouping or 'strand', having been called 
upon to define its terms and its place within the matrix of 
feminism as a whole, seemed to settle into degrees of theoretical 
autonomy that eschewed any comprehensive attachment to 
male-oriented thought. However, by the latter half of the 
eighties, the question of male alliances 
- 
whether it be the 
entry of men into feminist thought as contributors and teachers, 
or the forging of liaisons with an increasingly sophisticated 
postmodernist lobby 
- 
returned as perhaps the single most 
pressing debate of recent years. 
Many theorists were at pains to demonstrate feminism's 
compatibility with postmodernist theory in signalling the end of 
modernity and its humanist account of individuality; they also 
offered a very significant critique of feminism - namely, its 
tenacious reliance upon gender difference as the single most 
important analytical category. This, it was suggested, 
demonstrated a reliance on totalizing and unifying categories -a 
revivification of the binarism that typified Western thought 
within modernity, and a consequently naive, or even regressive 
investment in notions of progress and continuity. While the 
radical potential of feminist contributions to postmodern thought 
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were acknowledged because of their recognized contribution to 
reconceiving Western binarism, it was simultaneously regarded as 
one of 'the flawed grand narratives of modernity'. 2 Grand 
narratives were perceived from a postmodern perspective as 
potentially tyrannical and unhelpfully universalizing, and 
feminism's own meta-narrative of gender was regarded as having 
trapped feminists in ethno/heterocentric truth claims, which no 
longer had any currency in a postmodern world view. Nonetheless, 
it is significant that-postmodernism continues to be determined 
as something other than feminism, so that feminism remains 
contemporary theory's significant other 
-a predictable and 
recurring relationship for feminism to academic thought. From 
the outset, it must therefore be emphasized that those figures 
accorded as having made a significant contribution to the 
development of postmodern perspectives in theory, art and 
literature are male; and feminists are perhaps justified in their 
suspicion that a dispersal of the meanings of gender in such a 
context fairly swiftly amounts to a gender-blindness. In this 
light, a real danger lies in the possibility that in place of 
feminism's analysis of gender, originary meanings of gender 
difference are reinforced. 
Within feminist ranks two points of conflict are currently 
receiving a significant degree of attention: (a) the escalation 
of 'identity politics' within the movement which threatens to 
turn feminist theory into a highly individualized, introverted 
and necessarily fragmented political stance; (b) a recognition 
that 'many feminist ideas become part of the common sense of our 
culture; yet those ideas may be expressed in forms we barely 
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recognize as feminist'. 3 The two points intersect, of course; 
- 
in that whether we recognize a particular stance as feminist 
depends upon our sense of identity within a particular faction. 
Nonetheless, most feminists recognize and are antipathetic to a 
specific appropriation of feminist ideas which is sustained 
within mainstream New Right ideology, identified as 
simultaneously pro-female and pro-family, and which offers itself 
primarily as a stance that recognizes and endorses women's 
current familial location as a position of strength: 
First, it promotes a 'pro-family' stance that views 
sexual politics, and particularly the politicization of 
personal relationships, as threatening to 'the family'. 
Second, it affirms gender differentiation and celebrates 
traditionally feminine qualities, particularly those 
associated with mothering. Finally, the new 
conservatives believe that struggle against male 
domination detracts from political agendas they consider 
more important. 4 
This view of feminism as detracting from the more important 
business of 'real' political enquiry is a familiar one for 
feminists, when we think of the reasons why many disaffected Left 
Wing women established feminist cadres in the late sixties and 
early seventies. 3 Proponents of such a stance often allude to 
the dawnings of a 'post-feminist' age where the worst excesses of 
Second Wave feminism can be discarded in favour of a political 
healing process, where the family can be once again made whole - 
freed from the indecent assaults of a sexual politics which 
denies the sanctity of personal privacy. 
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Perhaps the escalation of 'identity politics' was a 
contributing factor to feminists' general inability to produce a 
concerted response to such attacks, or at least to deny them any 
place in feminist thought. To deny them any currency would after 
all be to enact a tyrannous response to other 'pro-woman' forms 
of thought 
- 
to exacerbate the problem of vying feminist 
identities, and the question of who is 'allowed' to construct 
'authentic' feminist responses to such challenges. Feminism's 
political roots are, after all, multifarious, and any such 
resistance might be seen to mark a precedent, where a feminist 
'mainstream' could be construed as holding an unpalatable amount 
of authority over the utterances of more 'minority' groups. 
Identity politics, of course, need not be interpreted as a 
challenge against tyranny and exclusionism; they might be viewed 
as a positive sign that feminism remains a fluid site of healthy 
debate into the nineties. Nonetheless identity politics, taken 
to its logical extreme, facilitates a cacophony of warring 
feminist voices which can only announce their authority as 
speakers 'for' feminism by referring to the complex nature of 
their own subject positioning, of which being female is the 
lowest of common denominators. The result of such a tendency can 
be 'not to elucidate debate but to fix a woman somewhere along a 
predetermined hierarchy of oppressions in order to justify or 
contest a political opinion by reference to a speaker's 
identity-16 
There are clearly risks in deriving authority as a feminist 
speaker from one's own constellation of personal identities (as 
white, lesbian, working class, etc. ), and a chief danger is to 
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concretize the boundaries between major strands of feminism as if 
they were fixed and immutable, rather than part of a debate which 
has as its shared goal the maintenance of a viable feminist 
contribution at both a localized and wider political context. 
Critiques offered by black and lesbian feminists have, for 
example, been salutory in changing and expanding the terms of 
reference of what was by default a white, heterosexual feminism; 
and the general thrust of this thesis has been to show how the 
acceptance of heterogeneity within the term 'feminism' can be 
beneficial to all women. It is possibly the case that identity 
politics has been construed as fragmentary by white feminists 
because it is their definitions of oppression that have been 
under attack. 
Whether or not this is the case, identity politics were 
prefigured by the notion that 'the personal is political'. The 
primary effects of consciousness raising were arguably to suggest 
that achieving a feminist consciousness is largely a matter of 
finding a position which suits one's own public and personal 
context, which may well give rise 'to a self-righteous assertion 
that if one inhabits a certain identity this gives one the 
legitimate and moral right to guilt trip others into particular 
ways of behaving. '7 Of course consciousness raising was intended 
to be a preamble to collective action; but in the absence of a 
transformation of the social meanings of gender difference, the 
task of consciousness raising has to be repeated with every new 
generation, and in an era of proliferating academic discourses on 
feminism, consciousness raising of sorts can be a useful part of 
pedagogical practice. This can itself be rejuvenating for 
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feminism, and might be practiced in order to forestall the truth 
claims of anti-feminists who would otherwise consign feminism 
unchallenged to the annals of recent history. 
MEN IN FEMINISM 
The mid-eighties signalled a return to an argument that was 
fiercely debated in the late sixties 
- 
the place of men in 
feminist debate. At that time most feminists agreed that women 
needed space and time to develop their own arguments and 
theoretical perspectives, because men 
- 
regardless of the 
benignity of their intentions 
- 
represented the means by which 
female discourse could be/had been absorbed and defused by a 
patriarchal sleight of hand. But now, perhaps by virtue of 
feminism's increasing engagement with critical theory, men felt 
that they had a contribution to offer, as if feminism's 
involvement in new theoretical departures signified a commitment 
to male alliances. Just as feminists had previously exposed the 
male exclusivity of radical discourses such as Marxism, so male 
theorists felt obliged to question feminism's right to female 
exclusivity. Some men were content to use feminism as a point of 
departure to further explore the social construction of 
masculinity; others wanted to engage more directly in the heated 
debates that had come to characterize eighties feminism. The 
latter primarily wanted to demonstrate that they, too, had been 
profoundly affected by the way feminism undercut the 
epistemological foundations of contemporary socio-philosophical 
thought. From a more cynical standpoint, it is important to 
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observe that 
- 
in academic terms 
- 
feminism had come of age, and 
women's studies as a discipline, and as an interventionary 
project within existing disciplines, was a force to be contended 
with. One might suspect that male theorists, looking for new 
theoretical pathways in an increasingly competitive area, 
alighted upon feminism as another mode of' abstract thought which 
might yield new possibilities. 
The anthology Men in Feminism, published in 1987, is an 
example of such a male intervention: in it an almost equal number 
of male and female contributors challenge, posture, agree and 
vilify. The formula was evidently successful, and the dialogue 
aspects of the volume were extended in Linda Kauffman's two later 
volumes, Gender and Theory (1989) and Feminism and Institutions 
(1989). As the 'dialogue' format suggests, the male contributors 
were to some extent framed and moderated by female respondents; 
later male feminists felt able to go it alone, as illustrated by 
the all-male collection, Engendering Men (1990). Joseph A. 
Boone, one of the editors of the latter, reprints his essay, 
which first appeared in Gender and Theory, accompanied by a 
response by Toril Moi. However, he does not refer to her in his 
preamble to the republished piece, relegating all mention of Moi 
to a footnote, which itself carries more than a taint of 
retaliation. 8 
I have not space to interrogate the intentions of all such 
male critics in detail, but I have noticed certain tendencies 
within their writings which are worthy of note. There are two 
main textual strategies commonly utilized by such writers to 
shore up a rhetorical defence that they clearly feel is needed. 
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The first is to focus upon feminism's heterogeneity as a site of 
conflict, to better situate the 'right' of their own work to 
exist within such diversity; the second is to suggest that any 
exclusionism on feminists' part exhibits the increasing tyranny 
of feminist discourse, whose 'leaders' reserve the right to 
prohibit disagreement 
- 
even amongst their own 'kind'. The 
problem with many of these essays is that, such defences aside, 
their relationship to feminist debate is often strictly 
peripheral; one might be forgiven for assuming that one of the 
main objectives for such work is to lay claim to the identity of 
'feminist'. Joseph Boone is one such writer who sees himself as 
a feminist, a claim which engenders the awkward conjunction 
'female feminist' (in addition to 'male feminist') throughout the 
course of his essa: 
are not content to 
why therefore, the 
itself seems to be 
discussion I shall 
that feminists are 
quotation marks to 
y. It is interesting to speculate why such men 
be 'pro-feminist', or 'anti-patriarchal'; and 
question of the 'right' to a feminist identity 
at stake. During the course of this 
assume, as I have done throughout this thesis, 
women, and will indicate 'male feminism' in 
indicate its problematic nature. 
Many 'male feminists' thus use the tenets of early feminism 
against current theorists: they often adopt the 'confessional' 
mode of expression so favoured by radicals, summoning personal 
identities which signal the inadequacies of the homogenizing 
signifier 'man'. For example, Terry Eagleton, in response to an 
article by Elaine Showalter in Men in Feminism, reminds us of 
his 
status as maverick working class Marxist at Cambridge: 
in 
describing his working class arrogance in face of 'bungling, 
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well-intentioned Alisdairs', he all too earnestly reminds us of 
his own cultural 'otherness'. 9 It might seem churlish to object 
to a style so vigorously embraced by earlier Second Wavers, and 
most feminists would agree that masculinity/maleness as 
cultural/biological ascriptions are ripe for reinterpretation; 
but it is worth remembering that this technique proved 
contentious for feminists themselves, where an identity appeared 
to guarantee authority, and preclude dissent. It needs to be 
reiterated that the category 'man' is not the simple obverse of 
'woman': 'man' the homogenizing identity for half the human 
population at least guaranteed cultural/social/economic 
visibility for white heterosexual men; whereas generic 'man' 
- 
the subject of Western epistemological being 
- 
denied material 
and ideological privileges to all women for centuries. The 
central question must be, if feminism is to remain a politics as 
well as a polemic, an oppositional strategy as well as a 
discursive explosion, what are the political consequences of 
'male feminism''? This question is an ethical one ranging from 
the issue of whether the woman's voice will again be suppressed 
in favour of the male authoritative one, to whether in the 
academic institution (the last bastion of feminism's growth) 
women's tenure 
- 
even in the 'ghetto' of women's studies - will 
face renewed threat. 
Tania Modleski sees the threat not only in co-option, but in 
the trivializing of feminist agendas - 'these books are bringing 
men back to centre stage and diverting feminists from tasks more 
pressing than deciding about the appropriateness of the label 
"feminist" for men. '10 In addition she remarks on the 
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heterosexism underpinning the notion of a dialogue between men 
and women, 11 accompanied by the tacit assumption that 'dialogue' 
can herald a sense of formal equality between men and women 
(including the even balance of contributors in terms of gender), 
which clearly does not often exist in either the academic scene 
or the world at large. The problem with the writings of 'male 
feminists' might, after all, be more pragmatic. What casts them 
as such an irritant to feminist theorists such as myself is 
precisely the sheer degree of textual space and effort they 
devote to questioning the terms upon which they may enter 
feminism, whilst effectively blocking any response by identifying 
ways in which feminists denying them free access to feminist 
theory would be tyrannical, constructing artificial boundaries 
around feminism which are counter-productive. 
Much of' the work I have referred to in this thesis has been 
more in the business of breaking down the boundaries of male 
discourse, the better to create a mode of speech which is, for 
political and academic purposes, female-specific. I cannot help 
suspecting that current 'male feminists' are attempting to do the 
reverse 
- 
although of' course a reversal of roles presupposes at 
least that those positions are of different but equal value. For 
many men it seems to be a question of who 'owns' feminism - an 
issue subliminally contested among vying groups of feminists 
themselves 
- 
although the chief outcome has been to move away 
from the rhetoric of ownership altogether, into a position of 
celebration and acceptance of heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity 
seems to be the hardest issue for men in feminism to accept - as 
it is a position which involves an acknowledgement of the 
-305- 
dispersal of feminisms far beyond poststructuralist theorizing. 
According to Paul Smith, 'the intellectual task of understanding 
feminist theory is not a problem since feminist theory is 
situated within the array of poststructuralist discourses with 
which many of us are now perhaps over-familiar. 112 For many 
feminists this remark poses two immediate points of contention: 
(a) that feminist theory resides within poststructuralism, a 
tendency dominated by male 'greats'; (b) that, this being the 
case, and male theorists being 'over-familiar' with its 
methodology, the problem of men in feminist theory is assuredly 
not one of lack of understanding. Indeed, Smith's construction 
places feminist theory 'in men', and, further, outlaws or 
disavows other wings of feminism, so that we might be forgiven 
for wondering whether this fairly recent male theoretical 
interest in feminism is not spawned primarily by its seeming 
'marriage' with poststructuralism. 
Nonetheless 'men have a necessary relation to feminism', as 
Stephen Heath points out, 13 if men are supposed to be equally 
changed by its precepts. As Judith Mayne observes, "'men in 
feminism" is hardly a new formulation'; 14 feminists in the main 
have assumed as part of their task the necessity of raising the 
consciousness of both men and women. What distinguishes this 
'dialogue', then, is its theoretical dimension; and its male 
proponents might well be repeating one of the early errors of 
Second Wave pioneers in assuming that they can speak for all men. 
This implies that feminism's major problem is other feminists - 
not women, and certainly not 'men' (as they represent themselves 
in these debates as only too willing to learn and admire). 
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Joseph Boone takes up the point of the identity of the 'men' that 
speak in Men in Feminism in his contribution to Gender and Theory 
- 
'Of seven added contributors, Jacques Derrida, Robert Scholes, 
Denis Donoghue (in small print), and Terry Eagleton (in a reply 
to Showalter) 
- 
critics whose relation to feminism has never 
been, to risk understatement, unproblematic''5 
- 
by suggesting 
that the importation of the 'big' names in theory militates 
against the serious consideration of 'male feminists' such as 
himself whose intentions/interventions are entirely honourable. 
Unusually he pinpoints the heterosexism which has accompanied 
such projects, asserting that, 'a recognition of the presence and 
influence of gay men working in and around feminism has the 
potential of rewriting feminist fears about "men in feminism" as 
a strictly heterosexual gesture of appropriation. '16 Laudable as 
this observation may be, in identifying gay men as holding a 
possible key to solving the problem of men's possibly unwelcome 
attentions to feminism, Boone implicitly identifies the problem 
as lying in feminists'17 fears of symbolic penetration of their 
discourse. By another sleight of hand he ignores the reality 
that lesbians have long been exposing feminist's mainstream 
heterosexism in woman-to-woman debates quite effectively. In 
seeming to posit feminism's nascent homophobia as part of the 
problem, Boone unwittingly inserts his own gyno-homo-phobia 
into 
his argument. 
For the present it might be advisable to leave this argument 
floating, the better to underpin the following section on 
postmodernist feminism; I shall simply attempt to summarize 
the 
debate so far. My own antagonism to many aspects of the 
'men in 
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feminism' debate results 
- 
as I think do other feminists' 
antagonisms 
- 
from the content of the essays, and the wish to 
appropriate the term 'feminist', rather than from the very idea 
of men in feminism 
- 
which is not after all particularly 
shocking. In their introduction to Engendering Men (1990), Boone 
and Cadden make the obvious but important point that 'there now 
exists an entire generation of male critics, many of whom, having 
been educated by "first generation" feminist scholars, have in 
turn been "engendered" by feminism. '18 I would not wish to 
hamper the progress of their work, or deny their right of 
'access' to feminist thought; but I remain troubled by their 
insistence on the 'right' to be dubbed 'feminist', rather than 
'pro-feminist', or some other term which might indicate their 
interests in gender, whilst allowing women to retain the most 
important impact of the term feminism 
- 
that it has come to 
signify a female presence. Feminism is after all constructed as 
a work in progress, a debate which empowers women, and indeed is 
the only non-patriarchal identity that women can lay claim to. 
In deconstructing Western binarism, such men appear to believe 
that men can write the 'feminine', as claimed by French 
feminists: while it is true that writing is not 'gendered' in any 
direct sense, feminists have found it politically expedient to 
foreground the identity of the author, as have gay and black 
theorists. While men perceive the focus of the debate to be 
around relations of authority/subalternity, women will resist 
their interventions: these terms themselves are ripe for 
deconstruction. 
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FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 
It is not only the phenomenon of the 'male feminist' that has 
caused feminists to rethink the dominant framework of their 
theories; since the mid-eighties feminist postmodern theorists 
such as Linda Nicholson have identified the continued existence 
of universalizing tendencies within feminist thought, observing 
that, 'it was the failure, common to many forms of academic 
scholarship, to recognize the embeddedness of its own assumptions 
within a specific historical context. '19 A particular trait in 
Western scholarship is the quest for objectivity, the notion that 
a critique can transcend the perspective of one individual or 
group, to carry truth claims that could be recognized as such by 
other individuals or groups; and although feminist groups among 
others have problematized the notion of neutrality, there do 
remain traces of dominant Western forms of thought within 
feminist methodology. Clearly the concept of patriarchy would be 
one example of a tendency towards ahistorical universalism, 
particularly when summoned by feminists in examining the 'cause' 
of women's oppression. Postmodernist theorists locate the mode 
of objectivity as a symptom of modernity, a range of' epistemic 
conditions which they would argue are waning. Postmodern 
relations of power therefore render claims of truth or falsehood 
illegitimate, and displace the unified notion of 'woman' as 
subject 
- 
something perhaps that feminists are reluctant to part 
with on a political level. 
The category of gender itself, and the way gender distinctions 
are culturally manifested, informs a feminist perspective on 
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social realities which many would seem loath to relinquish. 
Fraser and Nicholson, however, suggest that interfaces between 
feminism and postmodernism would be mutually beneficial since, 
postmodernist reflection on feminist theory reveals disabling 
vestiges of essentialism while a feminist reflection on 
postmodernism reveals androcentrism and political naivete. '20 
Here the relations between feminism and postmodernism are still 
seen to be tense; particularly, as the above quotation implies, 
because postmodernism emerges from a very male-identified 
'a 
reaction to modernity. Postmodernist critiques might be used by 
feminists to cleanse their own reflections of the worst kind of 
essentialism, but feminism's stake in modernity 
- 
or any 
perspective on male systems of power 
- 
can only be partial. 
Postmodernism has as one of its primary goals the aim to free 
itself from overarching philosophical givens, to ground social 
criticism within specific contexts and locales. 21 Gone is the 
dependency upon notions of historical progression, the 
transcendence of reason and freedom 
- 
the meta-discourse (such as 
Marxism) is reduced to the status of just another discourse with 
no prior claim to particular privilege. Feminism, in the 
Lyotardian terms utilized by Fraser and Nicholson, would be just 
such another totalizing discourse, dependent as it is on the 
generalising categories of gender (or even race and class), which 
are too unitary and too homogenizing to be accommodated within a 
postmodern notion of subjectivity. However, there are grounds to 
suppose that even the displacement of the meta-narrative demands 
a social criticism that can embrace the local and contextual - 
and this would clearly be the case for a credible feminist 
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response. 
During the past decade many feminists have found previous 
accounts of female subjectivity to be too reductive 
- 
since at 
the very least they provide grounds for the exclusion of race, 
class and sexual orientation. But even the inclusion of such 
categories can be seen to totalize group identity in ways that 
preclude more cogent and 'localized' analyses of the 
constellation and mediation of power relationships. In any case, 
it could be argued that woman remains a totalizing theoretical 
category, within which other categories of 'otherness' are 
effaced. Politically, feminists have a strong investment in 
retaining the masculine/feminine binary in their discourse, 
whereas utopian tendencies in postmodernist thought might 
envisage an end to the significance of such a binary. However, 
it might be advisable to consider Jameson's definition of 
postmodernism as 'not just another word for the description of a 
particular style', but: 
also, at least in my use, a periodizing concept whose 
function-is to correlate the emergence of new formal 
features in culture with the emergence of a new type of 
social life and a new economic order - what is often 
euphemistically called modernization, postindustrial or 
consumer society, the society of the media or the 
spectacle, or multinational capitalism. 22 
Such a definition might prove useful to feminism since it offers 
the moment of postmodernism a historical location, whereby the 
material and ideological conditions that pertain within such a 
period can be investigated in relation to women in particular. 
Moreover, some feminists may be tempted to argue that a 
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patriarchal ideology retains a rigid stronghold within a 
post-industrial capitalist society, just as it has been argued 
that the institutionalization of sexual difference can be 
perceived to predate capitalism. 
Most feminists would accept, however, that the meanings and 
positioning of gender relations do change when there is a 
changing cluster of power. networks, and the identification of a 
postmodern moment allows feminists to consider the condition of 
women as a distinct feature of postmodern social reality. If one 
of the significant aspects of the postmodern condition is the 
final dissolution of the myth of autonomous subjectivity, this 
may have a bearing on dominant feminist articulations of 
subjectivity, which often do depend upon notions of liberation 
which suggest a quest for a pre-existing putative autonomy 
available to masculine subjects. Jameson does not wish to 
suggest that the postmodern moment indicates a radical break with 
the period of modernity; rather it involves 'the restructuring of 
a certain number of elements already given: features that in an 
earlier period or system were subordinate now become dominant, 
and features that had been dominant again become secondary. '23 
Jameson's assertion is made within the context of cultural 
productions; nonetheless in both the sphere of cultural 
production, and production in a wider sphere, feminism's chief 
problem is to ascertain whether one feature - the 
representation/positioning of women as subordinate/other - 
remains the same. In addition, despite the embeddedness of 
feminist discourse in identifying a 'reality' of gender 
difference which finds its intelligibility in essentialism or 
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biology, the cultural logic of sexual difference has gained 
momentum from its historical longevity, resulting in the 'fact' 
of difference being entrenched in experience 
- 
not an easy 
category to theorize, or indeed to generalize about. Cynthia 
Cockburn looks back on the emergence of Second Wave politics and 
reflects upon the nebulous sense of difference which pervades 
feminism still: 
There was a material reason for the growth of 
difference-politics. It was a response to women's lived 
experience in the 1970s of' struggling with men's response 
to feminism. We felt different. Not some essential or 
biological difference but an empowering difference born 
of our centuries-long experience as the subordinated half 
of the heterosexual couple. Our history had given us 
different values. 24 
There may be much that a feminist can invest in the postmodern 
explosion of the binaries of classic Western thought. But might 
it not be the case that postmodernism itself derives impetus from 
a certain binarism in its demarcation of postmodernism and 
feminist postmodernism?. Is it readily apparent that most 
postmodern reflections are any more gender conscious than other 
theoretical offerings by radical male academics have been? If 
dispensing with the binaries means that gender as category has no 
theoretical currency, then it would be difficult to interrogate 
postmodernism for instances of gender-blindness. Yet feminist 
interventions in postmodernism must do precisely that, and find 
that although large-scale power relationships can be 
problematized in the delegitimation of the grand narrative, 
hierarchies of gendered power may exist in the spaces of 
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postmodernist theory itself. Perhaps an analogy can be drawn 
here with Jonathan Rutherford's comments on the organization of 
political agendas: 'Men's power is not simply a sovereign, 
repressive force. It can be that, but it is a more complex 
phenomenon, and also operates through the ways in which politics 
and problems are defined, and in determining what are the real 
issues and priorities. '2S Perhaps the priorities of postmodern 
theorists are by and large still too entrenched in announcing our 
epistemological and cultural break with modernity to wonder what 
women's place in modernity could possibly be defined as. 
Modernism in art has often been described as a moment of high 
elitism and male exclusionary practices, and the historical mode 
of process and objectivity yielded little insights from a 
feminist point of view. Women are necessarily embedded within 
these historical moments as material factors, but in terms of 
their relation to them as grand narratives, they have usually 
been quietly absent. Christine Di Stefano seems to be suspicious 
of the postmodern project itself as having an investment - if 
mainly in its sense of reaction and destablizing of the models of 
modernist thought - in the basis of a gendered social 
organization which is still left intact by its neglect in 
mainstream postmodernism: 
The feminist case against postmodernism would seem to 
consist of several related claims. First, that 
postmodernism expresses the claims and needs of a 
constituency (white, privileged men of the industrialized 
West) that has already had an Enlightenment for itself 
and that is now ready and willing to subject that legacy 
to critical scrutiny. Secondly, that objects of 
postmodernism's various critical and deconstructive 
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efforts have been the creations of a similarly specific 
and partial constituency (beginning with Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle). Third, that mainstream postmodernist 
theory (Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault) has been 
remarkably blind and insensitive to questions of gender in its own purportedly politicized rereadings of history, 
politics, and culture. Finally, that the postmodernist 
project if seriously adopted by feminists, would make any 
semblance of a feminist politics impossible. 26 
Stefano's concluding point 
- 
that postmodern theory renders 
feminist politics untenable 
- 
offers the bleakest outlook on 
feminism's engagement with postmodernism. The call to explode 
gender binaries, might well be perceived as a exhortation to 
'gender neutrality', which all too easily slips us back into the 
bad old days of academic rigour and rationalism. Such a stance 
denies feminist academics the opportunity to analyse the impact 
of their own female identity in a social context, that in so many 
other ideological and material ways reminds us of our own 
femaleness as otherness. Susan Bordo perceives that this 
tendency displays further evidence of a backlash against Second 
Wave feminism 
- 
analogous to debates among some First Wave 
American feminists, who called for an end to discussion focused 
on gender difference. 27 Then as now, perspectives on the 
heterogeneity of female experience and aspirations led to an 
extension of the notion of human differences, a pull to accept 
differences of identity and their social impact as a fact of 
'human' life. 
It needs to be stated that other cultural 'outgroups' might 
also feel unprepared to dispense with their own totalizing and 
unitary categories, such as being black or gay or lesbian. Again 
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these voices appear on the margins of* postmodernism's mainstream, 
so that Bell Hooks' sense of being on 'the outside of the 
discourse looking in'28 might sum up how many non-white/ 
non-male/non-heterosexuals feel; that they are a priori excluded, 
while at the same time being urged to dispense with their 
old-fashioned 'modern' ways of thinking. Bell Hooks points out 
that when race is discussed in a postmodern context, black women 
rarely merit a mention, and she convincingly identifies the aims 
of postmodern thought as themselves paradoxical: 
It is sadly ironic that the contemporary discourse which 
talks the most about heterogeneity, the decentred 
subject, declaring breakthroughs that allow recognition 
of Otherness, still directs its critical voice primarily 
to a specialized audience that shares a common language 
rooted in the very master narratives it claims to 
challenge. 29 
Nonetheless, she accepts that postmodern critiques of notions of 
identity and subjectivity are potentially effective tools for 
black people, who have after all collected politically under an 
identity foisted upon them by an imperialist ideology, and which 
is narrow and constrictive. For example, critiques of racism 
have not heretofore been concerned with the way that class 
mobility has fractured notions of collective identity; and it may 
well be in black theorists' interest to focus more upon the 
diverse and multiple experiences and meanings of racial 
difference. Yet her exposure of the fact that postmodernist 
thought remains directed at the most privileged, appears to 
justify the caution with which feminists have in general received 
postmodern explorations into the sphere of gender, race and 
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sexual identity. 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FEMINIST CRITICISM 
Unlike the heady days of the sixties and seventies, when women 
academics seemed to be fighting just to get feminism perceived as 
a serious object of study-at all, feminist theory is now a 
recognized sphere of academic discourse. As I have suggested 
above, this might have contributed to the current state of 
affairs, where the meanings and ownership of feminism are now 
also being contested by male inquirers. The dangers of 
institutional acceptance have been discussed since the seventies, 
when Lillian S. Robinson wrote 'Dwelling in Decencies'(1971); 30 
and there remains a recognition that a degree of absorption by 
the academy is inevitable, even when clear advances in feminist 
thought and the dissemination of feminist knowledges are in 
evidence. Nonetheless, as theorists such as Jane Gallop point 
out, feminist academics are of the institution, and it is less 
than helpful to resignedly bemoan our inevitable role as 
transmitters of elitist bourgeois values within it. Gallop 
instead wants 'to understand why we are located here, how we got 
here, what we sacrificed to get here, what we gained: all as 
preliminaries to the question of how do we do the most good, as 
feminists, as social and cultural critics, speaking from this 
location. '31 
Another side-effect of the institutionalization of feminism is 
the means by which vying feminist positions are accepted or 
rejected, coupled with the question of who determines this 
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inclusion or exclusion. Early radical feminist fears of an 
emergent 'star system' of honoured spokespeople, sadly realized 
in the public recantations of Germaine Greer and Betty Friedan, 
were also occurring in the academy 
- 
especially in the 
increasingly privileged valuation of feminist 'high' theory. The 
demarcation between 'high' and 'low' feminism created a tendency 
to characterize earlier Second Wave feminism as naive, 
responsible for some of the 'errors' or contradictions in 
feminist politics today. 32 While it is perhaps inevitable that 
'stars' should emerge in the feminist firmament, the danger is 
that feminism as a marketable academic enterprise becomes more of 
a 'career' and less identifiable as oppositional politics. As 
Marianne Hirsch remarks in conversation with Jane Gallop and 
Nancy K. Miller, 'there is now a way of building a career on 
trashing feminist work'. 33 Here she signals a danger inherent in 
intra-feminist debates 
- 
that there is a thin line between 
healthy discussion and diminishing the successes of currently 
less popular feminisms. 
Jane Gallop concludes this conversation by declaring that 
'What we need is an ethics of criticism'; 34 a sentiment echoed by 
Bell Hooks in a discussion on the inclusion of race-specific 
issues into feminism's 'mainstream' when she says, 'when we write 
about the experiences of a group to which we do not belong, we 
should think about the ethics of our action. '35 What they both 
identify are the dangers of feminism as a 'career' in academia, 
which 
- 
in keeping with the demands of scholarly competition - 
necessitates the debunking or destabilizing of alternative 
feminist positions. Moreover, this is often viewed as a 
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gratifying phenomenon outside feminist circles by theorists who 
may delight in witnessing what they regard as evidence of splits 
and factions in feminism, suggesting proof of its inherent 
weakness. However, few feminists would want to counter the risks 
involved in intra-feminist critiques by issuing any kind of 
embargo on the types or scope of criticism 'allowed' 
- 
for many 
since the mid-eighties in particular, the extent of debate within 
feminism has been taken as a sign of its continued vivacity as 
discourse. 
During the seventies Adrienne Rich was attempting to envisage 
the shape of a 'woman-centred university', and some of her 
critiques of the steadfastly male hierarchical practices of the 
traditional academic institution remain problems today. Rich 
rightly identifies the means by which women's studies courses 
within the mainstream are rarely able to transform the 
epistemological givens in pre-existing disciplines. Whatever 
victories can be gained in women's studies - for example, by 
means of making available a new resistant range of knowledges - 
the overall fabric of the institution remains entrenched in 
patriarchal ideology: 
Women in colleges where a women's studies program 
already exists, or where feminist courses are beginning 
to be taught, still are often made to feel that the 
'real' curriculum is the male-centred one; that women's 
studies are (like Third World studies) a 'fad'; that 
feminist teachers are 'unscholarly, ' 'unprofessional, ' or 
'dykes'. But the content of courses and programs is only 
the more concrete form of undermining experienced by the 
woman student. More invisible, less amenable to change 
by committee proposal or fiat, is the hierarchical image, 
the structure of relationships, even the style of 
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discourse, including assumptions about theory and 
practice, ends and means, process and goal. 36 
Here Rich foregrounds the paradox for women working as 
teachers/students within such an environment 
- 
that the framing 
of women's studies or feminist courses within institutional 
parameters, means that the definition of the academy or education 
continues to be resistant to change. The academic institution 
remains relentlessly male-identified, creating divisions not 
merely between the successful feminist scholar 
- 
who may achieve 
academic acclaim at the expense of other feminists who cannot get 
a foothold in the institution 
- 
but between women as teachers, 
students and women who service the institution in other ways. 
Women workers, such as secretaries, clerks, cleaners and cooks 
generally receive little support from their feminist 'sisters', 
although they collectively suffer from the design of an 
institution created with male needs in mind - this is most 
evident in the lack of childcare provisions. All in all, this 
obviously undermines the scope of feminist intellectual pursuits 
claiming to be 'political', as well as increasing the threat of 
absorption by patriarchal ideologies. 
Rich and later theorists draw our attention to the fact that 
there are numerous factors which contribute to the negative 
features of feminist institutionalization that extend far beyond 
the subject matter of feminist thought itself, or any questions 
of its relation to knowledges in the 'centre' of the academy. 37 
Feminist knowledge, despite its acceptance within the institution 
remains marginalized and 'other' as an optional extra, even 
though this marginality has at least allowed feminism to flourish 
-320- 
as critique of the mainstream. There are, inevitably, problems 
with feminism remaining a subordinate and co-opted fragment of 
the mainstream, implying as it does that feminism suffers from 
absorption more often than it wins any victories over the status 
quo. There is simply no other option for feminists; they cannot 
work 'outside' the patriarchal order, since the academy is just 
one example of an institution which perpetuates and reinforces 
male-oriented perceptions of social reality. Therefore, while 
the problems associated with institutionalization require further 
scrutiny along the lines of the critique offered above, such 
scrutiny has to include an acceptance of feminism's existence 
'within' in order to better construct agendas which resist the 
demands upon feminist knowledge to be just one contested 
scholarly methodology among many. As Gayle Greene observes, 'We 
need jobs in the profession in order to have any effect on the 
profession. As to whether we can fight the oppressor with the 
oppressor's weapons, we have no choice. '38 
ALL THE THEORISTS ARE MEN, ALL THE FEMINISTS ARE WHITE. BUT 
... 
A significant shift in feminist thought of the eighties and 
nineties was heralded by the increasing availability of black 
feminist work, which demanded that its own agendas be recognized 
and acted upon by white feminists. It is now a truism to state 
that white feminists have up until recently elided the questions 
that black feminism raises, or simply continued to produce theory 
which operates along a model of white female experience, and 
remains blind to questions of racial and/or cultural difference. 
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Much of white feminism's reluctance to confront the challenge of 
black feminist writings, or to discuss them in their own work is 
couched in terms of not wanting to 'appropriate' the black voice 
and consequently perpetuate the silencing effect of dominant 
theoretical discourses. The result is that black feminists tend 
to take sole responsibility for adding the dimension of 'race' to 
women's studies; yet unfortunately this implies that racism is 
black women's problem 
- 
or that feminists are by definition 
anti-racist through the same political process of being 
anti-sexist. 
Adrienne Rich was one of the few white feminists to address 
the thorny issue of racial difference and its impact on feminist 
thought during the seventies in 'Disloyal to Civilization: 
Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia' (1978). In this essay she 
discusses the difficulties white women obviously felt when 
attempting to outline issues specific to black female experience. 
She observes that: 
a great deal of white feminist thinking and writing, 
where it has attempted to address black women's 
experience, has done so labouring under a massive burden 
of guilt feelings and false consciousness, the products 
of deeply inculcated female self-blame, and of a history 
we have insufficiently explored. 39 
As Rich acknowledges, much of this guilt is a side-effect of 
white women's ignorance about black women's lives, an ignorance 
perpetuated by an educational system which fosters white 
experience as the norm. Nonetheless it is clearly inadequate to 
use as one's defence the claim that we white women, duped by the 
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patriarchal ideologies of the dominant white male hegemonic 
force, share no responsibility for the construction, 
institutionalization and perpetuation of inequality. It is 
manifestly obvious that white women can and do contribute to the 
continuance of such systems of social oppression, and are 
directly responsible for its reinscription in oppositional 
discourses such as feminism. Many white feminists feel 
vulnerable to accusations of being dubbed 'privileged' 
- 
in that 
they have the choice and opportunity to learn about feminism and 
to identify themselves as feminists, compared to black women's 
general cultural exclusion from such liberties. Yet hierarchies 
of privilege among women are a social and historical fact, and it 
appears futile, not to say dangerous, to merely sidestep such 
features of women's difference. To do so is to imply acceptance 
of the power and durability of racism, as well as its influence 
within feminism. 
Rich warns against the feeling of passivity that comes with 
guilt and becomes an excuse for inadequacy; rather, she 
recommends a deeper search for common ground, coupled with an 
investigation of racist fears still residual within white 
feminism's subtext. Meanwhile she herself is culpable of one 
cardinal error during the course of her discussion, which is to 
talk about 'women' and 'black people' as if they were two 
mutually exclusive interest groups, creating a rhetorical chasm 
in which black women are absorbed and rendered invisible yet 
again. Her essay remains, perhaps, too optimistic about the 
simple measure of sharing experiences and overcoming boundaries, 
because she is too ready to ascribe all tools of oppression as 
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solely the property of males. In addition she is too willing to 
attribute critiques of white feminism's racism to male Left-wing 
groups anxious to expose feminism as a distinctly bourgeois and 
counter-revolutionary phenomenon. 40 Despite its flaws, Rich's 
essay had groundbreaking potential by the mere fact that she 
acknowledged race to be white women's problem too, and suggested 
that white feminists should begin to examine the reasons for 
their ethnocentricity rather than simply summon guilt as a viable 
response. However, black feminist theorists of the eighties and 
nineties, committed to constructing a discourse which unseated 
the dominance of the white gaze, still found that their work was 
often consigned to the 'black perspectives' margins. Even though 
there are many black feminists such as Bell Hooks who see a 
future for feminism in a sharing of experiences, critiques and 
perspectives, they are also made increasingly angry and impatient 
by the seeming arrogance of some white feminist positions which 
situate themselves as though they are in a position to bestow the 
'honour' of acceptance on to black women. Meanwhile black 
feminist scholarship has developed and expanded through producing 
collections devoted to black women's work; 41 whereas within white 
feminism, black feminist critiques are still regularly 
marginalized as the token essay or footnote, and 'overviews' of 
Second Wave feminism are produced which appear to ignore the 
existence of black women altogether. 42 
Bell Hooks characterizes the emergence of the Women's 
Liberation Movement as being dependent upon its voices being 
those of white, middle-class women, and that therefore it is 
inevitable that their experiences shaped and determined the main 
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agenda for feminism 
- 
'what other group of women in the United 
States had the same access to universities, publishing houses, 
mass media, money? '43 Even though white bourgeois women's 
initial hegemony in the movement might be partly attributed to 
their greater access to educational and other privileges, this 
alone can not explain their retention of the power to police the 
boundaries of feminism 
- 
not by excluding women on the grounds of 
race or class, but by dictating the range of 'acceptable' issues 
for discussion. 44 This is particularly apparent when race and 
class are considered, but maintained as subordinate to gender, as 
if gender oppression operates autonomously from other forms of 
social and cultural subordination. The tendency to distinguish 
gender difference as the most crucial issue for all women, denies 
black women the right to assert that racism plays an equally 
important role in the shaping of their lives and politics, and 
perpetuates a corresponding sense of 'them' and 'us'. In this 
way, Hooks's judgement of feminism as primarily founded on 
privilege (of race, class and education) is a correct one. 
The prevailing sense that white feminism 'allows' black 
feminists to contest or 'correct' designated areas of discussion, 
inhibits the interrogation of what women can be deemed to share 
in terms of experiences of oppression, and prevents the revision 
of other features of feminist thought which currently do not 
reflect a female consensus across racial and class boundaries. 45 
The rhetoric of equality itself is problematic; since if the 
central thrust of white feminist thought is formal social and 
economic equality with (white) men, is it assured that women (and 
men) from less privileged positions will attain the same 
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equality? One might predict that were white women's equality 
achieved, they might retain an investment in the continued 
exploitation and oppression of other non-hegemonic groups. 46 
From this perspective, feminism's focus might be better relocated 
to concentrate on the removal of oppression, rather than a 
concern with equality. Such a change in emphasis does not appear 
to me to be incompatible with a sustained focus on the 
ideological construction of gender and a corresponding analysis 
of its effects upon women of' all groups, as a contribution to the 
erosion of patriarchal oppression, rather than risking 
replicating pre-existing power dynamics. 
At present 
- 
particularly in America 
- 
black feminist thought 
flourishes semi-autonomously, developing in academia via women's 
and black studies courses, and furthering the analysis of the 
nexus between racial and sexual oppression. Although black 
critiques of white feminism have foregrounded their questionable 
universalizing accounts of women's relation to economics, the 
law, medicine and the family, a primary focus (in common with 
earlier Second Wave white feminists) has been on the area of 
representation and ideology. As Patricia Hill Collins asserts, 
From the mammies, Jezebels, and breeder women of slavery 
to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake mix boxes, 
ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare 
mothers of contemporary popular culture, the nexus of 
stereotypical images applied to African-American women 
has been fundamental to Black women's oppression. 47 
Certainly in the area of cultural criticism and the theorization 
of the female gaze, white feminists have been largely blind to 
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i 
the fact that the ideal-type feminine image which bombards all 
women, at least provides a point of identification with white 
women in that she is normally white. When white women have 
turned to black female experience, they show a tendency to admire 
black women's personal strength; though of' course, this image 
itself is partially a myth, in that it tends to ignore the 
adversity of a racist society which supplies an interpretation of 
'strength' to a situation within which black woman as subject may 
only be thinking in terms of survival. 48 Black feminists have 
devoted much of their energies to debunking such myths, while 
celebrating the endurance of their foremothers for surviving, and 
educating their 'daughters' - whether biological or affectional - 
to learn the necessity of resistance to the dominant culture's 
worldview of black inferiority. Many black writers - of both 
fiction and theory 
- 
emphasize the importance of the mother's 
de-socializing role in teaching their daughters self-confidence 
and self-worth. 
Perhaps white feminists still tend to see black feminist 
theory as a threat to an epistemological centrality that they 
have enjoyed for two decades, instead of observing - as Collins 
does 
- 
that multifarious feminist standpoints all provide 
important but partial visions, which should explore each other's 
work not just as a corrective of their own but to enhance the 
overall growth in an increasingly non-racist, non-homophobic body 
of feminist thought. Bell Hooks argues that broadening and 
shifting the terms of the commonly accepted central feminist 
agenda is not in itself enough. She also suggests that feminists 
might adopt a linguistic shift in the way they identify 
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themselves, on the grounds that the statement, 'I am a feminist', 
implies that concerns of gender difference exclude all others. 
Hooks argues that a modification of this statement to 'I advocate 
feminism' implies one's commitment to a feminist viewpoint, but 
does not exclude the possibility of supporting other political 
movements. 49 Hooks' distinction appears to be a valid one, in an 
era where feminism has often come to designate individual 
lifestyle politics, which tends to prioritize certain exclusive 
interests: yet, to advocate feminism suggests a certain distance 
from its processes, giving the lie to the notion that feminism is 
a pre-established dogma. It also implies that feminism is 
irredeemably entrenched in a bourgeois vision of oppression. To 
identify oneself as a feminist at least indicates an active 
engagement and commitment to the further development of a 
feminist theory which can do justice to all groups of women, 
regardless of present access to social privilege. This is not to 
advocate complacency with the term feminism, which has till now 
been tardy in recognizing its ever-present potential for the 
perpetuation of dominance. As Hooks asserts in a later book, 'It 
is necessary to remember that it is first the potential oppressor 
within that we must resist 
- 
the potential victim within that we 
must rescue 
- 
otherwise we cannot hope for an end to domination, 
for liberation. '50 
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PLAYING WITH DIFFRENCE; ESSENTIALISM, GENDER AND THE CYBORG 
The term 'essentialism' has often been used in negative terms by 
many feminists; I have used it myself earlier in this work as 
shorthand description of a feminist stance which makes appeal to 
a discrete female 'nature'. Most feminists see themselves as 
social constructionist, believing that gender is an effect of 
culture rather than a condition for its current configuration. 
Thus, essentialism and social constructionism take on the 
appearance of binary opposites; the former celebrating the fixity 
of female difference, and a revaluation of its social meanings; 
and the latter expressing a concrete denial of the innateness of 
sexual difference, arguing that difference is an effect of social 
and historical relations of power. Yet, as Diana Fuss has 
pointed out in Essentially Speaking (1989), the two terms are not 
mutually exclusive, and the use by social constructionists of the 
category 'gender' constitutes an appeal to a community of women 
as a group with a single identity, which inevitably assumes a 
broad shared essence. In other words, all political movements 
that focus on a particular identity (femaleness, gayness) as the 
basis for action, effectively presuppose that particular 
properties define such groups, implying that there is an essence 
within identity which is fixed and can be unearthed through the 
foregrounding of an oppressed group's experiences of 
subjectivity. 
All branches of feminist thought have valued experience, and 
the garnering of multifarious female experiences - in 
consciousness raising and in writing - has been a crucial 
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feminist activity. 51 From the outset of the Second Wave, the 
explosion of experiential writing demonstrated that experiences 
are never unified or universal, but reflect differing 
relationships to class. race and sexual orientation 
- 
not to 
mention more localized variables. Yet the centrality of 
experience to feminist thought indicates a belief in the 
authenticity of experience, as if the woman who writes her own 
life as woman, reveals some previously suppressed truth about the 
state of being female. It is as if a woman can miraculously 
distance herself from the cultural and historical processes that 
make gender difference matter; yet as Fuss remarks, 'belief in 
the truth of Experience is as much an ideological production as 
belief in the experience of Truth. '52 Narratives of experience 
do regularly yield common elements, which enhance feminist 
theoretical activities, and in this way the politics of identity 
is a useful tactic to initiate collective resistance to the 
patriarchal status quo. But it must be recognized that appeals 
to experience as authentic reconstructions of the nascent self 
risk reinstating difference as essence, and have resulted in the 
dissemination of identities within feminism that are often 
perceived as counter-productive. 
There has been a tendency in feminist thought to recognize the 
constructedness of gendered identities, but at the same time see 
female appropriations of 'masculine' qualities in purely negative 
terms. Judith Butler prefaces her book Gender Trouble (1990) 
with the proposition that the binary framework which informs 
notions of gender only has real currency within a heterosexual 
world view, and asks, 'what happens to the subject and to the 
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stability of gender categories when the epistemic regime of 
presumptive heterosexuality is unmasked as that which produces 
and reifies these ostensible categories of ontology? '53 The 
meanings of gender, generally ascribed by feminists to the broad 
effect of patriarchal social organizations, is thus further 
problematized as being the product of a hetero-reality, where 
heterosexuality has a clear investment in such delineations of 
difference. Gender, in Butler's view, is less stable than its 
'official' meanings suggest, and she uses the example of female 
impersonator/film 'hero(ine), Divine, to argue that his 
'impersonation of women implicitly suggests that gender is a kind 
of persistent impersonation that passes as the real. '54 Drag, it 
is argued. can dramatize the fluidity of gender signifiers and 
can subvert and parody conventional meanings ascribed to gender 
difference in a pantomimic performance of their artificiality and 
arbitrariness. Butler, then, denies gender any originary 
credence, and considers how the parodic 'quoting' of gender 
binaries can decenter defining discourses within phallogocentrism 
for feminist purposes. 
This thesis as a whole stands as testament to the fact that 
all feminists confront the problem that 'woman' as category 
cannot connote a common identity, and that it is debatable to 
what extent all women share a common form of oppression that 
outweighs other identities. If we accept that gender 
distinctions are an effect of culture, and that their meanings 
are constantly shifting within different historical and cultural 
formations, we necessarily accept that gender is always an 
ambiguous and contradictory category, which is independent of 
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sex, 'with the consequence that man and masculine might just as 
easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and 
feminine a male body as easily as a female one. '55 Within this 
context Butler argues that gay and lesbian citations of 
heterosexual conventions of gender organization (such as 
butch/femme) are not simply representations of heterosexual 
identities within a homosexual framework. Rather, such citation 
throws the constructedness of such categories into sharp relief, 
referring not to an original but a 'parody of the idea of the 
natural and original. '36 
Feminism's recourse to the representational category of 
'woman' is also viewed by Butler as construct, in that feminism's 
appeal to the 'we' of womankind is always exclusionary. Butler 
asserts that gender's instability 'sets into question the 
foundational restrictions on feminist political theorizing and 
opens up other configurations, not only of genders and bodies, 
but of politics itself. '57 In other words, if politics did not 
appeal to categories of subjects deemed to own pre-existing 
originary identities, the binarism of gender relations as they 
are now understood might be exploded in favour of a polymorphous 
range of identities, that would facilitate a better understanding 
of how gender identity, and all entries into subjecthood are 
negotiated. Compelling as Butler's argument is, the notion of 
parody suggests an imitation of something that already exists; 
and even if, in the case of gender difference, this is the 
imitation of the idea of gender binarism, that idea itself, 
rather than any sense of its naturalness, has been and remains 
the focus of feminism's contestation of dominant patriarchal 
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meanings of gender. The idea of appropriate gender socialization 
does have a material effect on the lives of women of whatever 
race or sexual orientation, although it is not the single 
determinant. Although the idea of parody as a tool in feminist 
politics is a seductive one, as I've suggested in the section on 
postmodernism, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the 
denial of the impact current meanings of gender difference have 
on women's lives would not result in a gender-neutral stance. 
This is manifestly not the case in Butler's writing, and her 
thesis indicates the increasing tensions within lesbian feminism 
as to the range of sexual identities lesbians can or should have, 
which have instigated new theoretical explorations into the 
appropriation and manipulation of gender difference 
- 
such as the 
meanings attributed to butch/femme roles. Susan Ardill and Sue 
O'Sullivan are concerned that in this we lose a feminist 
challenge to continued gender divisions and inequalities 
- 
particularly in the roles adopted by butch/femmes: 
Because lesbian experience is so untheorized and 
unsupported, even within radical or alternative cultures, 
any lesbian language of' self-description and 
self-analysis has tended to remain underdeveloped. So 
these two words [butch/femme] have become dreadfully 
overburdened. 58 
Butler would of course recognize in this a semantic richness, 
reflecting the continual dispersal of meaning around gender and 
the playful possibilities of ever-fluid butch/femme 
identification. Joan Nestle, in A Restricted Country (1987), 
demonstrates how important such identities were for lesbians in 
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the 1950s in making lesbianism visible on the streets as a sexual 
style of its own, in enraging the heterosexual spectator, and in 
signalling the eroticism of lesbian differences, despite the 
threat of violence and censure: 
My understanding of why we angered straight spectators 
so is not that they saw us modeling ourselves after them, 
but just the opposite: we were a symbol of women's erotic 
autonomy, a sexual accomplishment that did not include 
them. The physical attacks were a direct attempt to 
break into this self-sufficient erotic partnership. 59 
In an article on lesbian fashion in the 1990s, Inge Blackman and 
Kathryn Perry look at the increasing diversity of lesbian style 
signifiers that suggest and play with roles of butch/femme and 
S/M bottom and top. Although they add a cautionary note that, 
'style may be subversive, but it can never become a substitute 
for direct political campaigning. If identity is a constantly 
shifting and changing phenomenon, it can no longer be a useful 
rallying cry for mobilizing people into action. '60 Whether 
lesbian roleplay is subversive but not political continues to be 
debated. along with the question of whether the performance of 
difference necessarily reaffirms the power politics of 
heterosexual relationships. 
Whether such a stance can be rendered politically useful in a 
broader feminist context remains to be seen; but such debates 
evidently enrich feminist discourse around the subject of 
compulsory heterosexuality and the politics of desire. Lesbian 
theorists remain the leaders in this field, since the political 
status of desire is as yet a much contested area, commonly 
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avoided by straight feminists, and the notion of gender as parody 
of a non-existent 'natural' origin offers some challenging 
possibilities. Butler accurately identifies a paradox in 
feminism's location of gender as at once constructed and 
originary, and perhaps her situating of parody as part of the 
politics of gay identity could be extended to heterosexual 
feminists' work on sexuality and subjectivity 
- 
to show the ways 
in which a sense of the parodic status of gender is already 
implicitly a part of' the codification of heterosexual feminist 
discourse. Whether or not this extension of theories of 
otherness occurs, the value of such a position has clearly 
energized gay/lesbian theories, where the nineties has witnessed 
the modest beginnings of a new 'separatist' theoretical 
enterprise, with gay and lesbian theorists collaborating to 
produce such volumes as Inside/Out (1991); and new lesbian 
insights into feminist cultural criticism, such as New Lesbian 
Criticism (1992). In her introduction to Inside/Out, Diana Fuss 
asserts that 'what we need most urgently in gay and lesbian 
theory right now is a theory of marginality, subversion, 
dissidence, and othering'. bl Perhaps this would also make an 
accurate assessment of feminism's current needs, which in its 
institutional embeddedness in the mainstream, loses its purchase 
on the fact of its marginality and otherness. 
Perhaps one of the most sustained critiques of gendered 
binarism, and one of the most compelling images to emerge from 
feminism's cross fertilization with postmodernist thinking, is 
Donna Haraway's 'Cyborg'. Neither organism nor machine, the 
Cyborg marks a post-industrial, post-humanist fission between 
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nature and culture, which transforms or deflects any originary 
meanings attributed to either term. The bio-technological 
contribution to social control remains, however, decidedly 
patriarchal, and 'the main trouble with cyborgs... is that they 
are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism, not to mention state socialism'; but, as she 
continues, 'illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly 
unfaithful to their origins. '62 The cyborg, then, is not 
summoned by Haraway as a paradigm of the victim, caught up in the 
networks of what Foucault would term 'bio-power'; she is more 
interested in how cybernetics breaks down the humanist divisions 
between animal and human, mind and body, in a symbolic breach 
between nature and culture. For Haraway such an 'ironic' 
political stance as the one outlined in this essay, is an attempt 
to contribute to feminist debates around the politics of 
identity, by blocking the feminist tendency to retreat to 
pseudo-essentialist origins, extending the ground of 'new 
essentialist' discussions such as Butler's and Fuss': 
Consciousness of exclusion through naming is acute. 
Identities seems contradictory, partial and strategic. 
With the hard-won recognition of their social and 
historical constitution, gender, race and class cannot 
provide the basis for belief in 'essential' unity. There 
is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds 
women. There is not even such a state as 'being' female, 
itself a highly complex category constructed in contested 
sexual scientific discourses and other social entities. 63 
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Haraway identifies consequent risks in contemporary feminists 
constantly summoning the quality of 'being' female (particularly 
through experiential narratives) in its tendency to mark feminism 
as a totalizing discourse. Her intention here is to ironize 
female identity itself 
- 
something some lesbian theorists are 
also attempting to perform in their belief that gender parody 
such as butch/femme roleplay disassembles dominant meanings of 
gender identity, rather than simply replicating relations of 
dominance and submission. Haraway is signalling a position that 
might also facilitate a renewed rhetoric of resistance and 
opposition which does not simply rely on an acceptance of the 
'realities' of oppressive mechanisms. In a curious fashion her 
work carries resonances of that of Shulamith Firestone's 
Dialectic of Sex, although feminist critiques of this text have 
of course focused upon its underlying biologism. 64 Haraway's 
account, however, denies biologism any privileged epistemological 
status; and in her portrayal of the cyborg she grounds biology 
and its possible connotations within shifting conditions of 
scientific discourse. Her ascription of the cyborgian subject 
does not deny the patriarchal rootedness of such a construction, 
but rather sees in the deflection of originary gender binarism, 
the possibilities of a new ironic form of resistance to existing 
relations of power. 
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CONCLUSION 
No matter how enchanted one might be by the postmodernist 
redefinition of the categories masculine/feminine, and even 
male/female, feminists need to be able to 'crudely' assert that 
woman as category. encompassing the action and reaction of 
'difference' in its many semantic layers, remains the subject and 
Subject of its political discourse. As Modleski avers, 'in the 
final analysis, it seems more important to struggle over what it 
means to be a woman than over whether or not to be one. '63 The 
luxury of female anti-essentialism is still one only accorded to 
the privileged; non-white, non-heterosexual, non-bourgeois women 
are still finding political impetus in summoning up womanhood as 
identity, and femininity as a construct which excludes and 
punishes them most painfully of all 
- 
as Bell Hooks' summoning of 
Sojourner Truth's question, 'Ain't Ia Woman? ' as title for her 
1982 text testifies. 
one significant crisis in feminism is, I believe, the 
overwhelming consciousness that differing internal movements tend 
to create their own unwritten do's and don'ts; and women gaining 
access to feminist thought for the first time might be forgiven 
for feeling that they don't want to label themselves feminist 
because of the pejorative tone this term has culturally acquired. 
More importantly, they may feel that they cannot call themselves 
feminists, if they lack the 'qualifications' that certainly the 
more arcane branches of modern feminist thought seem to 
designate, a consideration strengthened by popular denunciations 
of feminism as prescriptive or even 'puritan'. 66 Alison Light 
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perceives the danger of a tone of piety creeping into feminism, 
perpetuating the complacency among (white) feminists that they 
are one of the 'chosen few', and she contests that 'Being a 
feminist, as I understand it, should not be like being in church: 
there are no blasphemies, no ritual incantations, no heretics and 
no saints. '67 I would agree with these sentiments, which perhaps 
deserve restating 
- 
despite their 'obviousness' 
- 
because recent 
debates among feminists give the lie to the notion that there are 
some fairly tenacious 'heresies' which need weeding out. Yet, 
paradoxically, we are in a position where there are some 
'heretics' who use feminism to annihilate it, prompting a need 
for greater explicitness around the question of what feminism as 
discourse and action intends to achieve, and whether demarcated 
'boundaries' are feasible. Whether or not such boundaries are 
desirable, they seem to be urgently needed. 
Writing in 1971, Juliet Mitchell prophesied that the biggest 
single theoretical battle would be between radical and socialist 
feminists; 68 here. Mitchell assumes that radical feminists will 
overcome their disaffection with the Left to combine their 
insights into women's experience and consciousness with a 
socialist feminist theory of women's oppression. Although the 
rift between these two positions has been demarcated many times 
since, in retrospect the major battle has been in the field of 
'theory' itself and its possible disjunctions with a feminist 
political practice. Feminism has matured, and the potential 
sites for conflict - both within and outside feminist parameters 
- 
have multiplied. From largely eschewing political/theoretical 
coalitions with men during the seventies, in the nineties many 
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feminists are forging new connections with men 
- 
at least at the 
level of postmodern critiques. The new battle for feminism, 
assuming that it survives the most recent crises of 
confidence/meaning outlined in this chapter, will be to find 
epistemological measures to defend its autonomy while enacting 
bridges between the politics of race, class, and sexual 
orientation. Many women who previously felt that their concerns 
were not addressed by the dominant forms of feminism might then 
recognize a newly strengthened location for their own resistence 
within a politics of heterogeneity. We live in an era which 
offers academic feminism some confusing messages. The shape and 
scope of women's studies in face of' critical 'acceptance', has 
been transformed, yet the ideological pressures exerted by a 
patriarchal social reality still hold sway, and arguably are 
reinforced in a climate of recession and economic shrinkage. 
Speaking of the interfaces between black male and female 
experiences of oppression and those experiences of white females, 
Kate Millett comments on how in the case of women and the 
perpetuation of the ideology of femininity, 'a certain handful of 
women are accorded higher status that they may perform a species 
of cultural policing over the rest'. 69 It is tempting to see 
this tokenism filtering into increasing incidents of feminist 
interventions into 'high theory', particularly that of 
postmodernism. One of my chief concerns about the degree of 
acceptance, and even popularity, of feminist theoretical 
positions in academia is that such theorists are accorded by 
their male counterparts the 'honour' of being the cultural 
policeforce for feminism as a whole. Postmodern or 
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poststructuralist feminism is viewed in this light as a sign of 
feminist thought at its most sophisticated, a methodology which 
renders other forms of feminist expression redundant. It 
suggests that feminists are being encouraged to forget the 
tribulations of their recent past, and throw in their hard-won 
resources with the anti-humanist men, whose investment in 
exploding humanist binarism might still represent a somewhat 
different agenda from that normally associated with feminism. 
Feminism has always devoted time and energy to the 
anticipation of utopian possibilities of social transformation, 
as do all radical political positions to a greater or lesser 
extent. Perhaps the value of utopian preoccupations is 
undermined by postmodern critiques. When I attempt to identify 
the desirability or otherwise of the continuing production of 
feminist utopias as a viable political tactic, I recall 
Foucault's distinction between utopias and heterotopias in his 
Preface to The Order of Things: 
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real 
locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled 
region in which they are able to unfold: they open up 
cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, 
countries where life is easy, even though the road to 
them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, 
probably because they secretly undermine language, 
because they make it impossible to name this and that, 
because they shatter or tangle common names, because they 
destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with 
which we construct sentences but also that less apparent 
syntax which causes words and things... to 'hold 
together'. io 
Foucault (citing Borges as an example of a writer of 
-341- 
heterotopias) is here mocking conventional systems of' coherence 
and classification, which comprise the formation of knowledges 
from which we seek access to the truth of being. Such ordering 
instances, it is asserted, provide the conditions of possibility 
of uttering 'truths', and of founding disciplines of empirical 
knowledge. Similarly, feminists have long been in the business 
of mocking, inverting or disrupting the existing 'order of 
things', particularly in observing that Western epistemology 
assumes orders which on closer scrutiny conform to and support 
the conditions of possibility of a distinctly masculine body of 
knowledge and truth claims. At the centre of this order is 
language which inscribes gendered and other identities in 
opposition to one another in the indefatigible tension of the 
'either/or' logic of modern thought. In a sense feminists are out 
to destroy the syntax of phallogocentrism, to get to the cement 
that binds the logic of such thought together in such arbitrary 
terms, not in order to rebuild the structure of such syntax in a 
slightly different configuration, but in order to demonstrate 
that such a structure has no natural foundations whatever. 
Utopias are the 'no-places' of a future where society has 
transformed into something other than our present realities. In 
order to construct utopias, writers of fiction or political 
theory have recourse to the dominant systems of the present to 
enact a critique of its inequities, or its mistakes. Feminist 
utopias also seek to enter that no-place where the meanings of 
gender and oppression are exploded as ever arbitrary relations of 
power with a chimerical link to the 'natural', which only proves 
to be an essence constructed from the meanings of social life in 
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its ever changing social and cultural contexts. In offering such 
utopias feminists remind us of the 'no place' for women in 
current dominant ideological representations 
- 
and as they seek 
to gesture a future 'no place' for women as well as men, they 
might also be viewed as venturing a heterotopia of their own. 
Feminists do not, after all, envisage a future which is simply 
the obverse of the present; often the aim is to dispense with 
classic binarist thinking in favour of a multiplicity, which 
denies all essence, including what are thought of as biological 
imperatives, in order to think what is, in current discursive 
formations, radically 'unthinkable'. It we regard utopian texts 
such as Shulamith Firestone's Dialectic of Sex in this light, it 
is clearly inadequate to simply view her work as racked with 
essentialist truth claims about female biology. One might 
usefully review the intentions of Firestone's work, in common 
with other feminist writings, as an exhortation to women to think 
outside their current social reality, in order to articulate what 
has currently no 'language' of its own. 71 
As Angelika Bammer suggests, utopian visions remain partial 
'in both senses of the word: partisan and limited. '72 As Bammer 
indicates, this invites both negative and positive 
interpretations of the term: the negative side lies in the threat 
of exclusionism (particularly of the needs of less privileged 
groups of women), although the threat of the exclusion of men 
remains a powerful rhetorical challenge. Utopias are positive in 
the sense that feminists' multifarious and sometimes conflicting 
views of the desired shape of its utopias, remind us that 
feminist thought is constantly reshaping and re-envisaging gender 
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difference, and still has to focus upon reclaiming women's part 
in historical and cultural processes as a political necessity. 
The term heterotopia reminds us that not only are possible 
visions of the future multiple and ever changing, but that our 
critiques of the present draw upon multifarious perspectives on 
present social realities, specific to class, ethnic and sexual 
locations within patriarchy. Finally, the term heterotopia seems 
happily compatible with my exploration and affirmation of 
feminism's heterogeneity, where diversity and conflict might 
better ensure that our future is not a covert repetition of the 
shape of the past. 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the sad conclusions I have reached in writing this 
book is that feminists have reinvented the wheel a number 
of times. 1 
As this thesis has progressed it has drifted away from the realms 
of grassroots political issues, and into more abstract areas of 
thought. Such a transition seems to me to mirror the movement 
from activism to internal debate within feminism, which many 
feminists have lamented over the years 
- 
such sentiments appear 
in the British Anthology What is Feminism? (1986). Nonetheless, 
during the nineties there has been a tendency to search again for 
feminism's 'lost' political edge, and the work of black and 
lesbian feminists has been particularly important in their 
insistent focus on the political and theoretical implications of 
the fact of women's lived experience, without resorting to naive 
individualist tendencies characteristic of earlier bourgeois 
feminism. Feminists have learnt, too, that complacency can be 
dangerous 
- 
mainstream matrices of power have the breadth and 
capacity to absorb and contain sites of resistance, to render 
opposition obsolete with ease and rapidity. By the mid-eighties, 
feminism was mourning the increasing stranglehold of the New 
Right in the West, and none of the dominant strands of socialist, 
liberal or radical feminism seemed equal to face the challenge 
alone. As the eighties drew to a close the boundaries which 
defined each strand increasingly became blurred. Such political 
and methodological distinctions were played out on the surfaces 
of identity politics, which was either construed as an instance 
of feminism's nascent humanism - its investment in the discrete 
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individual subject self 
- 
or as a creative problematic of the 
status of identity (in the singular) altogether. 
In Britain, socialist feminism lost much of its initial 
investment in the Marxist Left. Indeed, Tessa ten Tusscher 
argues that the gender-blind political analyses of the British 
Left renders them unequal to challenging and understanding the 
nature of the New Right in America and Europe. Classic left-wing 
discourse, couched in economic and class-based terms, fails to 
account for the moral, traditional and familial aspects of 
current governmental policies and ideology. Tusscher asserts 
that the concept of individual freedom, fostered by Thatcherism, 
is a renewed freedom for men at the expense of women's newly-won 
economic and political freedoms. 2 The underlying themes of 
'organic' Toryism are the family, duty, law and order, free 
economy and nationalism. Socialist feminism's emphasis on the 
pervasiveness of familial ideology highlights the moral and 
familial aspects of both the British and US New Right; and they 
began to place even greater emphasis on contextualizing the 
changing social and economic position of women since the 1950s. 
During the capitalist boom of' the fifties, and the resulting 
expansion of the labour market, more women took up full-time 
employment and participated in trade union activism; in addition, 
women gained freer access to higher education, leading to entry 
into the professions. Greater social freedoms themselves 
facilitated the conditions of existence of a new women's 
movement; and gradually the media began to characterize the 'new 
woman' as wielding unbridled power, with the potential to 
threaten the masculinist status quo. Tusscher suggests that 
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feminism itself prompted a shifting of mainstream political 
agendas, arguing that, 'it was this crisis of patriarchy which 
prompted the birth of the moral right'. 3 
The conservative reaction against this supposed tidal wave of 
feminism and the rise of the so-called 'permissive society' 
strengthened in the wake of economic recession. Now the most 
widely publicized aspects of the 'Sexual Revolution' are the 
risks to society (or, more emotively, the 'family'), 
concentrating on disease (physical and moral), homosexuality and 
other forms of 'deviant' behaviour. As the seventies drew to a 
close, feminists, instead of being able to celebrate the 
'victory' of having a woman at the head of the British 
government, have had to face the fact that women have suffered 
sustained attacks on their newly won economic and domestic 
freedoms. Unlike America's National Organization for Women, 
British feminists have been largely unsuccessful in effecting 
legislative changes: 'Instead British feminism has exerted 
pressure in a more vicarious manner, forcing the moral right to 
adopt more subtle and complex strategies to exert patriarchal 
relations. '4 At the heart of this swing to the Right lies a 
certain conception of the family as a natural unit as well as a 
morally desirable one, and therefore any feminist critiques of 
current familial organization, are characterized as antipathetic 
to the desires of human nature. 
Of course a significant distinction made by feminists is the 
gap between familial ideology and actual families, who are less 
and less likely to conform to the perceived norm. 'Abnormal' 
families 
- 
such as single parent households, or lesbian parent 
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households are more than likely to suffer when the state 
continues to tailor its legislation and support facilities for 
the needs of the 'normal' minority. New Right ideology assumes 
that women are functional for the maintenance of familial 
stability, and the labour market 
- 
equal opportunities rhetoric 
aside 
- 
still operates along masculinist terms, subsuming 'female 
interests' within the family unit. This demonstrates that the 
New Right has done much to reaffirm contemporary gendered 
assumptions about women's place in society; moreover, the New 
Right has reinscribed difference 
- 
especially in the cases of 
gender and race/culture. It is not a new tactic to make 
reference to the natural to substantiate a preferred form of 
social order, but the New Right has worked hard to give the 
category of the natural a more urgent contemporary meaning. This 
is particularly evident in the construction of a new ideology of 
the natural, where in seeming to legislatively accommodate 
differing needs, otherness is an entrenched part of political 
reality: 
For women, the New Right's political philosophy signals 
the undermining of many of the equal rights gains and 
freedoms won over the last decade. For Blacks, it 
provides the basis for an insidious form of racism, 
dressed up this time as common sense rather than science, 
which will undoubtedly be increasingly used against 
them. 5 
If we can identify a 'new racism' founded on the notion of 
irreconcilable cultural differences, rather than biological 
inferiority, perhaps we need also to investigate a possible 'new 
sexism', which has gained momentum by going 'underground'. The 
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New Right cleverly favours an indirect attack on feminism through 
ideological means, and despite feminism's commitment to an 
interrogation of dominant ideologies, feminism as marginal 
discourse has less access to forms of communication which would 
enable them to counter such attacks. Feminism is popularly 
portrayed as outmoded 
- 
media announcements herald a 'post- 
feminist' climate where young women are successful and 
independent, and less likely to espouse 'dangerous' feminist 
ideals. Those women who doggedly insist on proclaiming 
themselves feminist are lampooned as ugly, fat and undoubtedly 
lesbians, and who spend their time condemning men and tearing up 
pornography. 6 In opposition to this, the 'post-feminist' of the 
TV advertisements is resplendent in her executive suit and 
unruffled by her male colleagues. Both images are, of course, 
outrageous distortions, but serve their purpose well: the first 
is 'masculine'; the second retains a quintessential femininity, 
despite its inherent contradictions. Yet these images neatly 
summarize one of the most insidious threats for contemporary 
feminists: if young women are internalizing the post-feminist 
ideal and the assumption that feminist politics are therefore 
redundant, 'consciousness raising' is again one of the most vital 
feminist activities 
-a consciousness raising that appeals to all 
women, whatever their background, but which avoids the pitfalls 
of divisive individualism. Here the legacy of radical feminist 
politics provides, perhaps, the strongest potential for both 
defence and counter-attack. 
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The idea of post-feminism has also been legitimized by a 
conservative backlash within feminist thought, typified by the 
later work of Germaine Greer and Betty Friedan, which announces a 
return to the sanctity of the 'private', and emphasis upon the 
family and childcare. Equality gives way to a celebration of 
difference and, in Greer's case, a utopian idealization of the 
extended family 
- 
demonstrating that an awareness of the 
heterogeneity of female experience can lead to a celebration of 
individuality, rather than initiate feminist collectivity. 
Judith Stacey remarks that this new pro-conservative feminism 
discards 'the most significant contributions of feminist theory 
and, more alarmingly, provides in their place a feminism that 
turns quite readily into its opposite. '7 Such women, who became 
public figures through feminism, continue to be received as 
feminists, and the feminist explosion of the 1960s and 1970s 
appears to risk implosion under the sheer weight of its 
contradictions. It is crucial, therefore, to focus upon 
contemporary issues which, depressingly, often turn out to be the 
'old' issues in a new guise. The popular conceptions of feminist 
and Left-wing politics have suffered badly under the present 
government, and this must be largely attributed to a failure to 
recognize the ideological impact of the New Right, and the 
failure to devise a means of response. Feminists have always 
sought to avoid the 'star system' inherent in political 
manoeuvring, but recent developments in both politics and the 
media suggest a pressing need for a statement of intent, if not a 
mouthpiece for such intentions. 
One of the central lines of attack of radical feminist 
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politics 
- 
the anti-pornography movement, and the challenge 
against the continued sexual objectification of the female form 
- 
has itself been hijacked by New Right moralist agendas. I 
briefly discussed the paradox of the unholy alliance between 
activists such as Dworkin with moral purity campaigners in 
Chapter Three, an alliance which clearly throws up wider 
ramifications for feminist coalitional strategies. The fusion of 
anti-porn with pro-censorship campaigners arguably dilutes the 
force of radical feminism's original attack, which was directed 
against a patriarchal ideology that utilizes the sexualized image 
of the female in all its cultural productions. Commentators such 
as Margaret Hunt have indicated that the moral crusaders' concept 
of obscenity and female degradation relies upon significantly 
different notions of 'appropriate' representations of women than 
does feminism: 
Feminists should be casting their nets both more 
carefully and more widely. It is madness to put new 
repressive tools into the hands of the state at a time 
when conservatism is riding high (perhaps at any time). 
A better strategy, which some feminists in both England 
and North America are already pursuing, is to infiltrate 
the TV and radio networks, develop alternative media, 
formulate subtler and better analyses of the 
intersections of power and representation, break straight 
white monopolies on all kinds of image production, not 
just pornography, and make coalitions with other groups 
traditionally excluded from the making of images. 8 
Hunt recommends coalitions, nonetheless, but only with groups 
that have themselves suffered exclusion at the hands of the 
mainstream; in addition, her recipe for change includes gestures 
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towards offensive rather than defensive operations as an 
effective mode of resistance. 
I believe that feminist academics, at least, are on the 
offensive in the nineties, particularly since the increasing 
sophistication of the 'men in feminism' debate has encouraged 
interventions by adversaries as well as allies. In 1992 American 
journalist Susan Faludi's Backlash was published in Great 
Britain: its title alone identifies the crux of the crisis in 
current feminism, which ought not to be attributed to a simple 
'breaking of the ranks' among some of the most important feminist 
voices, but rather to the means used to undermine feminism's 
influence in society at large. In her book, Faludi tackles the 
dominant theme of apologists for 'post-feminism' 
- 
that 
feminism's battle for social and economic equality has made women 
depressed, susceptible to stress-induced illnesses, and even 
infertile. 
The backlash is at once sophisticated and banal, 
deceptively 'progressive' and proudly backward. It 
deploys both the 'new' findings of 'scientific research' 
and the sentimental moralizing of yesteryear; it turns 
into media sound bites both the glib pronouncements of 
pop-psych trend-watchers and the frenzied rhetoric of New 
Right preachers. The backlash has succeeded in framing 
virtually the whole issue of women's rights in its own 
language. 9 
Faludi incisively demonstrates that the biggest danger 
confronting feminism today is the meanings attributed to it by 
the media and politicians alike, and the way that it has 
accordingly become an effective scapegoat for society's ills. 
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Neil Lyndon's No More Sex War was also published in 1992, 
predictably accompanied by a blaze of publicity that overshadowed 
Faludi's work. Several months before the book's publication, 
Lyndon was given space in the 'quality' newspapers to outline the 
terms of his critique of feminism, which rest largely upon his 
conviction that 'modern feminism was rooted in the totalitarian 
attitudes of the late Sixties when, in its search for a "class 
enemy", the New Left in America and the rest of the West 
appropriated the axioms of Black Power about white "honky" 
culture and applied them to sexual politics. " O Such beliefs, 
which are being voiced with increasing regularity, are 
underpinned by conceptions of feminism as orthodoxy; and as the 
above quote suggests are bolstered by a fear that outgroups such 
as blacks and feminists are undermining some of the most 
cherished features of 'our' culture. Responses to feminism's 
perceived threat are regularly cast in the language of nostalgia, 
which as Doane and Hodges point out, 'is not just a sentiment but 
also a rhetorical practice'. " In other words, the practice of 
'nostalgic' writing often claims recourse to a pre-existent 
'reality' and naturalness of a certain set of social relations 
that any radical discourse threatens to destabilize. It is a 
popular form of reaction, because it offers its readers the 
comfort of the myth of a past status quo which has been 
wrongfully swept away. 
With regard to feminism, as I have suggested, there has been a 
steady stream of such work since the seventies, and on the one 
hand this is itself a tribute to feminism's power to unsettle the 
popular consciousness; yet there are necessarily consequent 
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dangers in that 'The popularity of nostalgic texts and the power 
of these texts to appropriate dissident voices must be read as a 
massive effort to discredit and control feminist and other 
radical writing. '13 Anti-feminist work does not always come in 
predictable guises, and sometimes the most threatening and 
difficult to challenge is that which uses the discourse of 
feminism, or at least refers to it with an aura of scholarly 
knowledge. Camille Paglia, s Sexual Personae (1992) would be an 
example of this, where the writer situates herself as a 
disenchanted feminist, who now recognizes the pull of 'naturally' 
inscribed differences between the sexes and their contribution to 
men and women's predestined social roles. Even the phenomenon of 
the 'new man' 
-a term used to describe men who have acknowledged 
gender roles as oppressive, and have attempted to raise their own 
consciousness around the constraints of masculinity - is often 
ridiculed as an illustration of how feminism feminizes men. It 
is rare to find a positive appraisal of the new man that is not 
punctuated with scepticism and gloom; 13 yet its emergence as a 
term is at the least a backhanded tribute to feminism's power to 
infiltrate the popular consciousness - although as yet we have 
little control over the shaping of popular 'feminism'. 
One of the reasons that I have chosen to devote a good deal of 
this thesis to a critical re-evaluation of movement and 
transformation in the Women's Movement since the late sixties, is 
not to celebrate the evolution of feminist thought into the 
highly sophisticated academic business it has become. It is 
important to re-remember its origins in diversity, which in many 
ways explain its conceptual difficulties as well as its 
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strengths. As the editorial in the Spring 1989 edition of 
Feminist Review put it, 'feminists have learned 
- 
often painfully 
- 
that women's liberation, indeed any social movement, has no 
single point of origin; it is born in a diversity of times and 
places. 114 Much of this diversity has been essential to the 
development of a feminist position which can take account of the 
heterogeneous subject identities women achieve in their specific 
ethnic/cultural and historical locations. Perhaps we might 
establish some common ground with postmodernist thought in 
arguing that feminism's chief successes have been when they have 
devoted their attention to the constellation of power relations 
that are perpetuated at local and immanent levels. Certainly in 
an environment where the most basic demands of Women's Liberation 
have yet to be met 
- 
such as equal rights, equal pay, and the 
socialization of domestic labour 
- 
feminism must take heart from 
its origins in diversity, and use this as an object lesson in the 
necessity to keep shifting its focus, evading if not totally 
avoiding the absorption of a backlash. 
If I had started the work on this thesis some years later, I 
suspect that its structural logic would have been somewhat 
different; in particular, I might not have adopted the logic of 
thinking in feminist 'strands' to facilitate a critical overview. 
For many contemporary feminists, the premises of such divisions 
have become stale already, and studies of points of conflict and 
comparison between opposing positions is the preferred critical 
stance. 15 The title of this work itself suggests my profound 
conviction that conflict and heterogeneity are workable points of 
departure for a feminism that now has to contend with an 
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atmosphere of institutional absorption and political reaction. 
One of the most important intentions of this work was to link up 
the 'old' views of the 1970s and early eighties with the 'new' 
wave of ultra-sophisticated feminist theory, in order to argue 
that early Second Wave thinking is neither outmoded nor 
dispensable. 
There are of course dangers in foregrounding feminism's 
conflicts without suggesting that they are positive and organic 
to the wider aims of feminist discourse, which constantly remakes 
itself in newer guises of resistance. In this light the work of 
recent black feminist theorists such as Patricia Hill Collins can 
be viewed as a salutory example of theory which places sites of 
conflict and internal debate in the background, favouring an 
emphasis upon the common roots and extra-theoretical supports for 
modern black feminist thought. 16 Her account of the development 
of black feminist thought includes references to fiction, 
journals, blues lyrics; in addition she identifies a tradition 
among American black communities where mothers teach their 
daughters independence and self-confidence from an early age, in 
order to combat dominant ideological strategies which otherwise 
might convince black women of their continued cultural 
invisibility. Not all of these women, as mothers, singers or 
writers would conceive of themselves as feminists, but their 
special language of resistance created the conditions of 
existence for black women to conceive of themselves as feminists 
whilst simultaneously denying the centrality of the white 
feminist tradition. 
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Nonetheless, most black feminists are adept at identifying 
connections between their work and that of white feminists 
- 
unfortunately the reverse is rarely true. I think that white 
feminism could learn many lessons from black feminism 
- 
one of 
which would be to reconceive what is often perceived as black 
feminism's relative theoretical 'naivety'. What is often 
neglected when feminisms are judged in terms of their 
'sophistication' is that an important function of black feminism 
has been to keep alive the vitality of the social and political 
environment from which it emerged, particularly evident in 
celebrations of past black female activism and epistemological 
radicalism. In general, white feminists have lost any sense of a 
tradition of feminist thought 
- 
even the legacy of the seventies 
is neglected. Much of it may seem naive, ill-conceived and 
contentious, but it is evidence of a moment of success for women, 
when many chose to 
fearing reprisals 
endeavoured to devi 
of ordinary women. 
locating points of 
blindness to other 
identify themselves as feminists without 
- 
such as being dubbed man haters 
- 
and 
elop a theory which had a bearing on the lives 
This is not to undermine the importance of 
tension in such works 
- 
especially elements of 
forms of oppression which shape women's lives. 
Something that has struck me most powerfully in writing this 
thesis, is that feminism as a site of contested meanings and 
strategies is increasingly problematized by the amount of 
feminist texts that emerge and sink rapidly out of print, while 
others survive and become landmarks in feminist thought. We need 
such 'landmarks' in order to communicate to others who wish to 
investigate the origins of Second Wave feminism. Yet their 
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continued existence in face of others' extinction gives the lie 
to the notion that a 'history' of feminist ideas is easily 
traceable and exists as a concrete phenomenon, whereas 'what is 
taken as history are some privileged and published histories of 
feminism, which have been all too quickly naturalized. '17 
Although the last chapter of this thesis has been devoted to 
the abstractions and collisions in theoretical links made 
by/within feminism, it is important not to lose sight of the 
early aims of Second Wave Feminism. No matter how simplistic 
some of their constructions seem today, early critiques made 
those important steps towards forging a language specific to the 
experiences of women, whilst simultaneously facilitating the 
articulation of such experiences as manifestations of oppression 
by gender. In the race for theoretical sophistication it is easy 
to forget feminism's main aim as a tool of communication 
available to all women who desired means to express the specifity 
of their own hardships. Buzz words such as 'patriarchy' and 
'gender socialization' have been challenged for their 
over-simplistic universalism, and up to a point these criticisms 
are pertinent, particularly reconceptions of patriarchal power 
and gender divisions which deny women the simple 'luxury' of 
being victims to a huge anonymous system of power wielded by 
biological males. Yet these terms, contested from the moment 
they were coined in a feminist context, provided the beginnings 
of a language of resistance, even though it is often hard 
from 
our perspective in the nineties to recapture, for example, what 
was so earth-shattering about Germaine Greer's Female Eunuch or 
Kate Millett's Sexual Politics. Sheila Rowbotham echoes these 
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sentiments when she recalls 'I remember when it was not obvious 
that housework was work 
- 
hence the initial excitement created by 
this assertion. '18 
In tandem with the emergence of works of high feminist theory, 
there appeared publications such as Rowbotham's retrospective, 
The Past is Before Us (1989) and Michelene Wandor's Once a 
Feminist (1990), which attempt to offer personal and collective 
memories of the Women's Liberation Movement which are accessible 
and interesting to all women. There is no easy solution to the 
atmosphere of exclusionism endemic to a feminism which now does 
most of its maturing in universities, and where elements of 
cultural elitism are difficult to avoid. Nonetheless, it is 
worth recalling the writings of working-class women like Evelyn 
Tension, who entered feminism and attended conferences and 
meetings only to find that 'it's about hearing millions of words 
flying around our heads and it's not that we don't understand 
them, it's that they come from a different reality, a 
middle-class women's consciousness. '19 I would affirm the 
necessity for feminism to perpetually extend its scope, to 
interrogate its apparent past errors of judgement. Yet this 
widening of view should be supported by an awareness of why we 
continue to rejuvenate feminism in a semi-autonomous discursive 
field (yet remaining aware of its entrapment within dominant 
discursive practices), and specifically of the political reasons 
for this continuation. I have tried to look back, not to seek 
the origins of an authentic Second Wave consciousness in the 
interstices of our recent history, or to assert that there has 
been an evolution in thought in any simplistic sense, but to 
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resist the 'sad conclusion' expressed by Josephine Donovan in the 
epigraph to this conclusion 
- 
that to lose the sense of what has 
gone before is to be burdened with the task of constantly 
reinventing the wheel. 
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